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iii. Abstract 
It is widely assumed that people have direct access to knowledge 
about themselves, such as their preferences or propensities to behaviour.  
However, research has shown that people often accept bogus feedback about 
personal characteristics and decisions, even when it completely contradicts 
information they stated previously. This thesis investigates two examples of 
such feedback acceptance, the Barnum effect (Meehl, 1956) and choice 
blindness (Johansson, Hall, Sikström & Olsson, 2005), to explore the 
conditions required for false feedback to create a false perception of one’s 
choices.  
The Barnum effect refers to the tendency to accept false feedback 
about one’s personal characteristics when it is thoughts to be derived from 
personality measures. The first paper explores whether undergoing the 
Barnum effect can influence people’s perception of choices they would make 
in the future. We find that whilst the Barnum effect does occur, this does not 
alter people’s self-reported propensity to behaviour. 
Choice blindness demonstrates that, following a choice, people are 
often willing to accept the non-selected alternative as the indicated outcome, 
if this is suggested by feedback. The remaining work presented here 
investigates which parameters of choice and feedback can determine how 
likely it is that people will experience choice blindness. The results suggest 
that people’s susceptibility to choice blindness varies with the number of 
alternatives presented in the choice task, the framing (positive or negative) of 
the task itself, and whether the option presented as false feedback was 
encountered as part of the choice, in a different context, or not encountered at 
all.   
I conclude that the effects of false feedback on self-perception are 
situation dependent, however, difficult to eliminate completely, at least in 
some domains. The implications are discussed in light of past literature on 
false feedback effects, as well as related fields such as preferential choice, 
introspection, error detection and behavioural change.  
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Chapter 1. 
Introduction 
Consider a world where instead of choosing what you prefer, someone 
else informs you of your preferences. For example, you sign up to a dating 
website where you are allowed to examine the photographs of all the possible 
people you could choose to meet. You carefully consider the possible options 
and decide on one finalist. You then receive a confirmation of the person you 
selected to meet. However, the dating company has decided that it is better 
equipped to decide what you would prefer and send you a photograph of a 
person you did not choose. In this fictitious world, you cannot keep track your 
own choices, and do not notice that your original choice has been replaced 
with a different person entirely, simply accepting the information provided as 
your selected preference, and happily prepare for the date with your dream 
partner.  
Most people would consider such a world very different from the one 
we live in: the inability to monitor our own choices and preferences is hard to 
imagine for a normal functioning human being. Although the scenario 
described above is fictitious, the phenomenon of choice blindness suggests 
that if placed in that situation you may react in exactly the way described. 
Choice blindness was first reported in 2005, when Johansson and colleagues 
(Johansson et al., 2005) found that when presented with the task of justifying 
a previously preferred alternative from two female faces, people fail to notice 
if the choice presented is not the one actually selected. Furthermore, the effect 
occurred even if the face presented was dissimilar to the one selected, and the 
justifications provided were found to refer to features only present in this non-
chosen face. 
The current thesis stemmed from my own initial doubts that we are 
inherently bad at knowing what we might have, or in fact have, preferred in 
the very recent past, leading to a search of an extraneous variable that might 
explain or eradicate the phenomenon of choice blindness. My approach to the 
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research, however, evolved to treating choice blindness as a continuous 
measure of choice stability, to try and understand what factors can minimise 
the effect. Consider the earlier example of a dating agency sending you the 
photograph of the person you did not prefer. What would have happened if 
they sent you a photograph you did prefer, but asked you to explain why you 
rejected the person depicted? Or alternatively, if they simply sent you a 
photograph of someone you have never seen before, indicating that this was 
in-fact your selection? These are the kind of questions I try to address in my 
research, through measuring participants’ ability to detect the erroneous 
nature of the outcome of their behaviour, or choice blindness.  
I also extend my research of choice stability to a closely related but 
distinct phenomenon, the Barnum effect, testing whether altered personality 
feedback can influence subsequent preferential choice. Whilst the study of 
the Barnum effect may appear to be somewhat out of place, the range in 
research reflects the selection of the studies presented here from a wider body 
of experiments conducted over the course of the last three and a half years. 
Other research topics considered but not presented here include the effects of 
false feedback about a learnt categorisation task on subsequent reaction times 
exhibited if the task is repeated; effects of repeated choice blindness 
manipulation on risk preferences; and how the co-occurrence of seemingly 
irrelevant features in repeated choice can create subsequent biases for 
alternatives exhibiting such features. The four papers presented here were 
chosen partially because they address one specific domain, forming a 
coherent thesis, and because they were deemed to be of sufficient power and 
rigour to meet publishable standards. 
The research presented in this thesis consists of four papers, with 
papers II-IV at its core dedicated to understanding which variables can affect 
choice blindness and thus choice monitoring. The papers are summarised in 
chronological order in the next section. Paper I explores the Barnum and its 
impact on proceeding decisions. Paper II examines how increasing the 
number of choice alternatives, from two to three, affects the proportion of 
people who detect a switch of their chosen alternative, as well as establishing 
how similarity and attractiveness of the presented alternatives may impact 
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switch detection for ternary and binary choice. Paper III examines how 
positive versus negative question framing of the choice and justification tasks 
may impact the proportion of people who detect a switch of their choice. 
Paper IV examines whether choice blindness is confined to the alternatives 
presented in the choice or whether we can be “fooled” into believing that we 
have chosen an alternative that was not even available to us. 
Although each study addresses a distinct question, the four papers 
largely share their domain and methodological approach, examining the 
circumstances under which people accept false feedback about their 
personality (Paper I) or past choices (Paper II-IV).  
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1.1 Summary of Papers 
This thesis consists of four papers on the general topic of people’s (in) 
ability to recognise false feedback, summarised here to support the readers’ 
understanding of the introductory chapters. Paper I examines the Barnum 
effect, whilst papers II-IV focus on the choice blindness phenomenon.  The 
papers are presented in chronological order, as in some instances later studies 
build on earlier work. More specifically papers III and IV build on stimuli 
established in paper II. Links with other work conducted will be noted where 
relevant.  
1.1.1 Paper I – The Barnum effect and its consequences: 
can bogus feedback change behaviour. 
The ‘Barnum effect’ refers to individuals’ tendency to rate bogus 
descriptions of their own personality as highly accurate, because these 
descriptions have supposedly been tailored specifically to them (Meehl, 
1956). Past research has shown that experiencing the Barnum effect can 
impact future behaviours. More specifically, Halperin and Snyder (1979) 
have shown that when participants accept feedback that suggests higher 
potential to change, they are more responsive to phobia therapy. Sakamoto, 
Miura, Sakamoto and Mori (2000) further show that feedback suggesting 
higher levels of extraversion results in participants being more interactive 
with strangers. Unfortunately, the research demonstrating the effect has failed 
to use appropriate control groups, or a gender-balanced sample, and utilises 
seldom-used individual difference measures. Paper I uses well-established 
personality and risk attitude measures to induce the Barnum effect, and 
investigate any subsequent impact this may have on self-reported propensity 
to volunteer for psychology experiments and make risky choices respectively. 
The research is comprised of two experiments. Both experiments examine 
participant behaviour following real, as well as altered feedback, in order to 
provide an appropriate baseline for accurate interpretation of the results. In 
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addition, the consequences of the Barnum effect are examined using a mixed 
gender sample for the first time. 
Experiment 1. Participants completed a Big Five personality 
assessment (Goldberg et al., 2006) followed by receiving personalised 
feedback on their performance. Whereas some participants received real 
feedback, for others the scores were altered in a direction pre-determined by 
a randomly allocated condition. Feedback was altered to suggest either traits 
associated with low likelihood to volunteer for a psychology experiment, or 
high likelihood to volunteer for a psychology experiment (the associated traits 
were established in a pilot study). The participants were asked to rate the 
accuracy of the presented feedback, to establish whether the Barnum effect 
had occurred. Lastly, the participants answered four questions on 
volunteering behaviour: rating their likelihood to volunteer for online, phone, 
face-to-face, or group, psychology experiments.   
Experiment 2. Participants underwent a risk attitude questionnaire 
(Blais & Weber, 2006), and were provided with feedback on their ethical, 
financial, recreational and social risk attitudes. High scores indicated risk 
seeking attitudes, whereas low scores indicated risk averse attitudes in the 
specified domain. For some participants, their scores on the financial risk 
attitudes were either enhanced to suggest higher risk preference, or lowered 
to suggest risk aversion. Participants were asked to rate the accuracy of the 
feedback presented, and lastly completed ten preferential choice decisions 
between risky and certain lotteries.  
Both experiments successfully induced the Barnum effect, to the 
extent that participants rated altered feedback as more accurate than chance. 
The effect was, however, asymmetrical for both experiments. In experiment 
one, people rated personality feedback as less accurate when it was altered in 
the direction associated with low likelihood to volunteer for experiments, 
compared to when it was altered in the direction associated with high 
likelihood to volunteer, or not altered at all. For experiment two, participants 
rated the feedback as less accurate when the risk feedback was altered to 
suggest increased financial risk preference, compared to decreased financial 
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risk preference or real feedback. We propose that this may be the result of 
volunteering behaviour and low risk preference being regarded as socially 
desirable, resulting in feedback suggesting a propensity to such behaviours 
more likely to be accepted by the participants due to its positive nature 
(Macdonald & Standing, 2002). Regardless of the manner in which the 
feedback was altered, both experiments failed to induce any significant 
changes in the subsequent self-reported propensity to behaviour.  Any 
differences in the responses are so small, that the data appears to be much 
more likely to be obtained under the null hypothesis compared to the 
hypothesis that believing false feedback can alter subsequent responses. It 
seems that people do tend to “accept” false feedback, but do not alter their 
understanding of themselves substantially enough to affect subsequent 
predictions about their behaviours.  
Whilst experiencing the Barnum effect does not appear to alter 
people’s choices, the related phenomenon of choice blindness shows that 
using false feedback about the choice itself can directly alter the perception 
of one’s choices. Choice blindness refers to people’s inability to detect the 
switch of a stimulus they selected as their preference in a choice task, with 
the non-selected alternative, during feedback (Johansson et al., 2005). Given 
the similarity between the two phenomena (both use false feedback to impact 
self-perception), a partial aim of paper I was to explore potential parallels 
between the Barnum effect and choice blindness, as the substantial literature 
base on the Barnum effect could have proven very useful for understanding 
choice blindness if the two processes were to be considered the same. 
Specifically, it was anticipated that participants could undergo the same 
process when faced with false information in both paradigms, thinking ’I must 
be the kind of person who would choose X’, and adjusting choice perception, 
and subsequent choices accordingly. Whilst this process may occur for choice 
blindness (Johansson et al., 2005; Johansson, Hall, Tärning, Sikström & 
Chater, 2014), paper I suggests this is not the case for the Barnum effect, 
although the reason for this discrepancy remains unclear. To gain better 
understanding of the nature of false feedback effects the subsequent papers 
focus on choice blindness directly, drawing hypotheses from the broader 
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literature on preferential choice, building on our knowledge of variables that 
impact choice stability (or consistency). One such variable is the size of the 
choice set from which the participants make their selection (e.g., Collins & 
Vossler, 2009) which is investigated in paper II.  
1.1.2 Paper II – Ternary choice blindness: increasing the 
number of choice alternatives enhances the detection of 
mismatch between intention and outcome. 
Choice blindness, or the failure to detect a mismatch between the 
intended outcome of a choice task and an erroneous outcome presented as 
feedback (Johansson et al., 2005), has become a well-established 
phenomenon. It has been demonstrated across various decision types and 
domains (e.g., personal finance – McLaughlin & Somerville, 2013; haptic 
stimuli – Steenfeldt-Kristensen & Thornton, 2013; eyewitness testimony – 
Sagana, Sauerland & Merckelbach, 2013), however, has been largely limited 
to binary choice. Past research has shown that increasing the number of 
choice alternatives can play an important role in preferential choice (e.g., 
Collins & Vossler, 2009). Accordingly, we explored how increasing the 
number of decision alternatives to three options affects the proportion of 
people who detect a switch between intended outcome and the one presented.  
In line with the majority of choice blindness research, we used female 
faces to create the binary and ternary sets of stimuli to be used in the choice 
blindness paradigm. Since similarity has been shown to impact choice 
blindness in past research (e.g., Sagana et al., 2013; Steenfeldt-Kristensen & 
Thornton, 2013), the physical similarity and the similarity of perceived 
attractiveness of the sets was controlled for, using similarity and 
attractiveness ratings established in an earlier pilot experiment. For binary 
choice, the pairs were either physically similar or dissimilar, and of similar or 
different attractiveness to each other. For ternary choice, two of the 
alternatives were always similar physically and on attractiveness, whereas the 
third choice was either physically similar or dissimilar, and of similar or 
dissimilar attractiveness level to the other two faces. Additionally, the 
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perceived relative dissimilarity of a face was expected to be enhanced when 
presented alongside two alternatives, compared to one (Ariely, 2008), as a 
result of grouping (Tversky, 1977) and salience (Taylor & Fiske, 1978) 
effects, suggesting an interaction between the number of alternatives and 
similarity should be anticipated.   
Participants underwent a computerised, one shot decision variation of 
the choice blindness task online. The task consisted of making a preferential 
choice between two or three female faces, providing a confidence rating for 
the selection, and lastly explaining why a (non-chosen) face was preferred. 
The number of options, similarity and relative attractiveness of the facial 
stimuli were randomly allocated for each participant. Choice blindness was 
assessed using the justification provided, as well as by asking whether the 
participant noticed anything unusual post-task.  
Detection of the switch in outcome was higher for ternary compared 
to binary choice, but only when the face presented in the switch was visually 
dissimilar and of lesser attractiveness than the chosen alternative. The trend 
is in line with previous literature that suggests ternary choice leads to 
decisions that are more stable than binary choice. It is likely however, that in 
the current experiment the observed effect is a result of enhancing perceived 
differences between stimuli through altered salience, as opposed to a more 
generic mechanism previously proposed, such as the increase in the number 
of alternatives corresponding to the increase in likelihood that a suitable 
choice will be found (Caussade, de Dios Ortúzar, Rizzi & Hensher, 2005).  
Given the emerging relationship of choice blindness with the broader 
choice literature, the next experiment continued to investigate how factors 
known to impact choice stability interact with choice blindness. Specifically, 
paper III focuses on framing. Past research has demonstrated that when a task 
is framed negatively (asks participants to select the worst vs. best alternatives) 
participants exhibit higher consistency between choices and previously stated 
preferences (Kogut, 2011). Accordingly, we tested whether negative framing 
would also increase the proportion of people that detect a mismatch between 
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intended and presented outcomes, as would be expected for choices with 
better stability.  
1.1.3 Paper III – Choice blindness for preferred versus 
non-preferred stimuli. 
Procedural invariance, or the notion that the way in which the same 
question is asked should not affect the answer, is one of the fundamental 
assumptions of rational choice theory, yet past research has demonstrated that 
choosing versus rejecting alternatives can impact consistency of choices with 
previously stated priorities (e.g., Shafir, 1993; Kogut, 2011). In turn, the 
current paper examined how framing can impact the choice blindness 
paradigm. The classic choice blindness paradigm consists of asking 
participants to select their preferred option from two presented alternatives 
(the choice task), followed by displaying the option inconsistent with their 
choice and requesting a justification for the decision made (justification task). 
Not noticing the mismatch between the chosen and presented options is then 
classified as choice blindness. The current experiment manipulated the 
framing of the choice task, as well as the subsequent justification task in terms 
of participants’ preferred or the least preferred alternative. This formed four 
distinct variations of the task: the preferred or least preferred framing of the 
choice task, combined with either preferred or least preferred framing of the 
justification task. In line with past research, faces were used as stimuli. It was 
hypothesised that the participants who were required to select their least 
preferred face and explain why they did not prefer the (preferred) face would 
be most likely to detect a switch of their intended choice, as expected if 
negative framing is to lead to higher choice stability. 
Participants were randomly allocated to one of the four task 
variations. All participants chose either their most or least preferred 
alternative out of two faces and rated their confidence in the decision made. 
They were then presented with a face and asked to explain why they preferred 
or did not prefer the presented image. The face shown during this justification 
task, was always incongruent with the justification instructions. For example, 
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if asked to explain why they preferred the presented face, they were presented 
with the non-preferred alternative. At the end of the experiment, participants 
were asked to describe anything unusual they noticed during the task. This 
response was used to assess whether the participant had experienced choice 
blindness, alongside the analysis of justifications provided within the task. 
The findings suggest that participants are more likely to detect a 
mismatch when both the choice and justification aspects of the choice 
blindness paradigm are framed positively. In other words, when participants 
are asked to select their preferred alternative and explain why they chose the 
presented (non-preferred) alternative, as in the original choice blindness 
paradigm, participants are more likely to detect that their initial response does 
not match the outcome presented.  Participants who encountered the negative 
framing of either the choice or justification task, or both, did not differ in their 
likelihood of detection.  
The finding that positive framing leads to increased detection of a 
switched choice is somewhat surprising, as it suggests positively framed tasks 
lead to more stable preferences: the opposite to the pattern hypothesised based 
on past research by Kogut (2011). The paper puts forward a number of 
explanations for this discrepancy, from the possibility that mechanisms 
underlying choice blindness and choice consistency are, in fact, distinct, to 
procedural difference that may have impacted the effect such as the number 
of alternatives, and task format.  
The findings presented in paper III, suggest that choice blindness 
might be more distinct from other choice consistency measures than initially 
anticipated. This led me to consider properties of the choice blindness 
paradigm, which other choice consistency measures could not capture due to 
procedural limitations. One question that we can address with choice 
blindness, but not choice consistency paradigms, is whether people are able 
to detect a mismatch between their chosen alternative, and an alternative that 
was not even a part of the task, or an ‘imposter’ choice. This is the question 
considered in paper IV of this thesis. By investigating whether people’s 
acceptance of an imposter choice as their stated preference is dependent on 
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prior exposure to, or the level of interaction with, the imposter stimulus, we 
can enhance our understanding when and why choice blindness occurs.  
1.1.4 Paper IV – Choice blindness for stimuli external to 
choice. 
Whether choice blindness, or the failure to detect a mismatch between 
an intended choice and its outcome, is contingent on the stimulus presented 
being a part of the earlier undertaken task is unclear. In the current paper, we 
explored whether people accept an imposter choice regardless of having 
encountered it before; because they had seen it before; because they have 
evaluated it before; or because it was encountered as a part of comparative 
choice, even if that choice was separate from the one they are receiving 
feedback for.  
All participants made a choice between two female faces, and 
following a distractor task were presented with a face and asked to justify 
why they preferred that face. However, the face was always replaced with the 
one they did not choose, or in fact, an imposter that was neither of the faces 
presented in the original choice task. Depending on condition, the image 
presented was either a face they had never seen before; a face they were 
shown prior to the choice task; a face they were earlier asked to evaluate; or 
a face they rejected in a separate choice task, completed prior to the task they 
are receiving the feedback for. Choice blindness was measured by assessing 
the justification for responses provided (concurrent detection), as well as by 
asking participants whether they detected anything unusual after the 
experiment (retrospective detection).    
The results revealed that participants that were asked to explain why 
they selected an imposter face that they encountered in an earlier choice task 
exhibited a significantly lower level of detection, compared to participants in 
the other conditions. For conditions where the participants were asked to 
justify an imposter face that they had never seen before, or had encountered 
before but not as a part of a choice (just looked at the face in an array of 
options, or provided evaluative comments for the face as part of a distinct 
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task), a very low proportion of participants failed to detect that their choice 
had been switched, with less than fifteen percent experiencing either 
concurrent or retrospective detection. The findings demonstrate that 
deliberating an alternative as a part of a choice process plays a crucial role in 
determining whether choice blindness will occur. This can be interpreted in 
two possible ways: first, that the similarity of the contexts in which the actual 
chosen alternative and imposter alternative are encountered is crucial to 
choice blindness, or second, that the actual process of making a choice is 
crucial to inducing choice blindness. Since, a variation of choice blindness 
can be achieved using a judgement task (e.g., Hall, Johansson & Strandberg, 
2012), we conclude that the former explanation is more likely. 
The papers presented here demonstrate that choice blindness is likely 
to be guided by different processes to the Barnum effect (paper I), whilst 
being closely intertwined with the cognitive elements involved in making a 
decision (paper IV). I further conclude, that it is possible to manipulate the 
likelihood with which participants experience choice blindness (paper II & 
III), however, reducing choice blindness remains a challenge since increasing 
the number of alternatives only improves detection with very specific 
alternative properties (paper II), and the original choice blindness paradigm 
appears to already be framed in a manner that maximises the possibility of 
detection (paper III).  
Having presented the main findings of my work in this summary, over 
the next two chapters I will review the relevant literature pertaining to false 
feedback effects, specifically the Barnum effect, choice blindness, as well as 
broader areas of choice and self-perception. Chapter 2 will introduce false 
feedback effects, and their role within different areas of research, whereas 
Chapter 3 will outline factors that can impact false feedback effects and the 
possible explanations of the processes that give rise to such effects. The full 
papers will then be presented in Chapters 4-7, ending with a conclusion and 
summary in Chapter 8.  
  
  
23/215 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Literature Review 
24/215 
 
 
Chapter 2. 
False Feedback Acceptance: Why it 
matters. 
2.1 What are False Feedback Acceptance Phenomena?  
Feedback is fundamental to the behaviour of all living creatures. We 
rely on feedback on the biological level, to let us know if it gets too cold, or 
if we get thirsty; and on the behavioural level, for reward or punishment, to 
determine whether a behaviour should be repeated (Skinner, 1938; Ayllon & 
Azrin, 1968). Similarly, feedback features in most forms of higher cognition 
such as learning and general monitoring. For example, we use feedback to 
acquire speech by comparing the auditory feedback of the words we produce 
with those we are trying to imitate (Perkell et al., 1997); or to keep safe, by 
constantly processing environmental feedback about unexpected changes, 
such as shifts in motion or colour (Abrams & Christ, 2003; Boot, Brockmole 
& Simons, 2005). In a manner of speaking, all of our senses provide us with 
a form of feedback about our interaction with the environment. But, what 
happens when a piece of feedback we receive is incorrect, contradicting other 
sources of information such as our memory, knowledge of ourselves, or even 
the laws of physics? Would we be able to identify such information as false 
and ignore its implications, or would we accept it, updating our beliefs 
accordingly? To investigate this, psychologists have established a range of 
experimental approaches to investigate when we tend to accept false feedback 
and the implications of doing so.  
The study of false feedback acceptance can be broadly split into two 
categories, according to the type of feedback used: feedback about psycho-
physical processes and feedback about the psychological aspects of the self, 
such as attitudes, memories and behavioural propensities. This thesis focuses 
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on the latter, specifically exploring two types of paradigm: the Barnum effect 
(Meehl, 1956) and the choice blindness phenomenon (Johansson et al., 2005). 
Before proceeding with the detailed discussion of these effects, it is important 
to mention that as far as psycho-physical feedback is concerned, there seems 
to be a general consensus that altered feedback is widely accepted and is 
capable of changing our perception, and responses, accordingly. The most 
illustrative example of this is our ability to adapt to altered visual feedback, 
in the form of inverted perception (with the help of specially designed 
glasses). Research has shown that if everything we see is turned upside-down 
for a consecutive length of time, it takes as little as ten days for our vision to 
adjust completely, and perceive our surroundings as they would be without 
any inverting apparatus (e.g., Stratton, 1896; Erismann & Kohler, 1953). The 
research on false psycho-physical feedback has been widespread, ranging 
from examining how false feedback of our own actions can impact motor 
control (e.g., Fourneret & Jeannerod, 1998), to how altered auditory feedback 
of our heart-rate can affect perceived attractiveness (Valins, 1966), and has 
been advancing our understanding of human behaviour for over a century.  
The examples described above focus on augmenting environmental, 
or physical feedback that can be measured in an objective manner, for 
instance, the degree to which visual input is rotated, which can be established 
with great precision. The nature of feedback used in the early research on 
false feedback acceptance with regard to one’s psychological predispositions 
was very different, relying on vague and generalizable characteristics as the 
underlying properties that lead to acceptance of bogus, supposedly 
personalised, descriptions of the self (e.g., Forer, 1949; Sundberg, 1955). 
The tendency to accept such inaccurate feedback about one’s own 
personality was first reported by Forer in 1949. Forer administered a 
personality test to 39 of his students and pretended to score their tests to derive 
personalised feedback for each person. However, instead of scoring the tests, 
he gave the same feedback, copied from an astrology column of a newspaper, 
to all the students. The participants then rated how accurately they thought 
the feedback described them, resulting in an average score of 4.3 out of 5, 
suggesting high perceived accuracy of the statements provided. The findings 
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led Forer to conclude that when provided with general feedback that could 
apply to anyone, people tend to ignore its vague and widely applicable nature, 
and rate it as a highly accurate description of themselves. Forer described this 
phenomenon as the ‘fallacy of personal validation’, whilst literature initially 
referred to it as the ‘Forer effect’. The term ‘Barnum effect’ was later 
popularised by Meehl (1956), so named after P.T. Barnum – a circus 
entertainer with the catch phrase ‘we have something for everybody’. 
Since Forer’s (1949) experiment, the Barnum effect has continued to 
be successfully replicated. It has been demonstrated for feedback supposedly 
derived from a wide range of personality assessment tools, including 
astrology (e.g., Fichten & Sunerton, 1983; Glick, Gottesman & Jolton, 1989; 
Rosen, 1975), clinicians’ descriptions (e.g., Halperin, Snyder, Shenkel & 
Houston, 1976; Rosen, 1975; Snyder & Larson, 1972), and trait measures of 
personality (e.g., Furnham, 1989; Guastello & Rieke, 1990; Wyman & Vyse, 
2008), for both person and computer generated assessments (e.g., Baillargeon 
& Danis, 1984; Guastello & Rieke, 1990; O’Dell, 1972; Snyder & Larson, 
1972). Acceptance of bogus feedback also appeared to be influenced by the 
characteristics of the person assessing the accuracy of feedback (e.g., 
Furnham, 1989; Sundberg, 1955; Weinman, 1982), as well as the nature of 
the feedback itself (e.g., Johnson, Cain, Falke, Hayman & Perillo, 1985; 
Macdonald & Standing, 2002; for review see Dickson & Kelly, 1985; 
Furnham & Schofield, 1987; Snyder, Shenkel & Lowery, 1977). The risk of 
the Barnum effect was especially high if the generated feedback included 
vague (e.g., 'you enjoy a certain amount of change and variety in life'), 
double-headed (e.g., 'you are generally cheerful and optimistic but get 
depressed at times'), or favourable statements (e.g., 'you are forceful and well-
liked by others'), or described common characteristics of the subject's group 
(e.g., 'you find that study is not always easy', Sundberg, 1955; Dickson & 
Kelly, 1985).  
The findings raised widespread concerns across the field of 
psychology, as they questioned the validity of clinical and individual 
difference measures that were validated using subjective accuracy ratings (see 
Dickson & Kelly, 1985; Sundberg, 1955; Poškus, 2014 for discussion). 
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However, the interest in the Barnum effect has largely subsided over the last 
thirty years (Poškus, 2014), perhaps as a result of real personality measures 
becoming more established, and demonstrated to be less susceptible to the 
Barnum effect compared to the traditional vague and general ‘Barnum 
statements’ (Greene, Harris & Macon, 1979; Wyman & Vyse, 2008). For 
example, Wyman and Vyse (2008) found that when using feedback derived 
from the five-factor personality model (Costa & McCrae, 1985; Goldberg, 
1990), arguably the most widely accepted approach to personality 
assessment, participants were able to identify real feedback with better 
accuracy than chance, if presented with real and false personality profiles side 
by side. When presented with astrology profiles, however, their accuracy rate 
was approximately fifty percent. Although the concern regarding common 
use of general statements in accepted instruments may have become less 
consequential, research slowly began to turn its attention to the occurrence of 
the Barnum effect in more specific feedback types, to understand whether 
false feedback would be accepted even if it did not follow the generic 
characteristics associated with the Barnum effect.  
 Research using trait personality measures showed promising results, 
suggesting that specific feedback is less prone to the Barnum effect (e.g., 
Andersen & Nordvik, 2002; Wyman & Vyse, 2008). For example, Andersen 
and Nordvik (2002) demonstrated that the accuracy ratings of altered 
personality profiles decreased, as the difference between their real profile, 
and that presented to them, increased. Furthermore, studies have consistently 
showed that negative feedback was rated less accurately compared to real 
feedback (Johnson et al., 1985; Macdonald & Standing, 2002; for exception 
see Dmitruk, Collins & Clinger, 1973), supporting the notion that some types 
of feedback are less susceptible to the Barnum effect than others. Whilst the 
format used in real personality feedback appeared to outperform traditional 
generic feedback associated with the Barnum effect, examination of the actual 
ratings revealed that false feedback is still consistently rated as more accurate 
than the mid-point rating of ‘neither accurate, nor inaccurate’ (Poškus, 2014; 
Wyman & Vyse, 2008), even when the feedback presented was a full 
inversion of the real personality profiles. This indicates that whilst the 
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perceived accuracy of false feedback may reduce for specific and negative 
feedback types, to some extent participants are still prone to the Barnum 
effect.  
As evident from the research examples discussed, the definition of the 
Barnum effect has evolved over time. What started out as a term referring to 
acceptance of feedback that is vague and general enough to apply to anyone 
(Forer, 1949), has been expanded to refer to the tendency to accept any 
personality feedback as true despite its validity (Poškus, 2014). With the 
updated definition in mind, it is apparent that the Barnum effect is still 
relevant to individual difference research today, as well as a range of related 
fields. Whilst some progress has been made in identifying when and why the 
Barnum effect occurs, and the potential subsequent effects it can have on 
beliefs about the self and behaviours (see Chapter 3), there is still a lot to 
discover about the cognitive mechanisms involved in bringing it about and 
how beliefs about the self may be updated as a result. 
In 1974, Loftus and Palmer reported that people’s tendency to accept 
false information extends beyond abstract, hard to define, personal 
characteristics to actual memories of encountered information. In this classic 
paper two experiments were carried out to investigate how information 
embedded into questions can alter participants’ reports of car crash scenes 
previously shown to them in a movie.  In experiment one, participants saw 
seven films of traffic accidents, following which they were asked to provide 
their account of the events and answer a number of questions. One of the 
questions was "About how fast were the cars going when they hit each 
other?", however depending on the experimental group an equal number of 
participants saw words smashed, collided, bumped and contacted in place of 
hit.  Results demonstrated that the reported speed did indeed vary with the 
different verbs (40.8 mph for smashed, 39.3 for collided, 38.1 for bumped, 
34.0 for contacted and 31.8 for hit). In experiment two, participants repeated 
the procedure however only with the hit and smashed question variations.  A 
week later the subject came back and answered another set of questions, one 
of which was "Did you see any broken glass?". Fourty-seven percent of 
participants who were initially exposed to the smash variation of the question 
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answered that there was broken glass, compared to 16% who saw the ‘hit’ 
variation and 14% that did not encounter the question at all. The researchers 
concluded that implicit information contained in memory assessment 
questions can influence people’s memories.  
The ability to influence human memory through external information 
has become known as the misinformation effect capturing anything from 
minor memory alterations from contextual cues (e.g., Loftus, 1977), to 
creation of false memories (e.g., Roediger & McDermott, 1995) in over 200 
experiments (see Loftus, 1997). It is thought that deterioration of memory 
over time (e.g., Loftus, 2005), as well as aroused emotional state (e.g., Van 
Dame and & Smets, 2014) play an important role in determining malleability 
of the memory in questions, by weakening the memory and decreasing the 
likelihood that the information is noticed. Whilst information contained in 
questions is not a direct example of false feedback, it can be described as such 
as it provides a source of external information that can in theory be compared 
to the internal beliefs held.   
Johansson and colleagues (2005) introduced a new paradigm which 
demonstrated a more direct form of false feedback acceptance, furthermore 
without a significant time delay or the use of emotionally arousing stimuli. 
This paradigm, routed in the domain of preferential choice, became known as 
choice blindness. In the first paper to demonstrate choice blindness 
(Johansson et al., 2005) participants were required to select their preferred 
choice out of two pictures of female faces printed on pieces of card, over 15 
distinct choice trials. However, on the 7th, 10th and 14th trial, after the 
participants made their choice, the experimenter used a sleight of the hand 
trick to replace the selected face with the alternative, and participants were 
asked to explain why they selected the presented face. On the majority of 
trials participants (estimated as 74-88%) failed to notice the switch and 
proceeded with providing a justification. After the justification was provided, 
the researchers engaged in a conversation with the participant to try and 
establish whether they really did not detect the switch or just failed to report 
it. Even in such discussions, the majority maintained that they did not notice 
anything unusual. Furthermore, when the researchers analysed the reasons 
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participants provided for preferring the non-chosen alternative, the 
justifications often referenced features specific to the presented choice, 
suggesting that the effect was not a result of them failing to distinguish the 
two alternatives provided, or preferring the same features across the 
alternatives (Johansson, Hall, Sikström, Tärning & Lind, 2006).  
It must be noted that there are substantial similarities between choice 
blindness and the misinformation effect. Both approaches provide 
participants with information that alters the representations of past memories 
and choice respectively, altering the perception of events experienced in the 
past. There are however also differences, in that misinformation effect does 
not necessarily provide contradicting information but what is better described 
as additional information, that often cannot be described as categorically 
false. As previously mentioned, the core elements in the misinformation 
effect such as time delay and emotion also appear to have limited scope in 
their application to choice blindness. Whilst I would like to highlight the 
importance of the misinformation effect in emergence of choice blindness it 
remains unclear how much underlying cognition is shared between this effect 
and choice blindness (see Sagana, 2015) and a full discussion of the effect is 
outside the scope of this thesis, which sets out to explore the effects of 
definitively contradictory feedback. Accordingly, the discussion will proceed 
with a focus solely on the Barnum effect and choice blindness as a way of 
exploring false feedback acceptance. 
The choice blindness procedure of switching a chosen alternative, for 
a non-chosen one and asking participants to justify their choice has been 
applied to a range of domains since it was first reported,  including faces 
(Johansson, Hall & Sikström, 2008; Johansson et al., 2006), abstract patterns 
(Johansson et al., 2008), food and drink (Hall, Johansson, Tärning, Sikström 
& Deutgen, 2010; Somerville & McGowan, 2016), ingredient labels (Cheung 
et al., 2015),  personal finance (McLaughlin & Somerville, 2013), haptic 
choice (Steenfeldt-Kristensen & Thornton, 2013), school equipment and toys 
(Sauerland, Sagana, Otgaar & Broers, 2014), psychological symptoms 
(Merckelbach, Jelicic & Pieters, 2011), and witness testimony for incident 
details, faces and voices (Aardema et al., 2014; Cochran, Greenspan, Bogart 
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& Loftus, 2016; Sagana et al., 2013; Sauerland, Sagana & Otgaar, 2013).  
Some research followed the original procedure very closely. For example, in 
demonstrating choice blindness for the haptic, or the touch, modality 
Steenfeldt-Kristensen and Thornton (2013) asked participants to make 
preference decisions about pairs of common 3D objects that they could 
physically touch but not see, over 15 trials. Participants placed their hands 
into a specially constructed box in order to freely explore pairs of objects and 
verbally indicated a preference for one of them. Participants were asked to 
justify their choice and were allowed to haptically re-examine their preferred 
object. On three of these trials, a silent turntable was used to switch the 
preferred alternative, for the other alternative examined, before re-
examination. The switch was detected on 46 percent of the trials, indicating 
choice blindness does occur for haptic choice.  
Other studies adjusted the methodology to suit their needs (Hall et al., 
2010; Sagana et al., 2013). For example, Sagana and colleagues (Sagana et 
al., 2013) adapted the choice blindness paradigm to investigate false feedback 
acceptance in a field study of eyewitness recognition of people they had seen 
earlier, linking back to the misinformation effect (Loftus & Palmer, 1974) 
briefly discussed earlier. The researchers created a situation where passers-by 
encountered two individuals (under the pretence of tourists asking for 
directions), and after the interaction a third individual approached the person 
and asked if they would be willing to take part in the experiment. If consent 
was given participants were presented with two separate line-ups, consisting 
of six photographs, and asked to identify the first and the second individual 
encountered earlier (one from each line-up). After a distractor task, 
participants were then sequentially presented with the photographs they 
selected in each line-up and asked to motivate their decision, however, the 
choice made in the second line-up was always switched for a different face 
presented in that line-up. Despite the objective nature of the decision 
(recognition memory) and the field methodology, Sagana et al., 2013 
successfully demonstrated choice blindness, with approximately 40% of the 
participants failing to detect the switch in faces.   
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Since it was first introduced, the paradigm used to measure choice 
blindness has also been extended beyond discrete decisions, to scalar 
judgements (Hall et al., 2012; Hall et al., 2013; Merckelbach et al., 2011; 
Sagana, Sauerland & Merckelbach, 2014a).  Two approaches have been taken 
to changing the responses of the participants to achieve reversal in apparent 
preference. The first involves switching the statement the participants rated, 
but keeping the rating the same, and was used in demonstrating choice 
blindness with moral opinions (Hall et al., 2012). The experimenters asked 
participants to state their agreement with a statement on a pre-set scale and 
then used a magic trick to switch the statement, to its reverse (e.g., ‘large 
scale governmental surveillance … ought to be forbidden’ was changed to 
‘large scale governmental surveillance … ought to be permitted’). 
Participants failed to detect 52.8% of the switches. The other approach 
involved keeping the statements the same, but changing the rating themselves 
(Hall et al., 2013; Merckelbach et al., 2011; Sagana et al., 2014a). For 
example, Sagana and colleagues (2014a) asked participants to provide 
sympathy ratings for female faces on a scale of 1 to 10. The authors then 
presented the ratings back having altered responses by three points for 3 out 
of the 20 rated stimuli, and asked the participants to motivate their choices. 
This approach also successfully demonstrated choice blindness, showing that 
people were unable to detect the change in their stated response on 40.5% of 
the trials. 
As well as the procedure itself, the definition of it means for a person 
to be ‘choice blind’ has also varied across experiments. The first, and most 
commonly featured approach involved assessing the justifications provided 
by the participants for the switched choice (Johansson et al., 2005). The 
responses were assessed for any mention of a switch, erroneously selecting 
the wrong option, or any other indication that the option presented differs 
from the one they selected. This is termed ‘Concurrent detection’. The second 
approach is to assess ‘Retrospective Detection’ or the indication that the 
participants noticed the switch post experiment. This type of detection has 
been measured by asking participants to indicate whether they noticed 
anything unusual after the experiment. Additionally, some researchers have 
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also combined all forms of detection in their analysis, terming this ‘overall 
detection’. Each detection type listed here can produce a slight variation in 
results, specifically with overall detection yielding higher levels of detection 
compared to other types.  
Furthermore, there is always as subjective element in the analysis of 
verbal reports which is impossible to eliminate. For instance, if a participant 
gives negative evaluations such as ‘that alternative was unattractive’, without 
explicitly stating that their choice was switched, do we consider this to be an 
indication of detection or simply as a person’s preference for things 
‘unattractive’. Of course, in face to face studies the experimenter could 
request a clarification of such vague responses, yet this may in turn alert the 
participants to the switch that they may have overlooked before, artificially 
enhancing the level of detection.   As a result, the actual level of detection can 
only be estimated and is bound to change depending on methodology used. 
Nonetheless, there is abundant evidence to suggest that all types of detection 
demonstrate some level of choice blindness and we can still measure when 
the level of detection changes as long as a consistent measure is used within 
a study, and the manner in which verbal reports are analysed is clearly set out.  
In light of such variety of methodology used, when I discuss the 
choice blindness paradigm in the current thesis I refer to a whole host of 
procedural approaches that have been used to demonstrate the lack of ability 
to detect a mismatch between previously stated intentions and presented 
outcome. Every approach, however, is underpinned by the switch of a stated 
response, for one that is different. Choice blindness is then measured by the 
proportion of trials on which the switch was detected.  
Whilst the problems with procedural differences can be counteracted 
by using a consistent method of detection and comparing the different 
methodologies used, it does raise a theoretical question as to what it truly 
means for a trial to be detected. A mechanistic model would assume we create 
a representation of our choice, and compare it to the feedback presented, with 
detection of an error if the choice is sufficiently dissimilar to the one made. 
The higher levels of detection observed for retrospective compared to 
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concurrent detection however suggests that this is unlikely to accurately 
represent the true process taking place, as the process is clearly not an all or 
nothing event. Perhaps representing detection as a continuous variable that 
needs to reach a certain threshold for a ‘detected response’, such as likelihood 
of the information being incorrect (see Chapter 3.3), could account for such 
difference. For example, if we fail to detect a switch concurrently however 
judge the likelihood of the information being incorrect only slightly below 
the detection threshold, follow up questions about the accuracy of such 
information may raise suspicion and push the judgement above the threshold. 
In this instance, we may anticipate accurate feedback to be retrospectively 
judged as false on some trials due to the suspicion factor alone. Unfortunately, 
we do not have such data available and this will need to be researched in the 
future, but even with such knowledge it is difficult to understand what true 
detection means.  For instance, if people fail to report detecting the switch but 
experience some level of suspicion can a trial be really classed as non-
detected? In my own work, I take the view that in studying the weakness of 
human cognition it is important to capture all types of detection, as it is the 
deviation from rationality that poses the difficulty in describing the human 
mind. Exploring the trials classed as undetected using one measure but not 
the other remain of great interest however, and the underlying mechanisms 
and potential effects on subsequent memories and behaviour would comprise 
a fascinating topic for future research. 
 Despite the varied approaches and the wide range of domains in 
which choice blindness has been investigated, research has consistently found 
that people are prone to accepting false feedback about their choices 
regardless of methodology, although this has been found to vary with 
familiarity of the stimuli used (Somerville & McGowan, 2016), similarity of 
the items presented within the choice set (e.g., Steenfeldt-Kristensen & 
Thornton, 2013) and the time limit within which the choice needs to be made 
(e.g., Johansson et al., 2005).   
As well as which factors may influence the level of detection 
exhibited, some progress has been made in understanding what underlies the 
phenomenon (Pärnamets, Hall & Johansson, 2015; Sagana et al., 2014a; 
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Somerville & McGowan, 2016), and the possible subsequent effects 
experiencing choice blindness may have on preferential choice and 
judgement ratings (Johansson et al., 2014; Merckelbach et al., 2011). These 
advancements will be discussed in Chapter 3.  
Although the majority of research into the Barnum effect precedes 
choice blindness (see Poškus, 2014), there are a number of parallels that can 
be drawn between the Barnum and choice blindness phenomena. In a sense, 
both paradigms deceptively modify the outcome of choices in order to 
dissociate the actual and perceived behaviour, although this is achieved 
through manipulating aggregate scores as personality representations for the 
Barnum effect, whereas for choice blindness the individual outcome of a 
choice is manipulated. Similarly, the two types of invalid feedback 
acceptance played an important part in drawing attention to potential 
limitations of the methodology used in research, whilst Barnum effect 
cautioned the scientific community about using self-reported accuracy to 
validate individual difference measures, choice blindness has raised concerns 
about using participants’ choices as indicators of stable preferences.  
Overall, there is ample evidence to suggest that people often fail to 
identify false feedback about the self. This is evident in the literature on the 
Barnum effect and the choice blindness phenomenon. Whilst false feedback 
acceptance is well established, the factors that affect the likelihood of such 
acceptance, mechanisms that underlie it, and the possible consequences, 
require further research to establish a comprehensive understanding of such 
phenomena. This thesis aims to contribute to such understanding.  
The following sections of this chapter aim to describe the research to 
which false feedback acceptance may be relevant.  Specifically, I consider 
how our knowledge of false feedback acceptance relates to the study of 
introspection, or the access to knowledge about the self, and our ability to 
detect errors. In the last section of this chapter I consider the research on 
preferential choice, an area more specifically related to the choice blindness 
paradigm. 
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2.2 Introspection 
One research area closely intertwined with acceptance of false 
feedback is that of introspection and metacognition, or the understanding of 
one’s own thought processes. The very nature of accepting false feedback 
about the self demonstrates limitations of our introspective abilities. For 
example, when we readily accept a false personality profile of ourselves (e.g., 
Poškus, 2014; Wyman & Vyse, 2008), assuming the feedback is specific and 
is indeed inaccurate, we demonstrate an inability to compare the external 
information to our real personality traits, in turn failing to access information 
about the self that would be used in such comparison. Similarly, when we 
accept false feedback about our preferences (e.g., Johansson et al., 2005; Hall 
et al., 2010), we demonstrate a lack of ability to compare real preferences 
with the ones received during feedback, indicating that we fail to bring our 
real preference to mind. 
Our inability to access information about the self is surprising, given 
that most people can not only express their attitudes and preferences, but also 
provide coherent reasons for such characteristics, as well as overtly expressed 
behaviours. Nisbett and Wilson (1977) explain such discrepancy by 
demonstrating that the reasons people provide are often inaccurate, and are 
nothing more than causal theories, or plausible explanations that are not 
necessarily representative of the real cognitive processes undertaken. In one 
of the experiments presented by Nisbett and Wilson (1977), for example, 
participants were presented with an identical array of night gowns and 
instructed to select the one they prefer the most. They were then asked to 
explain why they chose the way they did. Although the selection presented a 
strong right-side bias (right most garment was most likely to be chosen), 
participants failed to report order of the garments as a factor affecting their 
choice, yet provided other apparently coherent reasons for their selection. The 
study demonstrated that participants were not able to access the ‘processes’ 
underlying their choices, and failed to recognise this lack of access, instead 
providing alternative causal theories for their behaviours. The phenomenon 
of constructing inaccurate explanations has become known as 
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‘confabulation’. This example is just one of a string of research by Nisbett, 
Wilson and colleagues (Nisbett & Bellows, 1977; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; 
Wilson & Nisbett, 1978) demonstrating behavioural effects that are not 
reflected in subsequent causal reports, or causal reports that do not reflect the 
processes revealed in behavioural measures.  
The work by Nisbett and Wilson (1977) has come under some scrutiny 
after its initial publication (White, 1988; see also Wilson, 2002). Specifically, 
questions were raised as to whether the methodology was sufficient in 
capturing the cues participants used to make their decisions, as well as the 
sufficiency of definitions for concepts such as ‘mental process’ and 
‘introspection’ itself (see White, 1988). Nonetheless, it is hard to argue with 
the observation that on a behavioural level, participants cannot accurately 
report what aspects of the environment influenced their choice. In addition, 
other areas of research have also documented our lack of ability to explain 
what guides behaviours. For example, subjects that perform behaviours 
outside of their control, such as under hypnosis or through magnetic 
stimulation of the brain, have been found to confabulate coherent reasons for 
their actions (Dywan, 1995; Brasil-Neto et al., 1992). Similarly, people have 
been found to confabulate internal explanations of their own behaviour (e.g., 
I must have liked that one more), when other visible external sources of 
explanation are not available (for discussion see Festinger, 1957; Bem, 1967). 
The choice blindness research provides further evidence that people 
tend to provide explanations for their choices that cannot possibly be accurate.  
Johansson et al.  (2006) demonstrated that participants provide coherent 
explanations for how they reached a choice that they did not, in fact, select, 
supporting the notion that there is a dissociation between the real cognitive 
process that took place to reach a decision and that suggested in the 
explanation provided. Furthermore, the researchers reported that in justifying 
the choice presented as feedback, participants tend to refer to the features 
specific to the presented alternative and not to the initially chosen one, 
indicating that people rely on external information to construct a plausible 
reason for their choice as opposed to inappropriately applying the real 
decision process that took place. 
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The accuracy of such introspective reports and the existence of 
‘insider’ knowledge of the processes undergone have formed a crucial, and 
yet unresolved, debate in psychology and philosophy alike. Whilst the 
prevailing view appears to remain that we have transparent access to our 
cognitive processes (see Carruthers, 2011), experimental research provides a 
growing evidence base highlighting the inaccuracies of self-report 
descriptions of processes that guide behaviour (see Wilson, 2002). The 
demonstration of choice blindness has once again re-ignited interest in this 
field of research (Wilson & Bar-Anan, 2008), posing an additional 
observation that sometimes people do not only fail to report how (or why) 
they reached a choice that they did, but are not even sure of what that choice 
was. Raising the question of what do we actually know about ourselves? 
It is rarely disputed that there are some situations in which we can 
access our attitudes, motivations and behavioural propensities. Such ability is 
demonstrated in our ability to reason out loud and monitor how closely we 
are following a plan (see White, 1988; Wilson, 2002). The reality appears to 
be that introspective access is situation and individual dependent, making it 
impossible to definitively say how much we know about our internal states 
and the processes underlying our behaviours. However, the variation in our 
self-knowledge appears to be systematic (consistently affected by 
characteristics of the situation, see section 3.1 for discussion) and therefore 
open to academic scrutiny. By studying environmental variables that affect 
false feedback acceptance we can establish when people are more likely to 
detect a mismatch between feedback and their own ‘mental states’ and thus 
measure when introspective access is stronger, or weaker.  
2.3 Error Detection 
Human behaviour is riddled with errors, and understanding how these 
errors can be minimised has been of great importance to a broad range of 
activities (see Rizzo, Ferrante & Bagnara, 1995).  For example, human error 
is the biggest cause of accidents in the aviation and medical industries, as well 
as work related accidents more generally (Amalberti, 2013; Sarter & 
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Alexander, 2000; Ghaferi, Birkmeyer & Dimick, 2009). However, successful 
organisations have been found to differ in their ability to detect and neutralise 
errors before they lead to irreversible consequences, and not in the initial 
amount of errors made (e.g., Ghaferi et al., 2009). Yet the propensity to 
perceive false feedback as accurate appears to demonstrate that on the 
individual level our ability to detect a mismatch in expected and actual 
information about the self is very limited, even when that information is 
collected and then changed in a controlled environment, with minimal 
environmental distractors and limited range of possible outcomes. Although 
the study of false feedback acceptance has been largely limited to feedback 
on personality traits and preferential choice, it seems to question the 
fundamental cognitive mechanisms that have been identified as necessary for 
error detection; (i) a feedback mechanism with some monitoring function that 
compares what is expected with what has occurred, and (ii) the ability of the 
cognitive system to catch a discrepancy between expectations and 
occurrences (Norman, 1981; Rizzo et al., 1995).  
In light of the limitations of introspective abilities discussed in the 
previous section (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) questioning the existence of 
an efficient error monitoring system may seem like a natural progression. Yet 
our inability to detect a mismatch between our stated preference and outcome 
are more surprising in the context of low level psychological processes such 
as motor control (e.g., Bernstein, 1967; Adams, 1971; Schmidt & White, 
1972; Schmidt, 1975; Scott, 2004). To illustrate, consider a study by 
Fourneret and Jeannerod (1998) which required participants to trace a straight 
line to a target approximately 20cm away. However, instead of being able to 
see the action of their arm directly, participants were presented with the 
feedback of their action on screen with a computerised cursor that distorted 
the movement. The study found that participants adjusted their behaviour 
according to the feedback, in other words, if the feedback deviation was to 
the right they moved their arm towards the left to compensate for this 
discrepancy and vice versa. The findings necessitate the ability to monitor the 
discrepancy between expected and actual outcomes, as otherwise it would be 
impossible to adjust the behaviour.  
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Although the study by Fourneret and Jeannerod (1998) reports the 
monitoring ability for real time processes that may appear to be distinct from 
the personality and choice literature, similarly successful error monitoring can 
also be observed in simple discrete decisions. For example, when choosing 
which button to press in response to a presented stimulus, participants 
successfully detect trials on which they select the wrong response even if no 
feedback is provided (Rabbitt, 1966). Indeed, error detection appears to be 
hard-wired within our cognition, with distinct neural processes dedicated to 
monitoring whether observed outcomes match our expectations (see Holroyd 
& Coles, 2002; Yeung, Botvinick & Cohen, 2004). More specifically 
electroencephalography (EEG) research has identified neural activity specific 
to error detection, termed the Error-Related Negativity (ERN; Gehring, 
1992). The ERN is a sharp negative EEG signal that typically peaks 80-150 
milliseconds after the motor response begins, and has been found in humans 
and non-human primates alike (e.g., Godlove et al., 2011) across a wide range 
of tasks (e.g., categorical discrimination –  Gehring, Coles, Meyer & 
Donchin, 1995; flanker task – Jodo & Kayama, 1992; Go/No Go task – 
Ruchsow, Spitzer, Grön, Grothe & Kiefer, 2005; Stroop task – Masaki, 
Tanaka, Takasawa & Yamazaki, 2001). Additionally, the ERN can also be 
observed in response to negative feedback received after the task. For 
example, when participants were required to press a button when 1 second 
had elapsed following presentation of a warning stimulus, and received 
feedback as to whether they were in an appropriate accuracy range, if the 
feedback indicated that the response was not within the criterion (negative 
feedback) it elicited an ERN (Miltner, Braun & Coles, 1997). The ERN 
exhibited in response to negative feedback is often termed the feedback ERN 
(fERN), and has now been well documented in research (e.g., Holroyd, 
Hajcak & Larsen, 2006; Moser & Simons, 2009; San Martín, Manes, Hurtado, 
Isla & Ibañez, 2010).  
Although to my knowledge neural activity of participants undergoing 
either the Barnum or the choice blindness paradigm is yet to be investigated, 
the very nature of wrong information being presented would, in theory, 
suggest that the same error-related neural activity should be anticipated. For 
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the Barnum effect, it could be argued that error detection and therefore ERN 
are not present because the expectations of the outcome are unclear due to 
lack of transparency of how responses are translated to the actual personality 
profile, and therefore there is a lack of comparison point for the feedback 
seen. Indeed, measures which have a clear relationship between the response 
and personality generated are less susceptible to the Barnum effect (see 
Furnham & Schofield, 1987, for discussion). On the other hand, the wide 
range of domains in which the Barnum effect occurs suggests that at least 
some of the experiments should contain a perceivable mismatch between 
reality and feedback. Without an exploratory study of the neural activity, 
however, it is impossible to conclude whether no ERN is present, or whether 
it does occur but does not translate to a conscious response.  
For choice blindness on the other hand, extrapolating findings from 
other choice tasks suggests that an ERN should be present. In fact, this may 
be the case on two accounts, first a direct mismatch of feedback to the action 
performed should result in ERN, second since presenting participants with 
the non-chosen alternative also entails presenting the less preferred outcome, 
or negative feedback, we can also anticipate a fERN. Without empirical 
research this is, of course, impossible to determine for sure, and the finding 
that the majority of people fail to notice when the feedback of their own 
choice is incorrect would suggest the opposite – since no error detection 
occurs it is unlikely that the associated neural activity does either. There is 
also another possibility, which is that the ERN does occur even for 
participants that fail to notice the error but it fails to reach the threshold 
necessary for the error to be detected in consciousness. It has indeed been 
reported that the ERN can be observed, albeit lower in strength, when 
participants make an error even when they are not consciously aware of this 
(e.g., Nieuwenhuis, Ridderinkhof, Blom, Band & Kok, 2001), suggesting that 
this may be a plausible hypothesis for the underlying neural activity in choice 
blindness.  
Whether false feedback acceptance occurs because of an absence of 
any error-related neural activity, or because such activity fails to reach 
consciousness, it is nonetheless surprising that despite an established neural 
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process in place to detect errors we often fail to do so.  It is, of course, possible 
that the specificity of domains used in false feedback acceptance research 
may be responsible for the uniquely poor error detection rates exhibited by 
participants. However, as you will see in the following chapters the range of 
domains that are prone to false feedback acceptance is very broad (e.g., Hall 
et al., 2010; McLaughlin & Somerville, 2013; Richards & Merrens, 1971; 
Sagana et al., 2013; Wyman & Vyse, 2008), suggesting that it is implausible 
that every domain selected is uniquely prone to poor error detection. It is 
however, also very clear that false feedback is not perceived as accurate one 
hundred percent of the time, and that the proportion of trials on which people 
do accept false information about their characteristics and preferences varies 
systematically depending on the precise nature of the task at hand (e.g., 
Andersen & Nordvik, 2002; Poškus, 2014; Steenfeldt-Kristensen & 
Thornton, 2013; Somerville & McGowan, 2016).  It is, therefore, crucial to 
investigate why error detection can be poor, and what factors are responsible 
for distinguishing between detected and undetected invalid feedback. This 
can not only help us understand how we operate on the cognitive and neural 
level, but also identify the best techniques that can be used to minimise error 
detection in real life settings.  
So far, in discussing introspective abilities and error detection 
mechanisms, I have tried to discuss the characteristics of human cognition as 
a whole, extrapolating between domains and behaviour types to try and paint 
a comprehensive picture of how people process information. In the next 
section, I will narrow the field of discussion specifically to preferential 
choice, as this is the main domain choice blindness research set out to explore 
(e.g., Johansson et al., 2005, 2008; Hall et al., 2010). Accordingly, the next 
section excludes the contributions of Barnum effect literature from the 
discussion. It must be noted that since choice blindness has been 
demonstrated for recognition of previously seen stimuli (Sagana et al., 2013), 
individual characteristic ratings (Sagana et al., 2014a; Sauerland et al., 2013), 
and perception of psychological symptoms (Merckelbach et al., 2011), it is 
likely that preferential choice is simply a sub-section of choice and judgement 
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more generally. Accordingly, much of the discussion can inform cognition 
beyond the confines of preferential choice alone. 
2.4 Preferential Choice 
Preferences are inherently subjective, varying from person to person 
depending on emotions, goals, past experiences and even biological 
differences. For most domains, it is, therefore, impossible to determine what 
constitutes a ‘good’ or rational choice. Consider for example the scenario 
outlined in the introduction (Chapter 1), where one is faced with the task of 
selecting a person they would like to date from a range of potential candidates. 
Whether they prefer a person who is tall or short, or blond or brunette, there 
is no objectively correct answer – only one that best matches the person’s 
subjective criteria. However, whilst one choice in isolation is hard to evaluate, 
a set of preferences in aggregate is expected to follow a certain pattern, which 
has long been of interest to psychologists and economists alike. This pattern 
is, in turn, thought to provide a benchmark against which the quality of 
choices can be evaluated. 
A term that best captures what we have come to expect from 
preferences is consistency (Rieskamp, Busemeyer & Mellers, 2006). Any sets 
of preferences held by a decision maker are widely assumed to be stable 
(consistent over time), and to have a stable order, where if alternative A is 
preferred to B, and B is preferred to C, A must also be preferred to C 
(consistent across alternatives – Houthakker, 1950; Arrow, 1959). It is further 
commonly accepted that subjects’ choices reflect this underlying preference 
order (Samuelson, 1938). For example, if we choose item A over item B when 
both items have the same associated costs we are thought to prefer item A, 
and unless some learning process takes place to alter this preference, 
repeating the task should yield the same result. These presuppositions have 
formed the basis of many influential theories (e.g., Samuelson, 1938; von 
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944), and are often applied in real world practice 
areas (e.g., marketing, consumer sales; see Jacoby, 2000).  
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The expectation that our preferences are broadly consistent is natural. 
After all, in other, more objective, forms of decision making inconsistent 
outcomes signal a problem. Even outside of the decision context, consistency 
is thought to play a fundamental part in attitude formation (e.g., Festinger, 
1957) and human behaviour more broadly (e.g., Ouellette & Wood, 1998). 
The stable and ordered model of preferences has also proven useful in 
describing how a rational agent should act if they are to avoid being open to 
manipulation. Consider the ‘money pump’ example commonly quoted in 
economics to illustrate the importance of preference stability, where a person 
prefers option A over option B, option B over option C, yet option C over 
option A.  In this example, we would expect a person to be willing to pay a 
small amount to upgrade option A to B, B to C and C to A, which would result 
in the end product being no different to that at the start, whilst the person 
would have made a loss. With a stable set of ordered preferences on the other 
hand, such manipulation should not be possible. 
Whilst a stable, ordered set of preferences provide a good description 
of how a completely rational agent would think, how far they describe real 
human behaviour has come into question over the past few decades. Research 
has increasingly shown that people’s choices are consistently affected by 
seemingly irrelevant aspects of the environment. Let us consider the violation 
of procedural invariance to illustrate this. Procedural invariance states that as 
far as we have a stable preference order, the method used to elicit preferences 
should have no impact on the person’s apparent preferential order (Slovic & 
Lichtenstein, 1968). However, in one scenario studied by Shafir (1993), the 
participants were given a choice between two ice creams; ice-cream one is 
very tasty but very high in cholesterol and ice-cream two is just moderately 
tasty. When participants were presented with the task of choosing their 
preferred option 72% selected the tasty alternative, however, when they were 
required to give up one of the choices only 55% rejected the non-tasty 
alternative, whereas the ordered preference approach would predict 
equivalent proportions in the two conditions. Similarly, Tversky and 
Kahneman (1981) demonstrated that people are equally easily swayed by the 
way the alternatives themselves are presented. The most commonly cited 
45/215 
 
example of this is that choices involving gains are often risk averse and 
choices involving losses are often risk seeking. Consider the scenario of 
preparing for an outbreak of a deadly Asian disease, which is expected to kill 
600 people. Here the participants are given a choice of saving 200 people for 
certain versus a 1 in 3 chance of saving everyone and 2 in 3 chance that no 
one will be saved. In this scenario, the majority of people selected the certain 
option. However, when faced with the choice of 400 people dying for certain 
versus 1 in 3 chance that no one will die and 2 in 3 chance that everyone will 
die, only a minority selected the first alternative. Mathematically the two sets 
of choices are identical, but merely described differently, yet the elicited 
preferences for two courses of action appear to change depending on how the 
alternatives are presented or ‘framed’. 
These examples of framing are by no means unique in challenging the 
notion of stable, ordered and revealed preferences, and many factors which 
should be irrelevant from a rational choice perspective have now been 
identified that can alter the elicited preferences of an individual, including the 
order of presentation (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), perceptual fluency (e.g., 
Reber, Winkielman & Schwarz, 1998) and the presence of a third, however, 
irrelevant, alternative (e.g., Huber, Payne & Puto, 1982) to name a few. 
Furthermore, even under a controlled environment when presented with a 
similar choice on two different occasions, people tend to change their minds 
around 25% of the time (e.g., Camerer, 1989; Hey, 2001; Loomes & Sugden, 
1998).  
Whilst problematic for rational choice theory, the study of choice 
inconsistencies and preference have allowed us to make considerable 
progress in describing real, human behaviours. The newly emerging 
descriptive models of choice have become more inclusive of variable and 
context dependent choices. The predominant themes to emerge have included 
recognising that decision are made under limited cognitive resources 
(bounded rationality – e.g., Simon, 1956), in a probabilistic rather than 
discrete manner (probabilistic choice – e.g., Block & Marschak, 1960; 
Rieskamp, 2008), and are at least to some extent constructed from the 
information in the surrounding environment (constructed preferences – e.g., 
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Payne, Bettman & Johnson, 1992; Slovic, 1995). Nonetheless, there is still no 
single model that perfectly describes all aspects of choice. Although research 
has shown that the rational choice approach fails to accurately describe 
human behaviour, some argue that we are still to create a theory powerful and 
comprehensive enough to put in its place (Posner, 1993, p367). In order to 
formulate comprehensive models and test the proposed governing rules of 
preferential choice, we need to provide more data that will allow us to test 
these models against real behaviours, and identify any choices that may 
deviate from what we would expect. 
Choice blindness provides one of the latest, and most striking, 
examples of violations of stable preference assumptions, what is more, is that 
it appears to do so within one choice. If we were to assume stable and 
accessible preferences, the occurrence of choice blindness seems very 
unlikely as we would be able to detect a mismatch between what we prefer 
and what we are presented with. Furthermore, if we fail to initially detect that 
the presented face is the wrong one, the action of providing a justification for 
choosing the wrong face should serve as an additional alert (i) as it would 
require us to attend to the stimulus at hand and (ii) as we would not be able 
to provide the justification, because we actually prefer the other alternative. 
Indeed, the implications of choice blindness present an important challenge 
that needs to be addressed if we are to progress in our understanding and 
description of human behaviour (Hall et al., 2010; Somerville & McGowan, 
2016). 
Choice blindness undoubtedly contributes to the bulk of research that 
has put the notion of a master list of preferences into question, it does not, 
however, negate the existence of preference altogether. Although the effect 
has been demonstrated across a wide range of domains (e.g., personal finance 
– McLaughlin & Somerville, 2013; haptic stimuli – Steenfeldt-Kristensen & 
Thornton, 2013; eyewitness testimony – Sagana et al., 2013), in some 
instances the levels of choice blindness have been found to be very low. For 
example, when presented with choices in a domain we are already familiar 
with less than a fifth of participants fail to report a mismatch between their 
choice and the feedback provided (Somerville & McGowan, 2016). This will 
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be further discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis, however, situations where 
choice blindness would seem extremely unlikely are not hard to imagine – 
such as choosing between being tortured and receiving a huge sum of money 
for example. Of course, this is speculative, but even strong proponents of the 
constructed preference approach agree that some preference are very stable, 
even from birth (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006), making mistaking a large 
reward for detrimental punishment unlikely (although I expect there would 
be one or two exceptions).  
One significant contribution provided by the choice blindness 
paradigm is a new tool that can help us better understand when, and hopefully 
more broadly why, we can detect a mismatch in exhibited behaviour and 
feedback available in our environment. As Payne et al. (1992) suggest, 
‘common sense dictates that consistent decisions are good decision’, and 
since it has been established with reasonable certainty that preferences are 
highly malleable by their environment the use of choice blindness allows us 
to establish in what circumstances choice consistency is best elicited. In the 
next chapter I will attempt to outline which factors in the environment can 
impact the likelihood of choice blindness being elicited, as well as the factors 
that affect the likelihood of accepting other forms of false information as 
demonstrated in the Barnum effect. This will be followed by a discussion of 
the role of false feedback in determining later behaviours, as well as the 
cognitive mechanisms put forward for explaining why false feedback 
acceptance occurs.  
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Chapter 3. 
False Feedback Acceptance: 
Properties, Influencing Factors, and 
Cognitive Mechanisms. 
3.1 Variables of Interest 
To recap, the Barnum effect refers to the tendency to rate invalid 
feedback about the self as highly accurate (Forer, 1949; Meehl, 1956), whilst 
choice blindness refers to the inability to detect a mismatch between an 
alternative we selected during a choice task, and a non-selected alternative 
presented as feedback (Johansson et al., 2005), and both demonstrate 
susceptibility to false feedback acceptance. An important question that lies at 
the core of this thesis is under what circumstance people are more (or less) 
prone to accepting false feedback about their own characteristics and 
preferences. In this section I will discuss the progress made in answering this 
question in past literature, in an attempt to summarise variables that influence 
false feedback acceptance (see tables 1 and 2, at the end of this chapter for 
summary of variable discussed for choice blindness and the Barnum effect 
respectively). Specifically, I will give consideration to the domain for which 
participants receive feedback, similarity and favourability of the false 
feedback used compared to the real outcome, ambiguity, and task parameters 
(specifically for choice blindness) such as time restrictions, framing and the 
consideration set. 
Barnum effect has been demonstrated for a wide range of tools used 
to measure individual characteristics. Whilst for the majority of assessment 
devices the elicitation of Barnum effect has been successful at least to some 
degree (e.g., Forer, 1949; Poškus, 2014; for exception see Layne, 1979), the 
accuracy ratings provided by participants have been known to vary 
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significantly depending on the tool used in question (Richards & Merrens, 
1971; Wyman & Vyse, 2008; for review see Dickson & Kelly, 1985; Furnham 
& Schofield, 1987; Snyder et al., 1977). For example, people have been 
shown to discriminate between real and false feedback better when that 
feedback is in the format used by valid personality measures compared to 
astrology (Wyman & Vyse, 2008). There is also some variation between the 
different recognised personality measures, with invalid feedback generated 
using the Rorschach test more likely to be rated as accurate compared to the 
Bernreuter Personality Inventory and the Life History Battery (Richards & 
Merrens, 1971). The false feedback accuracy ratings have also been shown to 
vary depending on who delivers the test and presents feedback for the task in 
question (Collins, Dmitruk & Ranney, 1977; Halperin et al., 1976; Snyder & 
Shenkel, 1976). For example, feedback is rated as more accurate when 
provided by individuals with higher status (Halperin et al., 1976). There are 
a number of possible reasons that underlie the differences observed between 
different domains, including the level of ambiguity associated with the 
feedback provided and the mystery associated with how that feedback is 
generated, which will be discussed later. For the moment, I would simply like 
to highlight that the levels of Barnum effect observed in one domain, cannot 
be directly generalised to other situations and we must treat the assumptions 
we make about Barnum effect for new measures with care.   
Choice blindness has also been established in a wide range of 
domains, however, few studies have provided a direct comparison for how 
the likelihood of experiencing choice blindness compares between these 
domains. Some studies have compared choice blindness for faces, with choice 
blindness for other types of stimuli. Johansson et al. (2008) for example 
reported no significant difference between the proportions of people who 
successfully detected a switch of faces compared to a switch of abstract 
patterns. Somerville and McGowan (2016) on the other hand, found that 
choice blindness experiments with adolescents result in a higher detection rate 
when choosing between chocolates, compared to choosing between female 
faces. Sauerland et al., (2014) also report a lower detection rate for school 
classroom items (e.g., chairs) compared to personal items (e.g., toys).  
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Somerville and McGowan (2016) propose that such differences can be 
attributed to prior experience with the stimuli used and not the different type 
of item presented per se. In other words, it is unclear whether if presented 
with unfamiliar chocolates or toys such a difference would occur. However, 
variability in familiarity and experience with different types of domains is in 
the very nature of such domains being different and therefore it does not seem 
realistic to set a golden standard for what proportion of detected trials 
constitutes a ‘normal’ level of choice blindness.  
One possibility is that by repeating a choice we learn which features 
are important and learn to differentiate these to establish our preference, 
creating the familiarity effect in choice blindness. Cheung et al., (2014), for 
example, demonstrated that using specific instruction which hold information 
on how the decision should be made (e.g., rate the naturalness of the product) 
can increase the proportion of people detecting a switch compared to general 
instruction (e.g., rate which one you prefer). This suggests that choice 
blindness could be reducing when people learn what is relevant to them in a 
choice, which can be taught or learnt through repetition.  
It should also be taken into consideration that a lack of experience in 
performing the task could also potentially explain why the Barnum effect 
occurs when rating the accuracy of personality descriptions. It is rare that 
people are required to perform such task, or even see their own personality 
descriptions, therefore as the use of personality measures becomes more 
accepted the Barnum effect may be minimised. Indeed, participants that work 
within the psychology domain have been shown to demonstrate a higher level 
of detection of their choice being switched, compared to less experienced 
student samples (e.g., Bachrach & Pattishall, 1960). Despite a lack of an 
absolute level of Barnum effect or choice blindness across different domains, 
some systematic variations can allow us to extrapolate relative effects from 
one domain to another.  
One parameter that appears to play a role in false feedback acceptance 
is the level of similarity between the outcome thought to be anticipated by the 
participants based on responses provided and the outcome presented. Whilst 
51/215 
 
this is difficult to establish for the early definitions of the Barnum effect 
because very general statement used in the feedback lacked specificity that 
would allow similarity to be compared (e.g., Forer, 1949; Sundberg, 1955), 
later work using specific feedback in the format of trait personality measures 
has shown that similarity does indeed impact the accuracy ratings participants 
provide for invalid feedback (Andersen & Nordvik, 2002).  
The role of similarity in false feedback acceptance is not surprising. 
Consider for example switching a picture of one identical twin, for a picture 
of the other. In this scenario, it seems reasonable that a person may fail to 
detect a switch, simply as a result of not being able to tell the two photographs 
apart.  However, the inability to detect a switch of visually different faces 
cannot be explained in the same manner. For choice blindness, the question 
of whether similarity has a significant effect on the likelihood of participants 
detecting an invalid outcome was first put forward by Johansson and 
colleagues (2005) in the original choice blindness study. The study roughly 
matched fifteen pairs of faces on attractiveness and asked fifteen independent 
raters to rate the similarity of the presented pairs to identify high similarity 
and low similarity stimuli sets. Controversially, the authors did not find a 
significant difference in detection of switched outcomes experienced for high 
and low similarity face pairs, moreover they reported that people use features 
specific to the new, non-preferred faces in their justifications.   
Research since has encountered this question on multiple occasions, 
predominantly with a very different outcome. The effects of similarity have 
been found to play a significant role in choice blindness for jams (Hall et al., 
2010), field studies of eyewitness testimony for voices and faces (Sauerland 
et al., 2013; Sagana et al., 2013) financial decisions (McLaughlin & 
Somerville, 2013), and haptic stimuli (Steenfeldt-Kristensen & Thornton, 
2013). One possibility which could explain the discrepancy in findings, is that 
the rough pair matching procedure and use of 15 raters utilised by Johansson 
et al. (2005) were insufficient to accurately represent the perceived similarity 
of the stimuli used in the wider population. On the other hand, Sauerland et 
al., (2014) also found no effect of similarity on choice blindness when using 
classroom (e.g., chairs) and personal items (e.g., toys), despite having a 
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sample of 60 participants to establish the differences in similarity beforehand. 
The results appear to be mixed, however, with the majority of findings 
indicating that similarity is, in fact, an important choice blindness predictor.  
Favourability of feedback presented is another parameter that has 
been known to influence the accuracy with which we perceive invalid 
feedback. There is a substantial volume of studies using the Barnum effect 
which demonstrate that favourable feedback is more likely to be accepted 
than negative feedback (e.g., Johnson et al., 1985; Macdonald & Standing, 
2002; Poškus, 2014; for exception see Dmitruk et al., 1973). For example, 
Poškus (2014) report that personality profiles that are viewed as positive (high 
trait openness, conscientiousness, extraversion and agreeableness, and low 
trait neuroticism, Poškus & Žukauskienė, 2014,) are rated as more accurate 
than the inverse of such profiles. In fact, Macdonald and Standing (2002) 
propose, that the self-serving bias, or the tendency to attribute positive events 
to the self and negative event to an external source can cancel out the Barnum 
all-together. The validity of such proposal is highly debatable, since many 
studies that report negative feedback being rated as less accurate than positive 
feedback, still report accuracy ratings of higher than the midpoint that would 
be associated with being neither accurate nor inaccurate (e.g., Poškus, 2014; 
Wyman & Vyse, 2008). Nonetheless, it is very clear that favourability of 
feedback is positively related to the perceived accuracy of the information 
provided.  
The main effect of favourability on choice blindness is more difficult 
to establish than for the Barnum effect. Facial attractiveness can be construed 
as a form of favourability or “expected utility” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), 
given that reward processing systems in the brain show higher levels of 
activation when an attractive face is encountered compared to an unattractive 
face (Winston, O’Doherty, Kilner, Perrett & Dolan, 2007). Representing 
faces as high or low utility limits the experimental scope, as this implies that 
to some degree participants always see the less attractive alternative during 
the switched feedback as the very action of choosing a different item suggests 
the ‘imposter’ choice is preferred less by the individual (assuming the 
existence of such preferences). As a result, when switching a choice for an 
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attractive or unattractive alternative, we are, in fact, switching it for a slightly 
less or much less attractive alternative and even this approach is not always 
accurate as there will always be some subjective variation in perception of 
attractiveness.  
Nonetheless, we can hypothesise that a higher discrepancy in 
attractiveness leads to higher switch detection. In some respects, this can be 
construed as rational, or in the very least evolutionarily beneficial as 
switching one item for another of the same utility has little consequence, 
whereas switching the same item for one with much lower subjective utility 
can be construed as negative feedback or punishment. Consider for example 
being offered £5 worth of euros or dollars, assuming you had to exchange 
them straight away after the experiment. Even if you indicated that you 
preferred euros, you would probably not complain if you got dollars instead. 
Now consider if you are offered £10 worth of euros, or £5 worth of dollars, 
as long as you exchange them straight away you would be expected to prefer 
the Euro payment, and would care if you receive the dollars instead as this 
represents essentially losing £5. Surprisingly, the effects of utility have not 
been directly investigated with respect to choice blindness, and will be 
addressed in chapter 5 of this thesis.  
Another way of interpreting the effects stimuli characteristics have on 
false feedback acceptance, is by considering how these factors may contribute 
decision ambiguity and whether such ambiguity may be the mediating factor 
for how we interpret invalid information about the self. The notion of 
ambiguity has been key in Barnum effect literature since it was first 
demonstrated by Forer in 1949, who proposed that false feedback is accepted 
because it is ambiguous and could apply to almost anyone. Whilst the Barnum 
effect has since been demonstrated for specific feedback types such as 
numeric representations of personality traits (e.g., Poškus, 2014), studies 
show that false feedback based on such measures is rated as less accurate 
compared to feedback derived from more ambiguous measures, with an 
unclear relationship between the information provided by the participant and 
the feedback generated, such as astrology (e.g., Wyman & Vyse, 2008), or 
the Rorschach test (Richards & Merrens, 1971).  There is general consensus 
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that ambiguity is an important element in determining whether the Barnum 
effect will occur (for discussion see Dickson & Kelly, 1985; Furnham & 
Schofield, 1987; Snyder et al., 1977), and accordingly, it is not surprising that 
other factors that introduce ambiguity, such as similarity (Andersen & 
Nordvik, 2002) would also affect the Barnum effect through changing the 
level of task ambiguity. However, without an objective measure of the degree 
of task ambiguity, we cannot say with certainty whether such a property can 
be fully responsible for the variations observed in the Barnum effect. 
Furthermore, ambiguity cannot be used to explain the difference in ratings 
observed for favourable, compared to unfavourable feedback. Favourable 
false feedback is often rated as more accurate than its real counterpart, even 
for specific feedback types such as trait personality (e.g., Macdonald & 
Standing, 2002). Such feedback would not be considered ambiguous, as it is 
not prone to multiple interpretations because it should be easily rejected by 
bringing to mind past events countering the stated personality characteristics. 
And yet despite the low level of ambiguity, positive feedback is rated as 
highly accurate.  
For choice blindness, I have already briefly mentioned that Somerville 
& McGowan (2016) propose that reduction in ambiguity is likely to be 
responsible for the high levels of switch detection observed for familiar 
(brand chocolates) compared to unfamiliar (facial preference) decisions. The 
reduction in ambiguity is, in turn, thought to be a result of substantial prior 
experience. Similarly, Sagana et al. (2013) note ‘When combining more than 
one source of ambiguity, the magnitude of the [choice blindness] effect 
increases dramatically.’ Here Sagana and colleagues (2013) refer to 
similarity and short decision time as sources of ambiguity, but favourability 
is likely to also contribute to altering this parameter because when the level 
of attractiveness is similar the difference in outcome becomes 
inconsequential. It is also possible that once this ambiguity parameter reaches 
a certain level, any differences beyond that fail to alert the individual to the 
invalid nature of the information provided. For example, Merckelbach et al., 
(2011), interpret the findings that people are more likely to accept falsely 
elevated psychological symptoms if they already reported having a high level 
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of those symptoms as a result of the increased ambiguity. The ability to 
minimise choice blindness with specific instructions (Cheung et al., 2014) 
also provides evidence that ambiguity is likely to play a role in the level of 
detection exhibited, as it directly minimises uncertainty about how to make 
the decision at hand.  
If we consider the predictive power of stimuli characteristics to be 
fully mediated by choice ambiguity, this could also explain why individual 
predictors may have a significant influence on choice blindness on some 
occasions but not on others. Consider for example if two stimuli are 
incredibly physically similar, in this scenario ambiguity would remain high 
even if domain or attractiveness is manipulated thus predicting a low level of 
detection irrespective of the latter characteristics.  Of course, there is a 
possibility that each of the investigated variables has a unique effect on choice 
blindness, and ambiguity is a distinct construct with its own contribution to 
the effect. Researching how ambiguity might influence choice blindness 
directly, may provide insight into this concept. 
It seems apparent that a direct measure of ambiguity is necessary to 
establish its effects on the susceptibility to Barnum effect and choice 
blindness. One measure of decision ambiguity is to directly ask participants 
about their subjective confidence in the responses they provided. 
Surprisingly, I was not able to find any literature on the relationship between 
self-reported confidence and the Barnum effect. Interestingly, for choice 
blindness most studies have focused on analysing the decision confidence 
after participants are presented with the real or switched feedback (Johansson 
et al., 2005; Hall et al., 2010; Hall et al., 2012), yet pre-feedback confidence 
is seldom discussed as a predictor of choice blindness. One study by Sagana 
and colleagues (2013) reports the post-decision confidence to be a significant 
predictor of choice blindness. On the other hand, when examining the effects 
of self-reported certainty of political views on subsequently altered responses 
to political questions Hall et al. (2013) fail to report a significant relationship. 
Other studies (e.g., Pärnamets et al., 2015) have included confidence 
measures in the procedure used to elicit choice blindness but do not report the 
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subsequent relationship to the detection of switched outcomes simply using 
the rating as a distractor task.  
One explanation for the discrepancy in the results reported by Sagana 
et al. (2013) with subsequent research is the nature of the task. Whereas the 
majority of choice blindness research tends to focus on preferential choice, 
Sagana and her team (Sagana et al., 2013; Sauerland et al., 2013) have been 
working on applying the choice blindness paradigm specifically to procedures 
resembling eyewitness testimony. As a result, the choices made in this 
research rely on participants correctly identifying previously encountered 
individuals, which unlike preferential choice are dependent on memory 
strength and have objectively correct responses. It is possible that in this 
research participants have more metacognitive access to their decision quality 
(e.g., ‘I remember the situation in which I encountered these people very well’ 
vs. ‘I do not remember the situation being described at all’), compared to 
subjective judgement of preferences in a novel situation. Nonetheless, the 
absence of a detected link between decision confidence and switched outcome 
detection does pose a problem for the ambiguity explanation of choice 
blindness in preferential choice, as easier decisions where the stimuli are 
different and vary in their attractiveness would be expected to be reflected in 
confidence.  
The failure to detect an effect of confidence on choice blindness in the 
majority of research is also surprising in the context of other literature, which 
has commonly demonstrated that confidence is a good indicator of choice 
consistency. For example, self-reported attitude confidence has been found to 
lead to greater consistency between the attitudes and behaviour (Bizer, 
Tormala, Rucker & Petty, 2006; Fazio & Zanna, 1978; Glasman & 
Albarracín, 2006; Tormala & Petty, 2004) as well as greater choice 
consistency over time (Koriat, 2012). Although there are many covariates of 
choice confidence that may be responsible for these findings, Tormala, 
Clarkson, and Petty (2006) found that even when only perceived choice 
confidence was manipulated through providing participants with altered 
confidence feedback, people’s attitudes became more predictive of 
behavioural intentions as perceived confidence increased. Although, this 
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research demonstrates that increase in perceived confidence, in turn, increases 
self-reported behavioural consistency, this also highlights the potential 
problems in using confidence as a measure of consistency. First, just as choice 
blindness shows that people have a limited ability to monitor their choices 
and preferences, Tormala et al., (2006) demonstrate that confidence is 
strongly dependent on external feedback and thus is a malleable concept that 
we might not have direct access to. Secondly, since this research uses 
behavioural intentions as opposed to actual behaviour, the authors can only 
hypothesise that confidence mediates actual behaviour. In the choice 
blindness paradigm, the equivalent of such a measure would be the likelihood 
at which participants would judge noticing a mismatch of the outcome with 
their decision, which Johansson et al. (2006) show to be very high (86%) 
indicating that in this instance there is a clear dissociation between self-
reported and actual behaviour (see section 2.2 for discussion on accuracy of 
introspective reports). 
It appears that the nature of the stimuli with respect to domain, 
physical similarity and relative attractiveness of the stimuli do influence 
choice blindness. The results also indicate that the direction of influence of 
the aforementioned variables is consistent with various levels of decision 
ambiguity elicited by the options, suggesting the effects observed may affect 
switch detection indirectly. On the other hand, at least on the subjective level 
it appears that choice confidence and certainty rarely mediate choice 
blindness posing that the role of ambiguity should be treated with caution.  
Another way of approaching variability of false feedback acceptance 
is by considering differences associated directly with the procedure itself as 
opposed to the stimuli used. I will now consider such variables, including 
decision times, decision strategy, problem framing, number of alternatives 
and various social effects that may influence false feedback acceptance, 
discussing ambiguity as a potential mediating factor where appropriate. I was 
not able to find research investigating how procedural variations of time, 
framing or number of alternatives (or scale range) impact the Barnum effect, 
perhaps due to the Barnum effect being less embedded in cognitive 
psychology fields, and more in social psychology, whilst this is an interesting 
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question to try and address in the future, for the purpose this discussion I can 
only focus on the procedural variations associated with the choice blindness 
paradigm. The Barnum effect will be discussed in more detail with respect to 
demand characteristics and social desirability at the end of this chapter.  
In the previous section, I mentioned that Sagana et al. (2013) consider 
decision time to play an important role in acceptance of false feedback, 
although this was not empirically tested within their study itself. Such 
relationship has however, been empirically addressed in other choice 
blindness research from two distinct approaches; by investigating how 
limiting decision time influences choice blindness and by measuring how 
varying decision time affects choice blindness when participants are free to 
take as long as they want. In the original choice blindness paper (Johansson 
et al., 2005) participants were assigned to one of three possible decision time 
conditions; 2 second and 5 second decision time limits, and a condition where 
participants could take as much time as they like. The results demonstrated 
that imposing time limits on the choice task, decreases the probability that 
participants will detect their chosen outcome being switched for a different 
alternative, regardless of whether the limit is 2 or 5 seconds. Similarly, 
McLaughlin and Somerville (2013) measured the time participants took to 
decide on a pension portfolio, before switching some of the funds included in 
the portfolio. They found that participants that took longer to reach their 
decision were more likely to notice the switched elements later. It, therefore, 
appears that taking longer to study the alternatives and reach a choice, results 
in increased ability to detect a mismatch between intended and actual 
outcome. On the other hand, Hall et al., (2012) find no significant effects of 
decision time on the likelihood of experiencing choice blindness for moral 
judgements. 
As far as imposed time limits are concerned, the findings appear to be 
in line with the hypothesis that ambiguity mediates choice blindness, as 
imposing time limits on a choice can increase decision difficulty (e.g., 
Haynes, 2009), thus increasing ambiguity of the outcome.  Then again, the 
mixed findings regarding time taken to make a choice when no time limit is 
imposed present a challenge for interpretation. Longer time spent making the 
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choice would suggest more information accumulated about the alternatives 
thus increasing certainty of the choice, yet since ambiguity increases choice 
difficulty longer time spent on the decision could also be related to higher 
decision ambiguity (Rolls, Grabenhorst & Deco, 2010). Perhaps the effects 
of decision time are dependent on the specific circumstances in which they 
are assessed, and the difference between the financial decisions investigated 
by McLaughlin and Somerville (2013) and the moral judgements investigated 
by Hall and colleagues (2012) are sufficient to moderate the effects.  Since 
the majority of choice blindness research (e.g., Hall et al., 2010; Hall et al., 
2013; Johansson et al., 2014; Sagana et al., 2013; Sauerland et al., 2013; 
Pärnamets et al., 2015) does not vary the time constraints imposed on the 
decision, or measure the time taken to reach the decision, it is difficult to 
establish when and how time taken to reach a decision can influence choice 
blindness. For the moment, we can only conclude that artificially restricting 
decision time leads to a decrease in detection of mismatches between 
expected and presented outcomes, whereas the role of the time taken to reach 
a decision requires further research under conditions that allow to control for 
any other possible variations of decision difficulty. 
Since time pressure has been found to influence choice blindness, it 
seems reasonable that other factors that may limit cognitive processing are 
likely to also. One such factor is the amount of information participants have 
to consider, which can be manipulated by increasing the number of choice 
alternatives presented in the task.  There have been two studies that have used 
multi-alternative variations of the choice blindness paradigm. First, Sagana 
and colleagues (2013) asked participants to identify a face out of six possible 
alternatives and reported a slightly higher switch detection rate (59%) 
compared to other studies on facial choice blindness (e.g., 26% in Johansson 
et al., 2005; 43% in Somerville & McGowan, 2016; 12% in Johansson et al., 
2008). However, as mentioned previously, cross-study comparisons are very 
difficult given that many procedural differences are likely to impact their 
outcome. For this study in particular, there were many deviation from the 
conventional paradigm as the researchers used a field method in order to 
model the choices as closely as possible to the legal system, thus the choices 
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were made in a realistic setting and the decision was such that it had an 
objectively correct answer unlike preferential choice. Since Sagana et al. 
(2013) did not vary the number of alternatives or provide a binary control 
group under similar conditions the study fails to provide insight into the effect 
of alternatives, beyond perhaps an indicative trend. 
These results may appear surprising, as it seems that increasing the 
number of alternatives should also increase cognitive load and thus decision 
difficulty, yet the findings are, in fact, consistent with other related areas of 
choice stability. For example, DeShazo and Fermo (2002) find that people are 
more consistent with a single utility function when they have more than two, 
but less than five, alternatives. Similarly, Collins and Vossler (2009) report 
that people are more likely to make an optimal decision for ternary compared 
to binary choices.  Overall, the trend observed in the experiment by Sagana 
et al. (2013) appears to be congruent with other research on choice stability. 
There are a number of reasons that this might be the case, DeShazo and Fermo 
(2002) for example suggest that the effect could be a result of a higher 
probability that a participants will encounter a stimulus to their taste when 
there are three versus two alternatives; another approach would be to consider 
how individual parameters (e.g., physical similarity and attractiveness – see 
beginning of this chapter) may be treated differently when there is a third 
alternative present, thus potentially increasing the salience of one option 
which may be more memorable (Huber et al., 1982). Whilst at this stage the 
effect of increasing the number of alternatives on choice blindness is nothing 
more than a hypothesis, this will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5 of 
this thesis.    
Another variable of interest within the choice literature is the framing 
of the task at hand. The way we present the question instructions (Shafir, 
1993), possible alternatives (Tversky & Kahneman, 1985) and the response 
format (Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1968) have all been found to influence task 
outcomes, even when from the logical perspective, the task is identical. The 
difference in choice outcomes suggests that the cognitive processes 
undergone must diverge also, allowing for the possibility that these processes 
result in varying levels of choice blindness. Cheung et al (2015) demonstrate 
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that task instructions can indeed influence the rate of switch detection, at least 
where food ingredient based choices are concerned. Cheung et al.’s (2015) 
study, does not just manipulate the way that information is presented but also 
provides participants with additional information through specific 
instructions. It does, however, demonstrate that small changes in the question 
can indeed influence choice blindness which in the very least does not 
eliminate the possibility of framing effects. 
In the previous section I have touched upon two response modes that 
have been used to elicit choice blindness; categorical choice versus 
continuous judgement. The response modes have never been directly 
compared to my knowledge, and given that there is very little overlap in 
domain between the choice and judgement studies carried out it is very 
difficult to contrast the two procedures. Sagana, Sauerland and Merckelbach 
(2014b) conducted the only choice blindness study using facial stimuli 
alongside a judgement response, eliciting 59% switch detection. Although the 
detection rates are at the higher end of those previously reported with facial 
choice blindness paradigms, they appear to be within the expected range. 
Furthermore, since the judgement ratings in question were in reference to 
facial sympathy, and not preference this once again creates a barrier to 
comparing this study with others. Whether asking participants to provide a 
judgement or presenting them with a categorical choice can impact choice 
blindness will remain a mystery for the moment. 
Although distinct from the effects of response mode directly, two 
studies have used judgement ratings alongside the categorical response 
provided in the choice blindness paradigm.  Johansson and colleagues (2008), 
for example, demonstrated that providing a preferential judgement for each 
of the female faces that were presented in the choice after they make their 
decision increases the ability to detect the face being switched. This is likely 
to be a result of deeper processing when two types of cognitive operations are 
performed. Conversely, another study that intended to induce a judgement 
based decision strategy in participants by asking them to judge a number of 
faces prior to encountering the decision (Cooke, Kirichek, Kusev, in 
preparation) found that using a judgement strategy, in fact, decreases the level 
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of detection exhibited – a surprising finding. Perhaps this is indicative of the 
level of choice blindness associated with judgement response mode, or simply 
indicative of decision fatigue, but the overall conclusion appears to be that 
inducing judgement based decision strategy can impact choice blindness, 
reducing detection. On the other hand, combining choice and judgement 
appears to increase the switch detection.  
The general conclusion that can be drawn from the procedural 
variations of the choice blindness paradigm, is that even small changes in the 
task such as time restrictions, number of alternatives and response mode could 
potentially alter the likelihood of choice blindness being induced. However, 
although I tried to paint a comprehensive picture of the relevant research, it 
is apparent that more empirical evidence is needed to conclude which 
procedural differences are of importance and to what degree. In addition, the 
study of such effects needs to be expanded to the Barnum effect, as well as 
choice stability, if we are to understand the full extent of what it is about the 
choice blindness paradigm that makes people accept invalid preferences as 
their own.  
Lastly, I would briefly like to discuss the potential role of social 
desirability effects or demand characteristics on false feedback acceptance. 
The majority of research on the Barnum effect and the choice blindness 
paradigm alike has been conducted face to face, with the experimenter 
personally presenting the false feedback to participants (e.g., Andersen & 
Nordvik, 2002; Hall et al., 2010; Johansson et al., 2005; Poškus, 2014). Such 
proximity to the experimenter could make the participants more vulnerable to 
demand characteristics, or participants forming an interpretation of the 
experiment's purpose and subconsciously changing their behaviour to fit that 
interpretation (Orne, 1962). Consider for example the first choice blindness 
study (Johansson et al., 2005), where the participants made 15 choices (7th, 
10th and 14th manipulated) from alternatives presented physically by the 
experimenter. The experimenter’s behaviour could have influenced the 
participants’ responses either implicitly, or on a conscious level where 
participants may have felt too embarrassed to point out that the experimenter 
made a mistake. Furthermore, the manipulated trial is first encountered after 
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participants have already encountered 6 pairs of faces, which poses a problem 
in that having encountered numerous trials participants may build trust with 
the experimenter amplifying the demand characteristic which may have 
resulted from face-to-face experiments in the first place (Kintz, Delprato, 
Mettee, Persons & Schappe, 1965; Nichols & Maner, 2008). The physical 
presence of the experimenter, and multiple trials, have not been directly 
investigated in choice blindness, thus the exact magnitude of any 
unintentional experimenter effects exerted cannot be established. However, a 
number of studies (McLaughlin & Somerville, 2013; Sauerland et al., 2013, 
2014) have attempted to establish whether demand characteristics play a role 
by investigating whether individual differences in susceptibility to social 
desirability (e.g., using Marlowe–Crowne Social Desirability Scale, Crowne 
& Marlowe, 1960) impact detection of invalid feedback. Since no significant 
effect was detected, the authors concluded that it is unlikely that social 
desirability is responsible for choice blindness. Furthermore, cross-study 
comparison also show that computerised choice blindness tasks (Sauerland et 
al., 2014; Pärnamets et al., 2015) are successful at eliciting choice blindness, 
although the detection rates do appear to be higher (54.8-62.8%) than the 20% 
average detection originally reported in Johansson et al. (2005). 
Similarly, it is unlikely that demand characteristics can fully explain 
the Barnum effect, as the phenomenon has been successfully demonstrated 
with computerised, as well as face to face tasks (e.g., Guastello & Rieke, 
1990; O’Dell, 1972). Direct comparisons of whether people believe the 
feedback was generated by a psychologist, or a computer (Baillargeon & 
Danis, 1984; Snyder & Larson, 1972), also showed no significant effect on 
perceived accuracy of false feedback, although it must be noted that the level 
of interaction with the experimenter remained high in both conditions, so it is 
uncertain to what degree this would reduce demand characteristics. On the 
other hand, the level of Barnum effect has been found to vary with the type 
of experimenter used to deliver the feedback, with the higher status, as well 
as better liked experimenters resulting in higher accuracy ratings of false 
feedback (Collins et al., 1977; Halperin et al., 1976; for studies that failed to 
detect an effect see Ulrich, Stachnik & Stainton, 1963; Snyder & Larson, 
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1972). This suggests that social desirability is likely to play a role in false 
feedback acceptance after all. Furthermore, there also appears to be a 
significant relationship between the Barnum effect, and participants scores on 
social desirability scales (Mosher, 1965; Orpen & Jamotte, 1975; Snyder & 
Larson, 1972), however, this relationship appears to be dependent on the 
favourability of the feedback presented with higher accuracy ratings provide 
for positive and neutral false feedback, and lower accuracy ratings for 
negative feedback (Snyder & Larson, 1972).  
The research presented provides some evidence that social desirability 
could play a role in choice blindness, and even more so in the Barnum effect, 
however, cannot account for false feedback acceptance completely. This 
leads us to the conclusion that whilst social desirability effects are likely to 
contribute to false feedback acceptance, this is likely to interact with other 
characteristics of the task at hand (e.g., Furnham & Schofield, 1987; 
McLaughlin & Somerville, 2013). I am by no means suggesting that social 
influences are irrelevant to the cognitive processes involved in choice, in fact, 
it is very likely that the desire to appear consistent with our past selves plays 
a large role in determining our behaviour. However, as I perceive it, the aim 
of the Barnum effect and choice blindness research is to determine whether 
we possess the ability to monitor information about the self regardless of 
social factors, at least in part.  
Overall, in this section, I have given consideration to factors that may 
influence false feedback acceptance. It appears that the tendency to accept 
false feedback, whether about our characteristics or preferences, is robust 
across a wide range domains and situations, however, the degree of such 
acceptance is variable. The task domain, similarity of the false feedback to 
the expected outcome, and favourability of that feedback all appear to 
influence the perceived accuracy of the information provided in some 
circumstances, as well as decision time, response mode, and social 
desirability effects with respect to the choice blindness paradigm specifically. 
The ability to use procedural variations to predict the false feedback 
acceptance are crucial to our understanding of why and when we accept false 
feedback, and to finding ways to minimise such acceptance, however, as 
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discussed, the evidence is still scarce and often mixed. The original empirical 
work presented in this thesis largely aimed to contribute to our understanding 
of the factors that influence false feedback acceptance. Prior to proceeding 
with presenting the discussion of my findings, the remainder of this chapter 
will consider the effects false feedback acceptance has on subsequent 
behaviours, as well as the cognitive mechanisms that have been proposed to 
explain our varied ability in judging accuracy of information provided with 
respect to the self.   
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Table 1. Characteristic of choice blindness studies and the variables of influence. 
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Table 2. Characteristic of Barnum effect studies and the variables of influence (due to the 
volume of literature on Barnum effect, the studies reported here are limited to examples used 
in section 3.1) 
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3.2 Behavioural Change, False Feedback Acceptance and 
Relevance for Application 
From the discussion so far, it is evident that the tendency to accept 
invalid feedback about the self as accurate is widespread and robust. As long 
as the perceived accuracy of such feedback is real, and not a result of faked 
agreement due to social desirability effects (see section 3.1 for discussion), 
the very nature of accepting inaccurate information should lead to a 
subsequent update of our knowledge of the self (at least short term).  Given 
our tendency to remain consistent with past decisions and perceived 
behavioural propensities, one would expect that if our knowledge of ourselves 
changes, accordingly so would behaviour. On the other hand, it is possible 
that some deeper, internal factors such as biological predispositions, or pre-
determined attitudes guide behaviour above and beyond momentary changes 
in our self-perception based on external information. False feedback 
acceptance paradigms allow us to dissociate such pre-existing propensities to 
behaviour from perceptions guided by externally presented information and 
therefore lead to better understanding of how behaviours are brought about. 
The experiments conducted to date appear to be in consensus, demonstrating 
that accepting false feedback does indeed lead to behavioural change, for both 
the Barnum effect and choice blindness (Halperin & Snyder, 1979; Johansson 
et al., 2014; Kusev et al., in preparation; Merckelbach et al., 2011; Sakamoto 
et al., 2000). 
For Barnum effect, I was able to find two studies which investigated 
subsequent behavioural effects of being presented with invalid feedback 
about the self; one looking into effects of enhanced personality feedback on 
treatment for fear of snakes (Halperin & Snyder, 1979) and the other looking 
at effects of extraversion feedback on stranger interaction (Sakamoto et al., 
2000). Halperin and Snyder (1979) reported that feedback suggesting high 
potential to change leads to a positive influence on outcome for participants 
being treated for fear of snakes. Furthermore, this difference is reported for 
both self-report (Snake Fear Questionnaire) and behavioural (Behavioural 
Avoidance test) outcomes. The second study by Sakamoto et al. (2000) 
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investigated the effects of extraversion feedback on self-perception and 
interaction with a confederate. The study used four questionnaire formats; 
‘academic’ personality tests and ‘popular’ personality tests, in multiple choice 
and open-ended question versions. The results indicated a higher self-image, 
increase in conversation with a confederate, better impression of the 
confederate by the participant as well as of the participant by the confederate 
for the group that receive high extraversion feedback, compared to the group 
receiving high introversion feedback, although it is important to note that the 
effect does not appear to be consistent across different survey types.  
The research suggests that in accepting fake descriptions of the self, 
people tend to update their knowledge of the self, in turn changing their 
behaviours to be more consistent with the received feedback. It is however, 
important to highlight that both experiments had a number of limitations, in 
that both failed to measure whether the feedback was actually perceived as 
accurate, used female only samples, failed to provide a real or neutral 
feedback control group, and used procedures highly prone to social 
desirability effects as the feedback was often delivered in prose and face to 
face. Whether the effects of false feedback remain in more stringently 
controlled conditions will be further explored in chapter 4 of this thesis, 
however, for the moment we can only conclude that experiencing the Barnum 
effect can indeed influence subsequent behaviours.   
The effects of accepting false feedback about the self has also been 
investigated in choice blindness literature (Johansson et al., 2014; 
Merckelbach et al., 2011; Kusev et al., in preparation). For example, 
Johansson et al. (2014) examined the effect of choice blindness on future 
choices of female faces. As per the classic paradigm, the researchers 
presented participants with pairs of stimuli, in this instance two pictures of 
female faces, and asked them to select the preferred option. On some trials, 
following their choice, participants were shown the non-selected option and 
asked to explain why they chose it. In line with past research on the majority 
of trials, participants failed to detect that the wrong face was presented and 
provided a justification for their choice. After the paradigm was complete 
Johansson and colleagues (2014) asked participants to make their choices 
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again, and interestingly for the sets where participants previously provided a 
justification for their non-chosen face they were then more likely to select the 
face they justified and not the one they originally selected. Similarly, 
Merckelbach et al., (2011) reported that participants that did not detect 
alterations made to self-reported intensity of psychological symptoms, 
subsequently changed their perceived symptom intensity in the same 
direction as the change (tested after 10 minutes, and after a week), whilst 
participants that did detect the switch exhibited similar responses to those 
initially reported. 
The effect of erroneous feedback altering future choice has also been 
documented when conducting the choice blindness paradigm with risky 
choice (Kusev et al., in preparation, reported in Chater, Johansson & Hall, 
2011). The study consisted of asking participants to select between 
hypothetical gambles. Each set of options contained a certain and a risky 
financial option in the following format: “What would you prefer: alternative 
(A) 45% of losing £100, or alternative (B) a certain loss of £50?”. After 
participant completed their choice they were presented with the stimuli again 
with the preferred option highlighted and asked to confirm or reject their 
earlier choice.  The study found that not only do the participants fail to notice 
manipulations of what level of risk they are willing to accept, but they also 
change their overall risk preferences for repeated choice scenarios, and in 
some conditions even show a complete preference reversal for the probability 
levels. 
 Interestingly, in my own work using graphical representations of risk 
I failed to replicate this finding. A small-scale study, using the data from 32 
participants (19 female), was conducted to assess whether switching stimuli 
in a pre-set direction (higher risk vs. lower risk) for each participant would 
result in preference change in the specified direction. Participants completed 
35 sets of choices between ‘gambling spinners’ (pie charts with the size of 
segment representing probability and colour representing potential gain), 
providing a confidence rating and justifying why they selected the way they 
did for each choice. On half of the trials, the participant’s choice was switched 
in the pre-determined direction, if their choice was not already in agreement 
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with that direction. Immediately afterwards they were asked to repeat the 
choices in a randomised order but without the justification. At the end of the 
experiment, participants were required to indicate whether they noticed 
anything unusual, followed by a more specific question of whether they 
believe the choices they had to justify were switched. Analysis of the 
individual choice justifications and post-experiment questions revealed that 
17 people (53.1%) detected at least one of the switch trials, suggesting a 
successful induction of choice blindness in half of the participants. However, 
there was no difference in the preference for risky alternative in the 
subsequent choice between the participants who received different feedback 
types. Although the overall consistency between choices in phase one and two 
was fairly low (average 52.3% consistent choices), and participants in all 
condition became more risk seeking (from 38.5% to 49.7%) on phase two. 
Overall, switching responses in a pre-determined condition did not appear to 
impact later choices irrespective of whether participants experienced choice 
blindness.  The continuation of the study was postponed until the details of 
the Kusev et al., (in preparation) study are published in order to allow 
comparison of methodology and stimuli used. However, the results do 
warrant caution in extrapolating the carry over effects of the choice blindness 
paradigm to other domains. 
The findings that changing our perceived responses can alter 
subsequent decision is consistent with past findings that repeating a choice 
strengthens preferential ratings and increases the likelihood that the same 
selection will be made if the choice is repeated (e.g., Brehm, 1956; Sharot, 
Fleming, Yu, Koster & Dolan, 2012; Hoeffler & Ariely, 1999). One classic 
demonstration of how making a choice can alter future preference was 
demonstrated by the Free Choice Paradigm (FCP; e.g., Brehm, 1956). The 
FCP involves participants rating a set of alternatives, then choosing between 
similarly rated items and finally rating the alternatives once again. The 
findings demonstrate that after participants choose between alternatives they 
rate the chosen alternative as better and the rejected alternative as worse 
compared to their pre-choice responses (Brehm, 1956), furthermore, this 
effect also appears to be long lasting (Sharot et al., 2012). Although the 
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interpretations of this effect have varied (Chen & Risen, 2010; Izuma & 
Murayama, 2013), it has been consistently replicated in a range of domains 
(for a review see Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999). Similarly, making repeated 
choice has also been found to lead to greater choice stability (Hoeffler & 
Ariely, 1999). An analogous effect can also be seen for perception of our own 
attitudes more broadly. For example, stating a belief has often been found to 
strengthen the attitudes expressed (see Festinger, 1957), and increase the 
likelihood of behaving in line with that attitude (e.g., Cioffi & Garner, 1996; 
Freedman & Fraser, 1966). This phenomenon has not only been consistently 
replicated, but is now also commonly used in behavioural change literature 
(e.g., Dolan, Hallsworth, Halpern, King & Vlaev, 2010).  
Paradigms used to study false feedback acceptance presented an 
interesting approach to self-consistency as they allowed to dissociate the 
action made from the behaviour perceived, demonstrating that the latter does 
contribute to determining behaviour at least in part. Consider, for example, 
an alternative explanation to describing why stating a choice, or attitude, 
might impact subsequent behavioural propensities, in that the process of 
performing an action automatically strengthens an association of the chosen 
alternative with positive appraisal which in turn would result in perceived 
consistency. Whilst experiments using the FCP cannot distinguish between 
this account, and one involving self-perception, the literature on choice 
blindness allows us to conclude that perception plays an important role in 
determining behaviour, as the alternative account would predict that the 
choice blindness paradigm would lead to the originally chosen alternative 
being preferred – the opposite of the observed results (Johansson et al., 2014). 
The observation that changing or reinforcing, information provided 
about self can alter future behaviour is not surprising, as people tend to seek 
consistency and patterns in their behaviour, to the extent that even irrelevant 
environmental cues have been shown to ‘anchor’ people’s choices (see Ariely 
& Norton, 2008). Evidence from the Barnum effect and choice blindness, 
provide further support for such arbitrary consistency with past perceived 
behaviours, although extrapolation of such effects to other domains should be 
done with caution. Furthermore, it is also important to highlight that the 
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behavioural change is achieved once a participant accepts the invalid 
information is accurate (e.g., Merckelbach et al., 2011), a phenomenon that is 
not achieved in one hundred percent of case and varies depending on the exact 
nature of the task at hand (see section 2.1 for discussion).  
When talking about behavioural change it is natural to also consider 
the potential practical applications of false feedback acceptance. For instance, 
the demonstration that false feedback about propensity to change can 
influence susceptibility to phobia treatment (Halperin & Snyder, 1979) has 
direct implications for clinical applications, as it provides a method that could 
enhance the effect of therapy, albeit in an ethically questionable manner. 
Clinical applications have also been considered for choice blindness by 
Aardema et al (2014), who demonstrated that the rate of detection is related 
to traits associated with obsessive compulsive disorder. Whilst this is not a 
direct application per se, it has the potential to aid the diagnosis and even 
treatment of the disorder. For instance, if we can reduce confabulation 
associated with choice blindness by training people to detect it, would this in 
turn reduce the obsessive compulsive disorder symptoms they experience? 
Whilst Aardema et al. (2014) only demonstrate co-occurrence of choice 
blindness and symptoms, the authors do hypothesis there is a possible causal 
effect of susceptibility to choice blindness on the disorder, which with future 
research may turn out to be a useful tool. 
Another applied field which has been impacted by choice blindness is 
eye witness testimony. Choice blindness has now been successfully 
demonstrated for recognition of faces and voices encountered (Sagana et al., 
2013; Sauerland et al., 2013), and even the recalled details of an observed 
incident (Cochrane et al., 2015). This poses a grave concern for our judiciary 
system and puts forth the question of how do we minimise altered recollection 
and errors in a field where human testimony is often at the core of determining 
the fate of victims, offenders and the wrongly accused. 
The behavioural effects of false feedback acceptance and the potential 
implication for the real world setting reinforce the importance of 
understanding when and why such acceptance occurs, and the following 
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chapter will attempt to address this further by considering the theories 
proposed to explain both the Barnum effect and choice blindness.  
3.3 Mechanisms 
In the previous sections of this thesis, I outlined the nature of false 
feedback acceptance and described how variations in the adopted procedures, 
and the feedback presented itself, can contribute to eliciting different levels 
of such acceptance. I will now turn to a discussion of why these effects might 
occur, outlining the theories and mechanisms that previous literature has 
considered core in explaining the Barnum effect and choice blindness, and 
the potential compatibility of these theories.  
The first question that seems fundamental to explaining why false 
feedback acceptance occurs, is why people do not simply recall the 
information they provided about the self and compare it to the information 
they are provided with as part of feedback. This is easier to account for, for 
the Barnum effect compared to choice blindness, since the information people 
see is not necessarily a direct reflection of information they provide, but is 
judged from some other property in a manner not overtly stated to the 
participant, such as personality test scoring. Not only does this often involve 
answering many questions, the responses to which would be difficult to recall 
(Miller, 1956), but also without knowing how those responses are 
transformed to individual descriptions an individual cannot have a precise 
representation of the outcome expected. For example, in judging the accuracy 
of an astrology generated personality, one would not be certain of what being 
a Gemini, born in the year of the snake, could possibly determine about their 
personality. Indeed, people presented with information from more 
‘mysterious’ sources, which do not explicitly relate the questions asked to 
traits provided, and use projective techniques to derive individual profiles, are 
more likely to experience the Barnum effect (e.g., Snyder, 1974).  
Johnson et al. (1985) propose that the availability heuristic, or the 
reliance on immediate information that comes to mind to make a decision 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1973), is responsible for such an effect. They suggest 
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that because we have a large memory store about the self, when presented 
with general feedback, we are likely to be able to easily identify past evidence 
that supports such feedback. As we have seen in section 3.1, double headed 
and general feedback, which could apply to almost anyone, is indeed more 
prone to the Barnum effect (e.g., Richards & Merrens, 1971; Wyman & Vyse, 
2008).  Johnson et al., (1985) present further evidence that a memory bias 
may be in play, by demonstrating that the Barnum effect tends to occur even 
when the participants are told that the feedback profile is random and not 
generated for them specifically. Furthermore, they are less likely to judge 
such feedback as accurate when applying it to someone else compared to 
themselves, as would be expected because we have fewer examples of other 
people’s behaviour than our own. Additionally, the availability heuristic can 
explain why people tend to accept false positive feedback more readily than 
negative (e.g., Johnson et al., 1985; Macdonald & Standing, 2002; Poškus, 
2014), as positive information about the self is more likely to be attended to, 
and in turn stored in memory (Sedikides, Green & Pinter, 2004). Overall, it 
seems that when comparing information presented, we may be using 
memories of past behaviours as a comparison after all, however, these 
memories consist of examples as opposed to some form of personal profile. 
Perhaps if people were more accustomed to assessing, or at least seeing, 
personality profiles this effect can be minimised. Indeed, Bachrach and 
Pattishall (1960) reported that psychiatric residents were less likely to accept 
false personality feedback than students (see also Greene, 1977; Greene et al., 
1979), indicating that level of experience with individual assessment can help 
eradicate the Barnum effect.  
For choice blindness, we are faced with a more perplexing question 
when it comes to memory; how is it we fail to keep track of a decision we 
made almost immediately prior to exhibiting such failure (justifying the 
wrong choice). Limited cognitive resources are often cited as the cause for 
deviation of observed decision-making behaviours, from what would be 
expected from choice under an unconstrained environment (e.g., Simon, 
1972). It is, therefore, a reasonable suggestion that choice blindness may be 
a result of insufficient ability to process information or limited memory 
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capacity. In fact, putting environmental constraints on the ability to process 
information, such as stringent time limits for example (Johansson et al., 
2005), has indeed been demonstrated to reduce the proportion of decisions 
that result in detection of the incorrect outcome being presented. However, 
whether the decision is limited at the stage of processing alternatives or 
encoding evidence, memory for the alternatives post choice blindness should 
demonstrate some impairment if we fail to create an accurate memory 
representation, which does not appear to be the case (Pärnamets et al., 2015; 
Sagana et al., 2014a). Research has found that recognition memory for facial 
stimuli used in a choice blindness task remains intact even after the 
participants justify their selection, regardless of whether the face presented 
during feedback was manipulated (Pärnamets et al., 2015). The effect has also 
been demonstrated with the evaluative judgement variation of the choice 
blindness paradigm (Sagana et al., 2014a), where participants’ memory for 
previously provided sympathy ratings for female faces did not differ 
significantly between trials for which participants received altered feedback 
and those for which they received real feedback. The authors conclude that 
memory limitations cannot, at least fully, be responsible for the choice 
blindness phenomenon.  
It would appear that recognition memory cannot account for the 
choice blindness phenomenon, yet the memory of the actual decision outcome 
must be impaired for choice blindness to occur. Pärnamets et al., (2015) 
propose that the memory of the decision outcome is altered whilst recognition 
memory remains intact, because source memory is underpinned by evaluative 
and reconstructive processes (Johnson, Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1993; 
Yonelinas, 1999). Whereas when testing recognition memory, it is sufficient 
to compare the nature of the perceptual experienced in the recent past with 
the currently presented alternative, when accessing the source memory, the 
perceptual information is accompanied by a number of judgements (e.g., 
‘Does this seem plausible given other things that I know’ – Johnson et al., 
1993). As a result, environmental factors, such as the incongruent feedback 
presented in choice blindness can lead to a distorted memory of how the 
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information was used, whilst the recognition of the information remains 
intact.  
A judgement process of assessing the likelihood that the feedback 
represents the decision made would also allow the ambiguity of the task at 
hand to influence our acceptance of invalid information, a tendency often 
noted in false feedback acceptance literature (see section 3.1 for discussion). 
Recall, that both the Barnum effect and choice blindness are influenced by 
whether the feedback can be interpreted in different ways, whether due to 
similarity of the information presented to the real outcome (e.g., Andersen & 
Nordvik, 2002; Steenfeldt-Kristensen & Thornton, 2013), generality of 
information (Sundberg, 1955; Merckelbach et al., 2011), or procedural 
parameters such as time constraints (Johansson et al., 2005). Now let’s 
consider the possibility that on encountering false feedback we recall the 
situation under which we made the decision fairly accurately, with all the 
relevant parameters, and have to evaluate the plausibility of the outcome 
based on those parameters. If the situation is ambiguous, we are more likely 
to find supporting evidence for the information presented as it would make 
an alternative outcome plausible if the task was to be repeated, therefore 
leading to a conclusion that the presented outcome could have been correct. 
As you can see, a judgement process certainly seems fitting for the description 
of processes underlying false feedback acceptance.   
Pärnamets et al. (2015) further stipulate that since choice blindness 
appears to be a result of using environmental information to judge our own 
behaviour, the phenomenon is best described by self-perception theory (Bem, 
1967). According to this theory, individuals come to know their own attitudes 
by observing their own behaviour and the circumstances in which it occurs, 
and therefore: “to the extent that internal cues are weak, ambiguous or 
uninterpretable, the individual is functionally in the same position as an 
outside observer.” –Bem, 1967, p2. Both the Barnum effect and choice 
blindness paradigms appear to be the perfect illustration of self-perception 
theory. Not only do they demonstrate that people will use external cues above 
their previously indicated responses to infer their own characteristics and 
preferences (e.g., Forer, 1949; Johansson et al., 2005), but research has also 
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demonstrated that accepting false feedback can also affect future behaviour 
(Halperin & Snyder, 1979; Johansson et al., 2014; Merckelbach et al., 2011; 
Sakamoto et al., 2000), indicating that instead of accessing a stable 
representation of the self, we think back to the responses we made and use 
these to infer our attitudes, just as we would for someone else.  
The main problem for the application of self-perception theory arises 
when one considers what ‘weakness of internal cues’ entails, and how this 
can distinguish between individuals and situation more predisposed to false 
feedback acceptance. Bem (1967) proposed that there are, in fact, a number 
of differences in self-perception and interpersonal perception. First, the 
theory does recognise that we can discriminate between some internal stimuli 
(e.g., the amount of effort exerted), however, poses that such discrimination 
is very limited. Second, when making attributions to the self as opposed to 
another, one has vast amounts of knowledge about past behaviours which 
could inform the attitude in question, alongside the current overt behaviour. 
And lastly, Bem (1967) recognises that personal motivations, such as seeking 
to protect self-esteem, are likely to influence how we interpret our own 
behaviour. 
Somerville and McGowan (2016) help clarify when external or 
internal cues may be used to make a judgement, though the Discovered 
Preference hypothesis (Plott, 1966) which poses that when people are faced 
with a new decision, in a new environment, they encounter uncertainty of 
which action would be in their best interest, which results in a strong element 
of randomness, and reliance on external cues. However, as people gain 
experience with the decision in question by repeating the choice process and 
receive consequential feedback their behaviour will evolve and knowledge of 
preference stabilise. In other words, as randomness plays a large part when 
making unfamiliar choices, detection of incongruent outcomes under such 
circumstances would be low (high choice blindness), whereas for choices that 
we have previously encountered on multiple occasions we will be familiar 
with our preference and detection will be high (low choice blindness) – 
exactly the pattern of behaviour described by Somerville and McGowan 
(2016).  
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Whilst the application of discovered preference hypothesis appears 
congruent with the self-perception theory account of false feedback 
acceptance, as familiarity  could explain internal cues becoming strong 
enough to be accurately recognised, the pattern of experience reducing false 
feedback acceptance can also result from building up a sufficient wealth of 
information about our past behaviours to detect that the outcome is out of 
character, equivalent to the constructed preference approach (Lichtenstein & 
Slovic, 2006). The inability to distinguish which theory is better suited to 
describing the mechanisms underlying choice blindness, is a weakness of the 
poorly defined ‘internal cues’ described in self-perception theory.  
Similarly, the pattern of positive feedback being more readily 
accepted in the literature on Barnum effect can be explained using two 
separate sources of internal information differentiated by Bem (1967). The 
first would be the heightened ability to recall positive information (as 
discussed with respect to availability heuristic) resulting in increased amount 
of knowledge about socially positive attitudes which can be used to judge the 
situation, thus making the negative feedback more likely to appear 
incongruent leading to its rejected. The second would be the direct effect of 
cognitions guided by personal motivation, such as the self-serving bias 
(Heider, 1958), or the tendency to attribute positive events to the self and 
negative events to external factors (i.e., the profile was positive because of 
my traits, versus the profile was negative because of the poor instrument 
design). Macdonald and Standing (2002), argue that self-serving bias is the 
main, if not the only explanation required for the Barnum effect. Yet other 
evidence suggesting that the Barnum effect can be induced for negative 
feedback (e.g., Dmitruk et al., 1973; Poškus, 2014; Wyman & Vyse, 2008) 
indicates this should not be considered in isolation. Regardless, whether the 
tendency to rate positive feedback as accurate is a result of a memory bias, or 
motivated cognition that takes place in the moment, self-perception theory 
does not help us discriminate between the two.    
Generally, self-perception theory is capable of accommodating most 
effects observed in false feedback acceptance literature. However, at this 
stage it is too broad and general to provide us with a precise prediction of 
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when internal cues are weak or strong, and fails to provide a description of 
what happens when we judge our behaviour using external cues, or ‘self-
perceive’.  This is not to say the information provided is not useful, simply 
that we need more if we are to gain full understanding of when and why false 
feedback is accepted.  
The predictions made by self-perception theory can also be explained 
by cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). Cognitive dissonance theory states 
when there is an inconsistency between cognitions, such as beliefs, attitudes 
or behaviours, people experience mental discomfort, or dissonance, which 
results in one or more of the cognitions to be adjusted in order to establish 
consistency. In the context of accepting invalid feedback, cognitive 
dissonance theory would predict that when we receive feedback about our 
own characteristics or choices that is inconsistent with the earlier expressed 
responses, we would experience mental discomfort and either change our 
belief about the earlier choice or reject the feedback itself, depending on 
which of the two elements receives more support from either internal or 
external cues.  
It seems that cognitive dissonance provides a plausible alternative to 
self-perception in the explanation of what leads to acceptance of invalid 
feedback, through the introduction of a new cognitive element – dissonance, 
or mental discomfort. To my knowledge, there has been no research which 
allows us to identify whether discomfort is experienced for participants who 
are presented with invalid information about the self in the Barnum effect. 
For choice blindness, neither the analysis of people’s justification for 
erroneous feedback (Johansson et al., 2006), nor the decision confidence post 
feedback manipulation (Johansson et al., 2005) reveal any sign of introduced 
discomfort or uncertainty. Although this is not necessarily unusual, since 
neither of the measures were designed to capture mental discomfort 
experienced by the participants as a result of the mismatch between choice 
and outcome. Nonetheless, cognitive dissonance introduces a new mental 
variable that to this date is yet to be established, making the self-perception 
approach the more parsimonious one.  
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 Overall it appears that some of the approaches used by researchers to 
explain choice blindness date back as far as half a century (e.g., Bem, 1967), 
yet these approaches are still largely under debate with no unified theory 
established to how the different explanations fit together (e.g., Gawronski & 
Strack, 2004). However, as long as the theories are in agreement as to the 
description of how choice blindness should behave they should all be treated 
as possible contenders for the mechanism underlying choice blindness. Self-
perception and cognitive dissonance theories both predict that when faced 
with inaccurate choice feedback, either we will misremember our past choice 
or reject the current feedback, with an increase in rejection for choices that 
have been repeated many times previously. Similarly, whether choices are 
discovered or constructed, we expect them to be less stable (thus susceptible 
to choice blindness) before we become familiar with these choices and rely 
more on the environmental conditions in which they are presented, which in 
turn can affect choice blindness by creating more or less ambiguous 
conditions.  Sadly, the lack of a single coherent theory of cognition still 
prevails across all of psychology, but hopefully by describing how various 
behaviours manifest, we are taking small steps to deciphering what exactly is 
going on in our brains when we fail to detect the errors in information 
concerning our own traits and preferences. My own research, presented in the 
following chapters, attempts to contribute to such a description by 
establishing the circumstances under which we are likely to accept invalid 
feedback (chapters 5 through 7), and whether this results in updating our 
beliefs about our own behavioural propensities (chapter 4).  
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4.1 Abstract 
Past research has demonstrated that accepting bogus feedback about 
the self, known as the ‘Barnum’ effect, can affect human behaviour (Halperin 
& Snyder, 1979; Sakamoto et al., 2000).  However, this research has failed to 
compare the effects of the bogus feedback to that of real feedback, making it 
impossible to conclude whether different types of feedback equally contribute 
to altering behaviour. Furthermore, the methodology has been limited to using 
written prose feedback, delivered to female only samples, posing potential 
problems for the generality of the research. In the current paper, we use 
validated personality and risk attitude measures to revisit this research area 
over two experiments; looking at how altering personality feedback can affect 
willingness to volunteer for psychology experiments and how risk attitude 
feedback can affect risky choices respectively. Both experiments partially 
elicit the Barnum effect, with feedback altered to suggest personality 
associated with high likelihood to volunteer for experiments, and lowered 
financial risk preference rated as of similar accuracy to real feedback. The 
type of feedback presented did not impact the responses provided on the 
subsequent measures, with data consistent with the null hypothesis, 
suggesting false personal feedback does not impact subsequent behaviour. 
The possible reason for the findings differing from previously reported results 
are discussed.  
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4.2 Introduction 
The ‘Barnum effect’ refers to the tendency to accept bogus feedback 
about the self, whether it is applicable to everyone or simply untrue, because 
it is supposedly derived from personality assessment procedures (Furnham, 
1989; Meehl, 1956). Forer (1949) was the first to demonstrate this 
phenomenon, by administering a personality test to 39 students, and asking 
them to indicate how accurately they believed the profile generated from the 
personality measure described them. Forer (1949) pretended to score the tests 
himself, however, instead he copied a personality description from an 
astrology column of a newspaper and gave it to his participants as their 
personalised descriptions. The average accuracy score provided by the 
students was of 4.3 out of 5, suggesting high perceived accuracy of the 
statements provided. 
Although initially known as the fallacy of personal validation and the 
Forer effect, the term ‘Barnum effect’ was later popularised by Meehl (1956), 
so named after P.T. Barnum – a circus entertainer with the catch phrase ‘we 
have something for everybody’. This phenomenon has since been well 
documented, with a lot of attention being given to why the effect occurs and 
how it varies across different situations (see Dickson & Kelly, 1985; Furnham 
& Schofield, 1987; Snyder et al., 1977). Although many researchers warn of 
possible negative effects associated with the Barnum effect (e.g., Dickson & 
Kelly, 1985; Furnham, 1989; Furnham & Schofield, 1987; Snyder et al., 
1977) the literature has been predominantly concerned with the issues the 
phenomenon poses for psychometric measure validation, whilst the 
consequences of accepting bogus personality feedback on the individual have 
seldom been researched. In particular, might people start to behave in a way 
that assimilates with the false feedback? That is, if people fall for the Barnum 
effect, could this shape their later behaviour? 
To date we were able to identify two studies looking into the impact 
of Barnum effect on subsequent behaviour; one examining the effects of 
bogus feedback suggesting high susceptibility to phobia treatment on 
response to the treatment of fear of snakes (Halperin & Snyder, 1979), and 
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the other looking at effects of extraversion feedback on stranger interaction 
(Sakamoto et al., 2000). Both studies successfully demonstrate that accepting 
bogus feedback can alter subsequent behaviours in the direction associated 
with the traits suggested by the feedback. This finding carries important 
implications for feedback use in clinical treatment, as well as non-clinical 
behavioural change (Halperin & Snyder, 1979), and can help us understand 
how external information shapes human behaviour (e.g., Self-Perception 
theory, Bem, 1967). It is, however, surprising that despite the broad scope of 
domains to which the Barnum effect can be applied, only two such studies are 
reported. Furthermore, both studies suffer from limitations that complicate 
outcome interpretations and question the validity of results. Accordingly, we 
will present these limitations for discussion and introduce two new 
experiments designed to test Barnum effect consequence in two oft-cited 
domains in psychometric and behavioural literature – personality measures 
and risk behaviours respectively. 
The first study by Halperin and Snyder (1979) reported that presenting 
female participants with bogus, supposedly personalised, feedback 
suggesting high potential to change leads to enhanced effects of clinical 
treatment for fear of snakes. The feedback used in this study was a hand-
written personality assessment, which suggested that a previously taken 
personality test revealed that the participants’ personality was well suited to 
change. Participant’s responsiveness to treatment was then compared 
between the group that received the aforementioned feedback, and a group 
that received no feedback at all. A positive effect of feedback was reported 
for both self-report (Snake Fear Questionnaire; Klorman, Weerts, Hastings, 
Melamed & Lang, 1974) and behavioural (Behavioural Avoidance test; 
Nawas, 1971) outcomes. 
The second study by Sakamoto et al. (2000) investigated the effects 
of bogus extraversion and introversion feedback on female participants’ self-
image and nature of their interaction with a confederate. The study used four 
questionnaire formats to assess personality; ‘academic’ personality tests and 
‘popular’ personality tests, in multiple choice and open ended question 
versions. Bogus feedback was designed for each of the questionnaires, either 
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suggesting the participants were highly extraverted or highly introverted. The 
authors conclude that giving participants bogus extraversion feedback results 
in a higher self-image, increase in conversation with a confederate, better 
impression of the confederate by the participant, as well as of the participant 
by the confederate, compared to participants who received the bogus 
introversion feedback. 
Let us first discuss the validity of the conclusions provided by each 
experiment individually. Halperin and Snyder (1979) demonstrate 
ecologically valid results that are consistent throughout the behavioural and 
self-report measures used. However, as the authors themselves note the lack 
of an appropriate control group (a group that receives neutral, or opposite 
feedback) means the observed effects may be a result of receiving any 
diagnostic feedback, or even simply the extra time commitment to the 
experiment. Although it is argued that in a clinical setting providing negative 
feedback is not ethical, the use of a neutral group that is provided with real or 
neutral feedback may provide an appropriate solution for future research. 
Alternatively, we can extrapolate from the bi-directional feedback effects 
observed by Sakamoto et al. (2000), where introversion and extraversion 
feedback result in behaviour associated with each trait respectively. Yet, this 
approach also fails to provide a definitive conclusion, as without a neutral 
control group we cannot determine whether extraversion and introversion 
feedback both lead to behavioural change or whether one simply maintains 
the behaviour at a level similar to neutral feedback, or no feedback at all.   
The research by Sakamoto et al. (2000) also provides evidence that 
bogus feedback can impact behaviour related to the feedback across a range 
of dependent measures, however, these measures comprised only a third of 
the outcome variables reported, with the remaining eight measures showing 
no significant effects of feedback (sitting distance, time for conversation, 
period of eye contacts, acceptability of result, pleasure in test, relaxedness, 
comfortableness, positive feelings). This complicates the interpretation of 
results since no explanation is provided for why bogus feedback may impact 
some, but not other, behaviours hypothesised to be related to the feedback 
trait. Furthermore, the effects observed also appear to be inconsistent across 
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the different questionnaire types used, for example when participants believed 
they were receiving feedback for an open-ended popular personality test the 
direction of the effects observed was the opposite to that concluded for the 
impression of the person by confederate as well as time spent talking to a 
stranger, despite the authors’ observation that popular tests are better at 
eliciting feedback effects. Overall it appears that despite the proposed 
conclusion that providing people with feedback that suggests they are 
extraverted makes them behave in a manner more akin to that of an 
extraverted person, we must be cautious with regards to accepting the validity 
of the results at face value. 
Aside from the limitations specific to each of the methodologies used, 
the aforementioned research shares a number of traits that may preclude us 
from reaching a valid conclusion. For instance, both studies used specifically 
designed written feedback, delivered to the participants by the experimenter. 
This may run a risk of providing participants with additional information 
about the experimenters’ expectations and thus increase demand 
characteristics, especially in the study by Sakamoto et al. (2000) where the 
experimenter read the feedback to the participants face to face. Although this 
may still be considered an effect of the bogus feedback, its presence can only 
be concluded for participants’ behaviour when they know they are being 
observed by the people who provided the feedback in the first place. The use 
of written prose is also inconsistent with personality assessments commonly 
encountered in academic or organisational settings (e.g., Myer’s-Briggs Type 
indicator – Myers, 1962; Myers, McCaulley, Quenk & Hammer, 1998; 
International Personality Item Pool (IPIP) – Goldberg et al., 2006), which 
organise individuals along trait scales creating directly interpretable numeric 
feedback. Since many individuals may be aware of the common practice of 
using numeric personality descriptors, they may have been suspicious of the 
vague format and not experienced the Barnum effect, which cannot be 
directly established since feedback accuracy was not measured in either of 
the experiments. 
It is important to note that the lack of establishing Barnum effect, or 
measuring the accuracy of the feedback provided, can in itself complicate the 
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interpretation of results. For example, without the ability to demonstrate that 
participants accepted the feedback observed, there remains a possibility that 
the behavioural changes observed by Halperin and Snyder (1979) and 
Sakamoto et al. (2000) does not require the Barnum effect at all, and are a 
result of a more direct associative process, such as priming (e.g., Herr, 1986). 
On the other hand, if the post feedback effects observed are dependent on 
believing the feedback received, there is a possibility that there is a limit to 
the types of behavioural change that can be achieved using this methodology. 
For instance, recent research has shown that although people are likely to 
accept positive feedback about the self, they tend to reject negative feedback 
(Macdonald & Standing, 2002), thus suggesting that the Barnum effect can 
only exist for positive feedback and in turn can only be used to achieve 
behaviours associated with socially positive traits.  
Another concern with the research that demonstrated the behavioural 
consequences of the Barnum effect is that both experiments only used female 
samples, thus providing uncertainty as to whether the results can be 
generalised to males also. This presents a concern as females tend to accept 
feedback more easily than males (Layne, 1998). In addition, the systematic 
personality differences (higher on neuroticism, extraversion, agreeableness, 
and conscientiousness – Schmitt, Realo, Voracek & Allik, 2008), and higher 
sensitivity to the experimenter effect (Deaux, 1985) in females compared to 
males could confound the experiment, making it difficult to pinpoint the role 
gender may have played in the experiments.  
Overall, it appears that research into the consequences of the Barnum 
effect indicates that accepting false feedback can subsequently affect human 
behaviour. However, this research is limited to only two domains, does not 
establish whether the Barnum effect actually occurs, lacks appropriate control 
groups and uses a very limited sample making the interpretations of the results 
limited at best. Accordingly, here we present two experiments that explore 
whether providing false feedback impacts subsequent responses perceived to 
be related to that feedback. In order to make sure our results are widely 
generalizable we picked domains that dominate psychometric measurement 
and behavioural change fields respectively – personality assessment and risk 
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taking behaviours, in order to test the impact false feedback can have on 
individuals.  
4.3 Experiment 1 
The main aim of experiment one was to establish whether altering 
participants’ personality scores in the direction perceived to be associated 
with high or low likelihood to volunteer for psychology experiments would 
impact self-reported likelihood to volunteer for experiments in the future. 
Personality assessment was selected as the independent variable 
because of its prominence across a range of disciplines, including academic, 
clinical and personnel recruitment. Specifically, the International Personality 
Item Pool (Goldberg et al., 2006; IPIP, 2006) measure of the Big Five 
personality factors was selected as the measure of choice because it is publicly 
available (IPIP, 2006), widely used, and is organised according to one of the 
most widely known personality taxonomies (Gow, Whiteman, Pattie & 
Deary, 2005).   
Self-reported likelihood to volunteer for psychological experiments 
was selected as the dependent variable because the measure is perceived to 
be easily verifiable post experiment, providing participants with an incentive 
to answer as honestly as possible. To ensure the bogus feedback provided to 
participants was associated with either low or high likelihood to volunteer, a 
pilot study was conducted that established how people perceived volunteering 
for psychology experiments to relate to personality traits. 
Although the Big Five approach to personality is one of the most 
recognised psychometric tools, there are a number of concerns in applying it 
to the Barnum effect and behavioural change. First, the use of multiple traits 
makes it difficult to control for the individuals’ personality due to the 
covariance of the traits, willingness to accept false feedback and susceptibility 
to the aforementioned feedback. Additionally, the introduction of all five 
traits as behavioural predictors poses a problem for the power of the 
experiment. Although we ensure that the base personalities of the participants 
do not differ between conditions, and exclude the traits from further analysis, 
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this is not ideal but cannot be overcome due to lack of a single trait measure 
that can comprehensively capture a personality profile.    
Second, when using the Big Five trait measures the elicitation of the 
Barnum effect has been shown to be limited, with participants rating 
personality profiles as less accurate the more they differ from their real profile 
(Andersen & Nordvik, 2002). It has also been shown that there is a high 
likelihood that a profile will be rejected if the personality profile used to 
describe the participant is perceived a negative (Macdonald & Standing, 
2002). Although the possibility that no participants will accept the Bogus 
feedback is certainly a concern, as long as a proportion of participants rate the 
bogus feedback as more accurate than chance, the experiment allows us to 
establish whether the Barnum effect can impact subsequent self-report 
willingness to volunteer for psychology experiments (by examining the 
interaction effects of feedback type with feedback accuracy). 
Overall, the study took on an independent measures design, with type 
of bogus feedback (consistent with high likelihood to volunteer, consistent 
with low likelihood to volunteer, and real) and participants’ accuracy rating 
of the seen feedback (rating on a Likert scale of 0 to 10) as independent 
variables, and likelihood to volunteer across four different types of 
experiment (online, via phone, face to face with experimenter, group setting) 
as the dependent variable.  The focal question of the experiment was whether 
believing altered feedback can impact subsequent self-report likelihood to 
volunteer.  
4.3.1 Method 
Participants 
One hundred and seventy-nine participants (86 female) were recruited 
online using the Prolific academic online recruitment platform with a mean 
age of 29.40 (SD=10.12). All participants were required to satisfy age 
(between 18 and 80 years old) and language requirements (English as a first 
language) in order to take part in the experiment. 
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Materials 
Personality. The self-report personality measure used was the short 
version (50-items) of the International Personality Item Pool (Goldberg et al., 
2006; IPIP, 2006), a publicly available measure of the Big Five personality 
factors – Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and 
Neuroticism. The measure uses 10 questions to measure each trait on a ten 
point Likert Scale, with half of the items negatively scored.  The measure is 
widely used and has good internal consistency and correlations with the oft-
cited Costa and McCrae’s (1992) NEO-FFI measure (Gow et al., 2005).   
Personality feedback was created based on the personality traits 
people think of when asked to describe a person that is either very likely to 
volunteer for psychology experiments, or very unlikely to volunteer for 
psychology experiments depending on condition. A volunteer sample of 22 
people was asked to imagine a person most likely to volunteer for psychology 
experiments, and rate this person’s Big Five traits on a scale of one to five. 
One indicating very low on that trait, and five indicating very high on the trait. 
The responses indicated that people perceived high trait Openness, 
Conscientiousness, Extraversion, and Agreeableness and low trait 
Neuroticism to be associated with people likely to volunteer for psychology 
experiments. 
Accordingly, Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, and 
Agreeableness scores were transformed onto a scale of 51 to 100, and 
Neuroticism scores onto a scale of 1 to 50, for feedback associated with high 
likelihood to volunteer. For simplicity purposes, this will be referred to as 
enhanced feedback. For feedback associated with low likelihood to volunteer 
for psychology experiments participants’ Openness, Conscientiousness, 
Extraversion, and Agreeableness scores were transformed onto a scale of 1 to 
50, and Neuroticism scores onto a scale of 51 to 100. This will be referred to 
as reduced feedback. For the control feedback condition participants were 
shown their actual scores, referred to as real. 
The feedback was provided alongside a question asking ‘How 
accurately would you say this describes you’ for each trait. The answers were 
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given on a Likert scale of 0 to 10, ranging from ‘Completely Accurate’ to 
‘Completely Inaccurate’. 
Volunteering Questions. The Volunteering questions were selected to 
cover a wide range of psychology research study types.  Intrusive research, 
such as medical interventions and physiological measures, was not included 
to avoid privacy, ethics and health concerns, as well as to make it seem 
realistic that participants might be approached to volunteer at a later date. 
Four research types were selected; online research, over the phone research, 
face to face research and group research. For the latter two categories, 
participants were told the research would take place varying locations and 
they would be able to pick the location most convenient for them. Participants 
were required to report how likely they would be to volunteer for each type 
of experiment on a scale of 0 to 10, from ‘Definitely Not’ to Definitely Yes’. 
Procedure 
The study was presented using the Qualtrics Software platform. The 
survey consisted of demographic questions, the IPIP NEO 50 personality 
scale, followed by feedback accuracy ratings and volunteering questions. 
Within each questionnaire, all questions were randomised to avoid order 
effects. The participants were required to provide informed consent before 
starting the study, and were provided with debrief information as well as 
contact details of the researcher in case of any concerns at the end.  
4.3.2 Results 
Fifteen (of 179) participants were excluded from the analysis because 
participant scored below 5 or above 95 on one or more personality traits, 
which would result in no difference in feedback between reduced and real 
(floor effect) or enhanced and real (ceiling effect) scores respectively.  
IPIP personality scores. The average trait scores were 66.85 
(SD=13.66) for Openness, 60.93 (SD=14.77) for Conscientiousness, 45.65 
(SD=18.06) for Extraversion, 65.34 (SD=13.24) for Agreeableness and 46.19 
(SD=18.59) for Neuroticism. Multivariate GLM analysis revealed no 
significant difference in personality profiles between different conditions (F 
(10, 316) =.955, p=.483)    
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Barnum effect. The average accuracy rating for the personality 
feedback was 6.21 (SD=1.73). The accuracy scores were 6.99 (SD=1.47) for 
enhanced, 5.18 (SD=1.48) for reduced and 6.73 (SD=1.88) for real feedback 
conditions. The difference between conditions was significant (F (2,161) 
=24.630, p<.001). Pairwise comparisons revealed that the accuracy ratings in 
the reduced feedback condition were significantly lower than the accuracy 
ratings for the real feedback condition (p<.001) and enhanced feedback 
condition (p=.001), there was no significant difference between the real and 
enhance feedback accuracy scores. The scores were significantly higher than 
the mid value (neither accurate, nor inaccurate) of 5 (p<.05) for enhanced and 
real feedback, but not for reduced feedback (t (64) =1.019, p=.312). 
No effects of gender were detected for feedback accuracy, overall 
(male M=6.16, female M=6.27; F (1, 162) =.194, p>.1), or by feedback type 
(p>.1). 
Feedback Effects. The average likelihood to volunteer (across all 
experiment types) was 5.16 (SD=2.45) overall, 4.96 (SD=2.64) for enhanced, 
5.00 (SD=2.42) for reduced, and 5.70 (SD=2.18) for real feedback conditions.  
A Multivariate GLM analysis was carried out using the likelihood to 
volunteer for the four separate experiment types (online, phone, face to face 
and group) as dependent variables, and feedback condition (enhanced, 
reduced or real) as a predictor variable. Feedback acceptance was not 
included in the analysis due to its strong relationship with condition, which 
would have resulted in collinearity. There was no significant effect of 
condition (F (2, 158) =1.679, p=.190) overall, or for any of the likelihood to 
volunteer measures in isolation (p>.05)  
The analysis was further repeated using a Bayesian linear regression 
approach, to establish whether a model using condition as a predictor variable 
was more likely than the null hypothesis. A BF01 of 5.933 was observed, 
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suggesting that these data are 5.933 times more likely to be observed under 
the null hypothesis1. 
No effects of gender were detected for feedback accuracy, overall 
(male M=5.10, female M=5.24; F (1, 162) =.125, p>.5), or by feedback type 
(p>.5). 
4.3.3 Experiment 1 Summary 
The results of experiment one suggest that the Barnum effect can be 
successfully induced, with false feedback rated as highly accurate by the 
participants, however, this only occurs for enhanced feedback, whereas 
accuracy of reduced feedback is rated as neither accurate nor inaccurate 
(midpoint value). No subsequent effects of feedback type presented on self-
reported willingness to volunteer for psychology experiments was detected, 
even when controlling for the perceived accuracy of the feedback. In fact, the 
differences in willingness to volunteer between the people who saw different 
feedback types were so small, that it is more likely that feedback type had no 
effect, than that it did.  
Whilst it is apparent that no effect of condition can be detected on 
subsequent willingness to volunteer in the current sample, there are a number 
of limitations which may have contributed to this. First, the feedback 
augmentation method was based on real personality scores which varied 
between individuals, in turn resulting in varied feedback scores. This 
variation made it difficult to control for similarity of feedback without 
introducing participants’ real traits as a confounding variable, and could have 
precluded the effect that may have been apparent if fixed feedback was used. 
However, this method allowed to control for personality and ensure that the 
direction in which the feedback changes personality was indeed inaccurate. 
                                                            
1 Both the GLM and Bayesian Regression analysis were validated with analysis 
controlling for participants’ personality scores, and the same pattern of results was 
observed. There was no significant effects of condition. Neuroticism (F (4,150) =2.938, 
p=.023) and Extraversion (F (4,150) =3.062, p=.018) were significant predictors of self-
reported likelihood to volunteer, whereas effects of Openness, Conscientiousness and 
Agreeableness were not significant (p>.05). Bayesian analysis revealed that the data were 
more likely to be observed under a model only using personality traits as predictors, 
compared to a model including feedback condition and accuracy ratings (BF01=2.557).  
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In piloting this study fixed numbers were initially used, revealing that extreme 
profiles (e.g., 100 or 0 on all traits) were not believable, and moderate profiles 
(75 or 25 across traits) often augmented feedback in the direction opposite to 
the one desired. Another problem arises when we consider that personality 
has often been found to impact the propensity to accept invalid feedback as 
well as volunteering behaviour, making it difficult to tear apart the effects it 
may directly exert on self-reported likelihood to volunteer, from the effect 
mediated by the feedback acceptance or any interactions of the two. With five 
variables being manipulated it is exceedingly difficult to control for the effect 
of original and presented personality, as there are multiple correlation and 
interactions that may be taking place and precluding a real effect. 
Accordingly, in experiment two, we only manipulate one trait which is 
directly relevant to the subsequent behaviour measured, which would allow 
us to better envision an interaction between real feedback and the direction in 
which it is augmented. 
4.4 Experiment 2 
The focal aim of experiment two was to establish whether altering 
participants’ financial risk attitude scores in either the risk seeking or risk 
averse direction would impact subsequent preferences for risky versus certain 
monetary lotteries. 
Risky choice was selected as the domain of interest given its 
prominence in the behavioural science literature. Although risky choice is 
often perceived as an economics domain with unique cognitive mechanisms, 
it has been proposed that risky choice should be treated the same as other 
types of choice and thus should be susceptible to general mechanisms such as 
feedback effects (Chater, Johansson & Hall, 2011).  
The Domain Specific Risk Taking scale (DOSPERT, Blais & Weber, 
2006) was used to measure risk attitudes, as it is a validated measure with 
good predictive power of risk taking behaviour (Harrison, Young, Butow, 
Salkeld & Solomon, 2005). The subsequent risk taking behaviour was 
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assessed through choices between certain and risky lotteries designed by 
Lauriola, Levin and Hart (2007). 
The DOSPERT scare measures ethical, financial, health and safety, 
recreational and social risk attitudes. In the experimental manipulation, bogus 
feedback was created for the financial risk preference trait only.  This is 
because people who exhibiting high levels of risk taking in one content area 
can be quite risk averse in other risky domains (Hanoch, Johnson & Wilke, 
2006), and financial risk attitude is the most relevant to the lottery task used 
as the dependent variable in the current experiment. In addition, this 
eliminates some of the covariance and power concerns discussed in 
experiment one. Two types of altered financial risk attitude feedback were 
created – enhanced and reduced. Real feedback was used as a control group. 
Overall, the study took on an independent measures design, with type 
of bogus financial risk preference feedback (enhanced, reduced, and real) and 
participants’ accuracy rating of the feedback (rating on a Likert scale of 0 to 
10) as independent variables, and the financial risk preference as exhibited in 
risky choice (proportion of trials on which the risky choice was preferred over 
the certain choice) as the dependent variable.  Based on past literature, it is 
hypothesised that participants will be more likely to select risky choices if 
they accept feedback that they are financially risk seeking, and less likely to 
select risky choices if they accept feedback that they are financially risk 
averse. 
4.4.1 Method 
Participants 
One hundred and eighty-four participants (71 female), with the 
average age of 29.56 (SD=8.92) took part in the study. 
Materials 
Risk Attitudes. Risk attitudes were measured using the DOSPERT 
scale (Blais & Weber, 2006). The scale was designed to measure the 
likelihood with which the participants would partake in risky activities across 
five domains; ethical, financial, health and safety, recreational and social. The 
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measure is comprised of 30 items, with 6 positively scored items per domain. 
The answers are rated on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Extremely 
Unlikely) to 7 (Extremely Likely).  
Feedback. Feedback was presented as a number between 1 and 100, 
for each domain. For ethical, health and safety, recreational and social 
domains, participants saw the real scores generated by the DOSPERT scale. 
For financial feedback participants saw their scores transformed onto a scale 
of 51 to 100 for the enhanced condition, 1 to 50 for the reduced condition and 
real feedback in the control condition. Participants were asked to indicate how 
accurately they think the feedback on each trait describes them on a Likert 
scale of 0 to 10 ranging from Completely Accurate to Completely Inaccurate. 
Participants were allocated randomly to each condition.  
Risky Choice. A subset of lotteries designed by Lauriola et al. (2007) 
was used to examine behaviour in a risky decision making task. In the task, 
participants are told to imagine that they are presented with two contracts, one 
of which they have to agree to sign and the other reject. One of the contracts 
offers a sure thing amount, whereas the other offers an uncertain amount 
proportionate to the riskiness involved.  
The original measure constituted a 2 x 5 x 6 independent measures 
factorial design. Half of the trials involve choosing between gains, and the 
other half between losses. Five levels of probability were used for the 
uncertain choice (0.02, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75 and 0.98), and the sure thing amount 
was set between 50 cents and $50000 in logarithmic steps of value.   
In this study, the contracts were presented in pounds instead of dollars 
to suit local currency. The 50000 value was excluded from the measure, due 
to the time-consuming nature of the task identified by volunteers in the 
piloting phase, leaving a 2 x 5 x 5 design (i.e., with six levels).  
The final measure was comprised of 50 items, varying across the three 
described levels of factors that may have a possible effect on risky decision 
making.  
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Procedure 
The experiment was carried out online. The materials were combined 
with questions about age, gender and education, and a survey was created 
using the Qualtrics software platform.  Questions within each questionnaire, 
as well as the risky and non-risky lottery options were randomised to avoid 
order effects. 
Participants were recruited and paid through the Prolific Academic 
crowdsourcing platform. They were required to enter a valid Prolific 
Academic ID at the beginning and to click on a link at the end of the study to 
confirm study completion. Only participants with English as their first 
language, and between the ages of 18 and 80 were allowed to take part, to 
ensure full understanding. 
4.4.2 Results 
10 (out of 184) participants were excluded from the analysis because 
participant scored below or above 5 on the financial risk attitude score on the 
DOSPERT scale, which would result in no difference in feedback between 
reduced and real (floor effect) or enhanced and real (ceiling effect) scores 
respectively.  
Financial Risk Attitude. The mean score for financial risk attitude on 
the DOSPERT scale was 33.94 (SD=17.30), which did not differ significantly 
between feedback conditions (F (2, 171) =.076, p=.927).  
Barnum effect. The average accuracy rating for the Financial Risk 
preference feedback was 6.75 (SD=2.20). The accuracy scores were 5.98 
(SD=2.35) for enhanced, 7.03 (SD=2.25) for reduced and 7.05 (SD=1.88) for 
real feedback conditions. A GLM analysis using financial risk preference 
scores, feedback condition and an interaction of the two as independent 
variables, and perceived accuracy as a dependent variable (F (5, 168) =6.583, 
p<.001), revealed that financial risk preference was not a significant predictor 
of accuracy ratings (F (1, 172) =.125, p=.724), whereas condition (F (2, 171) 
=15.290 p<.001) and the interaction of condition and financial risk 
preferences (F (2, 171) =11.512, p<.001) were significant. Pairwise 
comparisons of accuracy ratings between feedback condition revealed that the 
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accuracy ratings in the enhanced feedback condition were significantly lower 
than the accuracy ratings for the real feedback condition (p=.036) and reduced 
feedback condition (p=.034), all other comparisons were not significant. The 
scores in each condition were significantly higher than the mid value (neither 
accurate nor inaccurate) of 5 (p<.05). A Pearson’s correlation analysis further 
demonstrated that when participants saw enhanced feedback, financial risk 
preference was positively correlated with accuracy ratings (r=.405, n=47, 
p=.005) and when they say reduced feedback financial risk preference was 
negatively correlated with accuracy ratings (r=-.406, n=68, p=.001). There 
was no relationship between the two measures when participants received real 
feedback (r=-.073, n=59, p>.05). This effect is most likely a result of change 
in similarity between the altered and real feedback, with feedback similar to 
real preferences more likely to be accepted.  
No effects of gender were detected for feedback accuracy (male 
M=6.72; female M=6.76; not disclosed M=10), overall (F (2,172) =1.103, 
p>.1) or by feedback type (p>.1). 
Feedback Effects. The average risk preference (the proportion of 
lotteries on which participants preferred the riskier choice) was .255 
(SD=.223) overall, with .236 (SD=.237) enhanced, 0.247 (SD=.203) for 
reduced, and .280 (SD=.235) for real feedback conditions   
A GLM analysis was carried out using participants’ risk preference as 
the dependent variable, and feedback condition and the real financial risk 
attitude scores. Accuracy ratings for financial risk attitude score were not 
included in the model due to the observed collinearity with condition. The 
model was significant overall (F (5, 168) =4.097, p=.002; R2=.109), with a 
significant main effect of financial risk attitudes (F (1, 168) =18.798, p<.001). 
Neither the effect of condition (F (2, 168) =.833, p=.437), nor interaction of 
condition and financial risk attitudes (F (1, 168) =.569, p=.567) were 
significant.  
The analysis was further repeated using a Bayesian linear regression 
approach to establish whether the type of feedback received can predict risk 
preference scores with a better likelihood than the financial risk attitude 
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scores alone. The data was more likely to be observed under model including 
financial attitude scores only (BF01=4.95) compared to a model including 
financial risk attitude scores and condition as predictor variables.  
No significant effect of gender on the proportion of risky choices 
made was detected (male M=.27; female M=.24; Not Disclosed M=.30), 
overall (F (2,171) =.363, p=.696) or by feedback type (p>.05). 
4.4.3 Experiment 2 Summary 
The results of experiment two suggest that the Barnum effect can be 
successfully induced for risk attitudes, with false feedback rated as highly 
accurate by the participants. This is only the case however, for reduced risk 
preference, whereas enhanced risk preference feedback is rated as neither 
accurate nor inaccurate (midpoint value). No subsequent effects of feedback 
type presented on preferences for hypothetical certain versus risky lotteries 
were detected. The differences in choices made between the people who saw 
different feedback types were so small, that it is more likely that feedback 
type had no effect than that it did.  
Experiment two addresses some of the concerns observed in 
experiment one, such as the inability to control for the role of personality traits 
in feedback acceptance due to multiple traits being altered. For instance, by 
only varying one of the traits reported, we are able to assess whether the 
variation in real financial risk preferences could impact the propensity to 
accept feedback, which in this experiment does not appear to be the case. On 
the other hand, we do find that similarity of the altered feedback to real trait 
scores generated does appear to impact the likelihood of feedback acceptance. 
Whilst this makes it difficult to keep a consistent level of deviation from real 
personality across participants, as mentioned previously this was the optimal 
method identified in augmenting personality relative to the real traits, without 
making the feedback too extreme to be believable. 
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4.5 Discussion 
The research presented was designed to establish whether accepting 
bogus feedback about the self, or the Barnum effect, has subsequent effects 
on participants’ behaviours. Two experiments were carried out investigating 
how believing altered personality and financial risk preference feedback 
impacts self-reported willingness to volunteer for psychology experiments 
and risky choice respectively. Both experiments demonstrated a partial 
Barnum effect. For experiment one participants rated feedback consistent 
with low likelihood to volunteer for psychology experiments as less accurate 
than feedback consistent with high likelihood to volunteer or their real 
personality scores. For experiment two, participants rated enhanced financial 
risk preference feedback as less accurate, compared to reduced financial risk 
attitude feedback, or their real scores. Both experiments failed to demonstrate 
any effect of feedback type on participants’ predictions of how they would 
behave in hypothetical scenarios. For both experiments, the data was more 
likely to be observed under a null hypothesis compared to the alternative 
hypothesis. 
The findings are somewhat surprising, given that both Halperin and 
Snyder (1979) and Sakamoto et al., (2000) have previously found that bogus 
feedback can significantly alter participant behaviour. Recall that Halperin 
and Snyder (1979) found that giving participants feedback that suggests 
higher propensity to respond to therapy, resulted in higher reductions of fear 
of snakes following snake phobia treatment. Sakamoto et al., (2000), further 
reported that giving participants bogus extraversion feedback resulted in 
increased interactions with a stranger (confederate), and better impressions of 
the confederate by the participant, and of the participant by the confederate, 
in comparison to participants who received bogus introversion feedback. 
Nonetheless it is the shortcomings of these studies, such as not using a real or 
neutral control conditions to understand the contribution of each feedback 
type to Barnum effect consequences, and using a female only sample, that 
have lead us to re-visit the subject in the first place, and thus we propose that 
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the likely conclusion is that there is no robust effect of believing false 
information about the self on subsequent behaviours.  
There are a number of possible differences between the research 
presented here and the past methodologies, which can account for the 
different conclusions. Perhaps the most prominent is the failure to 
demonstrate a full Barnum effect in the experiments presented here, as only 
certain types of bogus feedback appear to be accepted in both experiment one 
and experiment two. However, we cannot directly compare this to the past 
experiments, as neither Halperin and Snyder (1979), nor Sakamoto et al. 
(2000) actually measure the feedback acceptance in their experiments, and 
therefore may suffer from the same limitation. In fact, it is likely that this is a 
manifestation of a robust effect described by Macdonald & Standing (2002), 
where participants are only willing to accept the positive feedback about the 
self, and thus we would expect other experiments to present a similar Barnum 
effect pattern thus failing to explain the difference in findings observed. 
Furthermore, although we do not observe the Barnum effect for all conditions, 
for the conditions where it is manifested we can test the hypothesis that 
accepting false feedback would lead to subsequent changes in related domains 
– which does not appear to be the case.  
Another possible reason for the discrepancies in the current findings 
and those of past research is the format of the feedback provided. Halperin 
and Snyder (1979) and Sakamoto et al. (2000) alike used pre-designed verbal 
feedback to elicit the Barnum effect, whereas in the current research we 
enhanced or reduced the scores presented to the participants by transforming 
the numeric outcome from a scale of 1 to 100, to either 1 to 50 or 51-100. 
With the personal nature of verbal feedback, and more opportunity for the 
experimenter to motivate the participants, it is possible that the former elicited 
behavioural effects due an experimenter effect which numbers would not 
capture thus leading to a more accurate conclusion.  On the other hand, the 
multiple ways in which numeric feedback can be interpreted may have failed 
to capture a real effect – although participants were told that the number is 
designed to reflect their performance relative to other people, the average 
performance of the majority is not well defined which could have led to 
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confusion. Although this may limit the conclusions based on the observed 
data to numeric feedback type, the findings remain consequential as this 
comprises a very common format of feedback delivery. 
Another key difference between the experiments presented is that for 
the first time we use a mixed gender sample, whereas in the past female only 
samples were used. There is strong evidence to suggest that females are more 
susceptible to feedback effects as they are more sensitive to the Barnum effect 
(Layne, 1998) and the experimenter effect (Deaux, 1985). However, we find 
no gender difference in feedback susceptibility in the current study, 
suggesting this is unlikely to be the determining factor.  
It is also important to note that both the Barnum effect and the 
consequences it may have on subsequent behaviour may simply be domain 
dependent, with phobia treatment and stranger interaction simply more 
susceptible to change compared to self-reported willingness to volunteer and 
risky choice – although the reasons for this unclear. Perhaps some domains 
simply have a closer relationship with personal feedback. For instance, the 
manipulation of numerous personality traits could introduce complexity 
which could lead to uncertainty on how the traits relate to volunteering 
behaviours. Or the perceived relationship between the personality profiles and 
the dependent variable may have simply not been as strong as that of 
propensity to change and susceptibility to treatment (Halperin & Snyder, 
1979), or extraversion and stranger interaction (Sakamoto et al., 2000). 
However, this should not have been a concern in experiment two given the 
direct relationship between financial risk attitudes and financial risky choice. 
Future research investigating the Barnum effect and its consequences across 
a wide range of feedback types is necessary to establish whether the observed 
pattern is universal or domain dependant.  
Lastly, we must note the possibility that lack of appropriate control 
condition and inconsistent effects of past research has led to concluding an 
effect that may simply not be there. For instance, in the experiment by 
Sakamoto et al. (2000) dependent variables are analysed one by one and only 
statistically significant effects are discussed in conclusion – neglecting the 
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possibility that a multivariate approach to the problem may, in fact, result in 
opposing effects balancing to produce a null effect overall.  
The possibility that believing bogus information about the self does 
not alter subsequent behaviour is very consequential. First, it suggests that 
altering feedback cannot achieve behavioural change, clinical or otherwise, 
as originally proposed by Halperin and Snyder (1979). Second, it 
demonstrates that although we may use external information to guide our 
behaviour (Bem, 1967), this does not appear to extend to relying on feedback 
we think is derived from psychometric measures. 
In conclusion, although past research has indicated that bogus 
feedback can impact subsequent behaviour we fail to detect the same effect. 
The data presented here suggests that bogus personality feedback, and 
financial risk attitude feedback does not have an impact on willingness to 
volunteer for psychology experiments and risky choices respectively, even 
when it is viewed as credible. 
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5.1 Abstract 
Choice blindness is the failure to detect a mismatch between intention 
and outcome when respondents make a choice (Johansson et al., 2005). The 
phenomenon is well established across various decision types and domains, 
from moral opinions (Hall et al., 2012) to haptic stimuli (Steenfeldt-
Kristensen & Thornton, 2013). Research, however, has been largely limited 
to binary choice. Accordingly, we studied how increasing the number of 
decision alternatives to three options affects respondents’ ability to detect the 
switch from their chosen stimulus to a non-selected alternative. We found that 
increasing the number of decision alternatives leads to an increase in switch 
detection, however, only when the alternative wrongly presented as the 
preferred choice was less attractive and dissimilar to the chosen stimulus. The 
roles of salience and preference strength are discussed as possible 
explanations for the observed effect.  
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5.2 Introduction 
Choice blindness refers to the behavioural failure to notice a mismatch 
between choice and outcome. The basic procedure involves presenting 
participants with two alternatives and asking them to select their preferred 
option. Participants then undergo a distractor task, typically rating confidence 
in their choice (Pärnamets et al., 2015), and are then presented with their 
selected option once again. However, in the following feedback stage, their 
choice is switched for the non-selected option and they are asked to explain 
why they preferred the presented option out of the two alternatives originally 
presented. This is followed up by assessing detection retrospectively through 
asking whether the participant noticed anything unusual on completion of the 
experiment (Johansson et al., 2005). The proportion of trials reported as 
detected in past research has varied from 12% to 88%, depending on the type 
of stimulus used in the choice (Johansson et al., 2005; Somerville & 
McGowan, 2016).  
The choice blindness phenomenon was first demonstrated using 
female faces as stimuli and involved using a sleight of hand to switch a 
participant’s preferred choice for the non-chosen alternative before asking 
them to explain why they preferred the presented image (Johansson et al., 
2005). Since it was first reported, the choice blindness paradigm has become 
a well-established psychological method and has been demonstrated with a 
wide range of stimuli, from moral opinions (Hall et al., 2012) to haptic stimuli 
(Steenfeldt-Kristensen & Thornton, 2013). The empirical robustness of the 
choice blindness phenomenon across domains and task types has been 
demonstrated beyond what would be expected from random errors in 
evaluation (Loomes & Sugden, 1998; Woodford, 2014). This has raised 
concerns about models of consumer choices as well as theories of human 
cognition based on assumptions of stable and coherent preferences (e.g., van 
Schaik, Kusev & Juliusson, 2011). Therefore, exploring this psychological 
phenomenon further is fundamental for understanding the nature of 
preference formation and decision consistency.  
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To our knowledge, the choice blindness procedures used in previous 
research have been limited to either judgment tasks or tasks using binary 
choice, with the exception of one study which explored eye-witnesses’ 
recognition of one face among six concurrently presented faces (Sagana et 
al., 2013). Sagana et al. (2013) reported a higher level of switch detection 
than previously reported for choice blindness demonstrated using facial 
stimuli (e.g., Johansson et al., 2005). However, as a result of procedural 
differences, as the study used a field method (closely resembling the legal 
procedure), it is impossible to draw any valid conclusions from cross-study 
comparisons. Furthermore, without a binary choice control condition, it 
remains uncertain how increasing the number of alternatives may impact 
choice blindness. Accordingly, in the current experiment, we use binary and 
ternary variations of the choice blindness paradigm to examine how detection 
of switched choices may be affected by the number of choice alternatives.  
The change from two to three alternatives could influence preferences 
in a manner greater than simply reducing the likelihood of alternatives being 
chosen. For example, Collins and Vossler (2009) report less deviation from 
induced preferences in a ternary choice task than in a binary choice task. Rolfe 
and Bennett (2009) also found that increasing the number of choices can 
reduce decision uncertainty, as demonstrated by the proportion of people 
indicating that they are unsure about their choice. 
Furthermore, choosing from triplets as opposed to pairs could alter 
how respondents treat different characteristics of the presented alternatives, 
such as their attractiveness and similarity. Since similarity of stimuli has been 
found to impact choice blindness in the past (e.g., Sagana et al., 2013; 
Steenfeldt-Kristensen & Thornton, 2013), and differences in attractiveness 
are known to impact preference strength and choice certainty (Olsen, 
Lundhede, Jacobsen & Thorsen, 2011) we anticipate that if we enhance the 
perceived difference of physical features, or the level of attractiveness, 
between alternatives the chance of detecting a switch is likely to be increased. 
Since past research suggests that increasing the number of alternatives is 
capable of producing such change, this further presents an interesting avenue 
to explore.  
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Evidence that perceived similarity is dependent on the number of 
alternatives is quite abundant. For instance, presenting two different 
alternatives alongside a third alternative that is similar to one option but not 
the other, can increase the visual salience of the dissimilar alternative (Taylor 
& Fiske, 1978) as well as the salience of the dimensions on which it differs 
(Bordalo, Gennaioli & Shleifer, 2012). The increase in salience can, in turn, 
enhance the memory for the dissimilar item (Pedale & Santangelo, 2015), as 
well as its perceived magnitude of dissimilarity to the other alternatives 
(Tversky, 1977) – characteristics likely to increase a person’s ability to 
differentiate between the alternatives after encountering them and thus 
increasing detection of mismatch between intended choice and outcome. 
Accordingly, we anticipate the similarity of stimuli may impact how the 
number of alternatives affects choice blindness. 
Whilst the effects of adding a third alternative are well researched for 
alternatives of similar attractiveness and asymmetrically dominated 
alternatives (Ariely, 2008; Huber et al., 1982), the perceived distance between 
alternatives where one is clearly dominant is less established. Nonetheless, 
the evidence that certainty increases with the number of alternatives (Rolfe & 
Bennett, 2009) may suggest that people make a stronger distinction between 
the utility of chosen and non-chosen alternatives. As a result, we anticipate 
that the perceived difference in attractiveness may be enhanced when three 
alternatives are available compared two.  
The research question of the current study is what effect, if any, 
increasing the number of alternatives in a choice task has on participants’ 
ability to detect a discrepancy between their indicated preference and the 
stimulus presented during feedback. In addition, we explore whether varying 
the similarity and attractiveness of one of the alternatives presented in the 
choice has an impact on any relationship observed. Based on the past findings 
that people are more consistent in their preferences for ternary compared to 
binary choice (e.g., Collins & Vossler, 2009), we hypothesise an increase in 
the detection rates exhibited, especially when the alternatives presented in the 
choice are dissimilar and varied in attractiveness. In order to maintain 
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consistency with past literature, we use facial stimuli used in the first choice 
blindness study (Johansson et al., 2005) to investigate this effect.  
5.3 Method   
An independent measures 222 design was employed, with 
independent variables consisting of number of alternatives (binary or ternary 
choice), similarity (similar or dissimilar), and attractiveness (uniform or 
varied). In accordance with past research (e.g., Johansson et al., 2005; Sagana 
et al., 2013; Somerville & McGowan, 2016), two dependent variables were 
used to assess whether participants experienced choice blindness: concurrent 
detection and retrospective detection. Concurrent detection (detected or 
undetected), was determined from the justifications participants provided for 
selecting the non-chosen alternative immediately after the manipulation.  
Retrospective detection (detected or undetected) was measured through a 
post-experiment questionnaire which required participants to indicate if they 
noticed anything unusual, followed by the instructions to describe what it was 
they thought was unusual. For both dependent variables, the written responses 
were assessed to determine whether participants detected the switch. Any 
reference to the face being different from that selected, choosing the wrong 
face in error or being presented with the face the participant did not prefer 
resulted in the trial being coded as detected. All remaining trials were coded 
as not detected. Since retrospective detection is considered to be a 
conservative measure of detection, the intention was to focus the analysis on 
this variable, however the pattern of results unusually demonstrated a higher 
proportion of trials detected concurrently and a composite variable overall 
detection was created to ensure the analysis includes all forms of detection.   
Stimulus Standardisation 
Overall sixteen combinations of faces were created: eight triplets and 
eight pairs (see Appendix).  Specifically, two highly similar face pairs were 
selected from the stimuli used by Johansson and colleagues (2005) and 
extended to triplets using head on shots of female faces from The 
Psychological Image Collection at Stirling (PICS) online face database 
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(http://pics.psych.stir.ac.uk/). One of the pairs was high on attractiveness, 
whilst the other low on attractiveness.  Four triplets were created with each 
of the pairs, by adding a third face which was either similar to the pair in 
question both physically and on the level of attractiveness, similar physically 
but of different attractiveness, dissimilar physically but of similar 
attractiveness, or dissimilar both physically and on attractiveness.  When 
selecting the faces different on attractiveness, if the pair to be extended was 
unattractive high attractiveness faces were chosen, when the pair was 
attractive low attractiveness faces were chosen. Eight triplets were created 
overall.  Similarity and attractiveness were defined based on the ratings of 
350 (173 female) people with the mean age of 48.35(SD = 12.65) in a pilot 
study.  
An additional eight pairs of faces were selected to create binary choice 
stimuli. Following the same principle as for ternary stimuli, each of the two 
faces from one of the high similarity pairs used by Johansson et al. (2005) 
was combined with one of four possible images: either similar physically and 
on attractiveness, similar physically but of different attractiveness, dissimilar 
physically but of similar attractiveness, or similar both physically and on 
attractiveness.  
Participants 
The experiment was carried out on-line using the Qualtrics Survey 
Platform. Overall 521 participants took part in the experiment. 54 people were 
excluded from the analysis due to selecting a less attractive stimulus in the 
set, thus deeming the stimulus manipulation unsuccessful. For the 467 (39.2% 
male; mean age 46.18) participants included in the analysis, 225 (36.9% male; 
mean age 46.99) took part in the binary choice blindness paradigm and 242 
(41.3% male; mean age 45.42) in the ternary choice blindness paradigm. 
Procedure 
The procedure was taken from the first study to demonstrate choice 
blindness with female faces (Johansson et al., 2005) and adapted to fit with a 
single (either one binary or one ternary choice), computerised, online decision 
task in order to minimise any interference of previous choices on the 
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manipulated decision. Participants read the instructions and, after giving 
consent, proceeded to the main experiment. One of the 16 possible choice sets 
(8 binary and 8 ternary) were presented to each participant at random, and 
they were instructed to select their preferred alternative. The participants then 
provided a rating of confidence in their choice on a scale from 0 to 10, partly 
to assess the effect of confidence on the switch detection and partly as a 
distractor task.  
Participants were further presented with a face that they did not select 
and asked to justify why they chose it. Since for ternary choice two of the 
alternatives were always visually similar and matched on attractiveness, if 
one of these faces was selected this was switched for the face outside of the 
pair to maximise the variability of faces encountered in the switch. For 
participants who chose the face that was not a member of the matched pair, 
one of the other alternatives was presented at random. For binary choice, the 
only other non-selected alternative was presented. 
Lastly, the retrospective detection of the switch was assessed by 
asking the participants to indicate whether they noticed anything unusual in 
the experiment, by selecting ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. If they answered ‘Yes’ they were 
then required to provide a description of what they thought was unusual. After 
the experiment participants received full debrief information, and given the 
researchers’ contact details in case of any concerns. 
5.4 Results 
The proportion of participants that detected a mismatch of choice and 
outcome was 56.5% (53.3% binary; 59.5% ternary) concurrently and 42.8% 
(38.7% binary; 46.7% ternary) retrospectively. As retrospective detection, 
usually a conservative estimate of detection, was lower than concurrent 
detection, an ‘overall detection’ variable was created, coded as 1 (‘detected’) 
when participants detected the switch either concurrently or retrospectively, 
to capture all possible types of detection present, all other trials were coded 
as 0 (‘not detected’). The proportion of participants to demonstrate overall 
detection was 60.0% (56.9% binary; 62.8% ternary). 
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Visual analysis of the data (see Figure 1.) revealed a different pattern 
of effect of 
similarity and 
attractiveness on 
binary and ternary 
choice. For binary 
choice the range 
of detection rates 
was lower (38.3% 
to 69.2%) 
compared to 
ternary choice 
(38.8% to 96.2%). 
Effects of stimulus similarity on overall detection were significant for binary 
(χ²=9.008, p=.003, df=1) and ternary (χ²=27.995, p<.001, df=1) choice. The 
effects of attractiveness were not significant for binary or ternary choice 
(χ²=2.995, p=.084, df=1; χ²=2.250, p=.134, df=1). 
A binary logistic regression was conducted on overall detection as a 
dependent variable. The independent variables were number of alternatives 
(binary=0 or ternary=1), attractiveness of faces (varied=0 or uniform=11) and 
physical similarity of faces (dissimilar=0 or similar=1). 
The three-way interaction was significant (odds ratio = 36.63, CI 
(95%) = [4.97; 270.07]).  Therefore, interpretation of the two-way 
interactions and the main effects was precluded and subsequently, the effect 
of alternatives was analysed by similarity and attractiveness (see Table 1).  
The effect of alternatives was significant when the faces were dissimilar and 
varied in attractiveness (odds ratio = 11.11, CI (95%) = [2.40; 51.37]), but not 
for any other similarity-attractiveness conditions.  
                                                          
1 Two variants of attractiveness coding were considered: one coded for the 
proportion of unattractive faces in the set, and the binary category coding reported here. The 
latter was deemed more appropriate as it resulted in a better model fit (-2 Log likelihood 
564.72 vs, 557.78). 
Figure 1. Proportion of detected trials by number of alternatives, similarity 
and attractiveness. 
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Confidence. The mean confidence reported by participants was 7.20 
(SD=2.04).Analysis of variance revealed no significant difference in self-
reported decision confidence between the participants that demonstrated 
overall detection and those that did not (F (1,465) =2.042, p=.154).  Visual 
analysis (see Figure 2. overleaf) of confidence by number of alternatives, 
similarity and attractiveness revealed a disparity in confidence for detected 
compared to non-detected trials when the participants were presented with 
binary stimuli varied in physical features and attractiveness, with a mean 
confidence of 6.06 for non-detected and 8.17 for detected trials. The 
difference was significant F (1, 51) =18.586, p<.001). No significant 
difference was detected for any of the other stimulus types.  
Decision Time. The average decision time was 4.48 seconds (SD=12.99). A 
general linear model analysis with decision time as a dependent variable and 
overall detection, number of alternatives, similarity and attractiveness and 
their interactions as predictor variables was not significant overall (F (15, 
466)=.488, p=.947). None of the individual predictor variable reached 
significance (p>.05).  
Lower Limit Upper Limit
Dissimilar Varied Binary 52.00 0.69 2.25 11.11 2.40 51.37
Ternary 52.00 0.96 25.00
Uniform Binary 62.00 0.65 1.82 1.10 0.53 2.28
Ternary 66.00 0.67 2.00
Similar Varied Binary 51.00 0.57 1.32 0.48 0.22 1.07
Ternary 49.00 0.39 0.63
Uniform Binary 60.00 0.38 0.62 1.74 0.87 3.47
Ternary 75.00 0.52 1.08
OR CI(95%)
Table 1
Overall detection by number of alternatives, similarity and attractiveness.
Similarity Attractiveness Alternatives N p (detected) Odds
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Figure 2. Mean confidence for detected and non-detected trials, by stimulus set 
presented. 
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5.5 Discussion 
 We investigated the effect of number of alternatives, similarity and 
attractiveness on choice blindness: people’s inability to detect a switch from 
their stated preferred face to a non-chosen alternative. Our principal finding 
was that participants are more likely to detect the switch when selecting from 
three, compared to two alternatives, however, only when the choice used in 
the switch is dissimilar to the other alternative and less attractive. It must be 
noted that due to the unusual pattern of data, the analysis was performed on 
overall detection, a combination of concurrent and retrospective detection. 
Whilst this is not the convention in the choice blindness literature, this was 
done to ensure the highest possible sensitivity to detection. As a result, there 
is a possibility that the level of detection is over exaggerated compared to 
other work, however the pattern was representative of the results apparent for 
concurrent and retrospective detection in isolation. 
Overall our findings appear to be partially consistent with past literature 
that suggests increasing the number of choice alternatives can lead to an 
increase in choice consistency (Collins & Vossler, 2009); however, for choice 
blindness this has been limited to very specific sets of stimuli. The interaction 
between the stimulus parameters and number of alternatives is, however, not 
surprising, as introducing an array of more than two objects can alter the 
relative salience of alternatives, and thus the perceived differences between 
them (e.g., Taylor & Fiske, 1978; Bordalo et al., 2012).  
Consider the scenario in which choice detection is enhanced for 
ternary compared to binary choice. For binary choice, the alternatives consist 
of two visually different alternatives a and b. For ternary choice, we add a 
third alternative, a' which is similar to a. This results in psychological 
grouping of a and a' (Tversky, 1977), making the differences of alternative b 
more salient for ternary compared to binary choice (Taylor & Fiske, 1978; 
Bordalo et al., 2012). After the participants’ make their choice, it is switched 
to a dissimilar alternative (either a or a’ to b, or b to a or a’), with the 
differences more salient, and therefore likely to be better remembered (Pedale 
& Santangelo, 2015) for the decision-maker who encountered the alternatives 
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in a ternary as opposed to binary choice. It is likely that by making the 
differences between alternatives more salient, we are simply amplifying 
whatever mechanism leads to similarity-induced differences in binary choice.  
This, in turn, could be because people are more likely to able to recall the 
differences between the faces presented.  
Furthermore, the effect of number of alternatives was only present 
when the chosen alternative and the alternative presented during feedback 
differed in their level of attractiveness. We hypothesised that this may be a 
result of increased perceived difference in attractiveness, as may be suggested 
by the increase in certainty for ternary compared to binary choice (Olsen et 
al., 2011). Whilst, we find that confidence decreases with ternary choice, and 
only appears to distinguish between detectors and non-detectors for binary 
choice with stimuli varied in attractiveness and similarity, this is in fact not 
surprising since participants still had to choose between two similar variables 
even if they eliminated one of the alternatives with certainty. To establish the 
certainty of eliminating an alternative early, one would need to ask 
participants to indicate their confidence in preference for every possible pair 
of faces presented, which is likely to influence subsequent detection rates due 
to repeated decisions strengthening the preference (Hoeffler & Ariely, 1999).  
Accordingly, it is impossible to establish whether participants’ certainty is 
altered when one of the alternatives differs in physical features and 
attractiveness, compared to physical features alone. 
One possibility is that participants do not only need to have the 
enhanced ability to differentiate between alternatives, but also need to justify 
why that difference resulted in the choice made. There is evidence to suggest 
that participants are able to remember the alternatives they encountered 
during their choice, but not the decision made and thus when provided with 
feedback reconstruct their preference based on the newly available 
information (Pärnamets et al., 2015). When reconstructing their preference, a 
participant must consider ‘why would I have preferred this option’, and if 
they cannot distinguish between choices or are indifferent to the outcome they 
can justify any alternative. On the other hand, if the physical difference of 
alternatives is enhanced the ability to differentiate between the two increases, 
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and thus justification becomes dependent on whether the two are equally 
liked.  
Overall, it appears that increasing the number of alternatives from two 
to three and the level of confidence in the original choice can significantly 
reduce choice blindness as predicted by past research (e.g., Collins & Vossler, 
2009) in terms of the proportion of trials in which participants fail to detect a 
mismatch between their intended choice and presented outcome. However, 
this only occurs when one of the alternatives in the choice set is dissimilar to 
the others and less attractive. Although it is uncertain whether the number of 
alternatives impacts choice blindness through manipulating the perceived 
magnitude of similarity, or attractiveness, or both, one or more of these 
mechanisms are likely to be responsible for the observed phenomenon.  
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5.6 Appendix 
Face combinations used in the experiment (eight triplets and eight pairs) with 
respective overall detection rates, by similarity and attractiveness. 
 
  
123/215 
 
Chapter 6. 
Choice Blindness for preferred versus 
non-preferred stimuli. (Paper III) 
 
 
Mariya Kirichek – Warwick Business School 
Nick Chater– Warwick Business School 
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6.1 Abstract 
Procedural invariance is one of the fundamental assumptions of 
rational choice theory, yet past research has demonstrated that choosing 
versus rejecting alternatives can result in preference reversal (Shafir, 1993) 
and affect the congruence of the choice outcome with previously stated 
priorities (Kogut, 2011). This study asks whether the framing of a choice task 
and subsequent justification task, in terms of choosing or rejecting, also affect 
participants’ ability to detect a mismatch between the choice made and 
feedback presented as part of the justification task, or the extent to which 
participants exhibit choice blindness (e.g., Johansson et al., 2008). Our 
findings suggest that participants are more likely to detect a mismatch when 
they are required to select their preferred alternative and asked to explain why 
they preferred the (non-chosen) choice, compared to when they are required 
to choose or justify their least preferred choice, or both. The direction of the 
effect appears to contradict the previous finding that participants are more 
likely to exhibit consistent preferences when the task is framed negatively 
(Kogut, 2011). The possible procedural and cognitive differences between the 
consistency task used in the past and the choice blindness tasks presented here 
are discussed as a possible explanation of the diverging results. 
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6.2 Introduction 
Preferences are highly subjective in their nature, making the quality 
of preferential choice difficult to evaluate. However, it is widely considered 
that stable preferences, which result in consistent choices being made over 
different points in time, are better than unstable preferences, at least from the 
rationality perspective (e.g., Rieskamp et al., 2006; Samuelson, 1938; von 
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). Accordingly, volumes of research have 
been dedicated to identifying what leads to violations of choice consistency, 
by establishing which seemingly irrelevant variables can lead to preference 
reversal. Many such factors have now been discovered, including positive and 
negative framing of the task (Shafir, 1993; Tversky & Kahneman, 1985), 
presence of other alternatives (Huber et al., 1982), recently encountered 
information (Herriges & Shogren, 1996), and even the font in which the 
information is presented (Novemsky, Dhar, Schwarz & Simonson, 2007). 
Interestingly, even when faced with identical choices over different points in 
time people often fail to be consistent (e.g., Camerer, 1989; Hey, 2001; 
Loomes & Sugden, 1998). For instance, Hey (2001) found that where risky 
choice is concerned people tend to reverse their choice on 1 to 21% of trials. 
Over the past decade, a new phenomenon, choice blindness 
(Johansson et al., 2005) has been used to demonstrate that preferences are 
often unstable. The choice blindness paradigm involves measuring a persons’ 
ability to detect a mismatch between their indicated preference, and the later 
presented non-preferred outcome, by switching the alternative and asking the 
participants to explain why they selected the alternative presented. The results 
indicate that participants often fail to detect the switch and coherently justify 
the wrong choice (Johansson et al., 2005; Johansson et al., 2006). The 
estimated proportion of trials on which choice blindness, or the inability to 
detect a switch, occurs has been shown to vary between 12-88% depending 
on domain and procedure adopted (e.g., Johansson et al., 2005; Somerville & 
McGowan, 2016), with this variability suggesting that there is potential to use 
the paradigm as a tool to investigate which task parameters lead to greater, or 
lower, choice stability. Surprisingly, the paradigm has been seldom applied 
126/215 
 
to exploring the factors thought to lead to preference reversal. There is 
however, reason to suggest choice blindness is closely related to choice 
consistency. Just as different response across two different trials indicates 
preference reversal, the inability to recognise that a presented alternative is 
not the one we indicated as a preference, accompanied by the ability to 
explain why we preferred the non-chosen alternative, also appears to suggest 
that preference change occurred. Similarly, the patterns observed with choice 
consistency have also been detected for choice blindness. For example, just 
as choice consistency improves as participants repeat trials, and become 
familiar with the products at hand (Brown et al., 2008), a very high level of 
detection is reported for products with which participants are already familiar 
(Somerville & McGowan, 2016). Here, we attempt to use the choice blindness 
paradigm to investigate one factor that has been implicated in preference 
reversal, namely whether the task is framed in terms of accepting or rejecting 
an alternative.   
The very existence of choice blindness may come as a surprise, 
however, since it was first reported a little over a decade ago, using a magic 
trick to switch out participant preferences for female faces (Johansson et al., 
2005), it has become a well-established phenomenon and has been 
demonstrated across a wide range of domains, from haptic stimuli 
(Steenfeldt-Kristensen & Thornton, 2013), to consumer choices (Hall et al., 
2010), and moral decisions (Hall et al., 2012). The most prominent stimuli 
used, however, have been female faces. Choice blindness for female faces has 
now been established not only using a physical sleight of hand, but also using 
computerised paradigms (e.g., Pärnamets et al., 2015), and has been used to 
establish choice blindness in experiments designed to maximise ecological 
validity (Sagana et al., 2013), as well as to investigate the role of memory 
processes in choice blindness (Pärnamets et al., 2015). Accordingly, the use 
of faces to demonstrate choice blindness is the most validated and established 
approach and will also be applied to investigating the effects of framing in 
the current experiment. 
The effects of task framing have been investigated with respect to a 
wide range of decisions, from hypothetical ice cream preferences (Shafir, 
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1993), to decisions on child immunisation (e.g., Abhyankar, O’Connor & 
Lawton, 2008; see also Tversky & Kahneman, 1985). For the purpose of 
understanding how selecting the most versus least preferred alternative can 
impact choice, let us consider the work carried out by Shafir (1993). In his 
experiments, Shafir (1993) manipulated the framing of the task by asking 
participants to either accept or reject one of two alternatives, and gave 
participants a choice between an enriched (higher positive and higher 
negative features), and impoverished (fewer positive and fewer negative 
features) option. To illustrate, in one of the scenarios participants were asked 
to imagine that they are planning to take a short break. They were then 
presented with two alternatives, but whilst half of them were instructed that 
they could choose which option to book, the other was told that reservations 
were being held for them in both places and they had to select which option 
they would like to cancel. The two alternatives were: 
Spot A Spot B 
Average weather  Lots of sunshine 
Average beaches Gorgeous beaches and coral reefs 
Medium-quality hotel Ultra-modern hotel  
Medium-temperature water  Very cold water and very strong winds 
Average nightlife No nightlife 
 
When participants were asked to indicate which spot they would like 
to book, a 67% majority preferred Spot B, however, when they were asked 
which option they would cancel 52% rejected Spot A. Logically, the two 
numbers should have been the same, however, it became apparent that a 
higher proportion of people preferred Spot B (enriched alternative) when 
choosing which holiday to book, compared to when choosing which holiday 
to cancel. Shafir (1993) went on to demonstrate a similar effect in child 
custody decisions, ice cream preference, financial lotteries, elections of town 
council president, and educational course selection. The overall observation 
was that when asked to select which option is preferred, or should be 
accepted, participants preferred the enriched option, whereas when asked 
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which option is the least preferred, or should be rejected, participants tended 
to prefer the impoverished choice.  
Shafir, Simonson and Tversky (1993) explained this effect through 
adopting the view that decisions can be explained by taking into account 
reason based choice. The approach involves identifying the reasons and 
arguments that enter the decision process, and explains choice in terms of the 
reasons people would have considered for and against the possible 
alternatives. Shafir et al. (1993) argue that when asked to select a choice, 
people look for arguments in support of the available options, resulting in the 
selection of the choice with the highest positive features, whereas when asked 
to reject a choice people look for the possible reasons to eliminate an 
alternative, thus choosing the alternative with the lowest negative features.  
Whilst Shafir and colleagues (Shafir, 1993; Shafir et al., 1993) 
provide ample evidence to suggest that people choose differently when asked 
to accept, or reject, one of the alternatives presented in the task, little is known 
about how this may influence choice consistency if the task is repeated more 
than once. Based on the pattern observed, we can hypothesise that choices 
would be more consistent across trials that use the same framing (i.e., accept 
task followed by an accept task, and reject task followed by reject task). For 
the purpose of this experiment, this suggests that framing both the choice and 
justification portions of the choice blindness task in the same way should lead 
to higher chance of switch detection. Consider for example a person making 
a choice of which alternative they prefer, and then being presented with the 
choice they did not select and asked to justify why they preferred it. From the 
reason based choice approach they would have considered the advantages of 
the alternatives during the task, and would also try to identify the positive 
traits of the alternative in the justification task. Having already evaluated the 
positive features before, the person would then be likely to recall that the 
positive features of the alternative have changed and in turn detect that the 
alternative presented was not the one they preferred. However, if they are 
asked to explain why they did not prefer the choice, having seldom considered 
the negative features that would explain lack of preference, the person would 
be less familiar with the negative features of the task involved and thus more 
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likely to accept the erroneous choice as their own. Whilst we hypothesise that 
framing consistency across a choice blindness task would lead to increased 
detection of invalid feedback, we are still left with the question of whether 
just the accept or reject framing of the task could alter consistency, or in turn 
the likelihood of experiencing choice blindness.  
Building on Shafir et al.’s (1993) theory (see also Yaniv, Schul, 
Raphaelli-Hirsch & Maoz, 2002), Kogut (2011) proposed that since the 
accept framing of a task is likely to result in participants focusing on the 
positive attributes of alternative, the attractiveness of the forgone options 
would become increased after it has been deliberated, thus bringing the 
attractiveness of the two options closer together and resulting in less choice 
consistency. Although Kogut (2011) did not demonstrate this using a 
conventional choice re-choice paradigm, he attempted to capture the effect of 
using an inclusion versus exclusion strategy in multi-alternative choice to 
establish which of the approaches results in higher consistency with earlier 
stated preference order.  
To carry out the experiment, Kogut (2011) asked participants to rate 
programs designed to improve a range of aspects of schools or universities 
according to their importance, from very important to not important at all. 
After a distractor task participants were presented with the programs again 
and asked to imagine that they were to meet with a donor and discuss which 
of the programs are to be supported. In order to prepare, participants had to 
mark the programs that were most or least important to them (accept vs. reject 
frame). After they made their decisions, the participants underwent the final 
choice, where they were instructed to choose only two best programs to 
present to the donor. Kogut (2011) was interested in two outcome variables 
in this experiment; the size of the consideration set used to make the choice, 
which appeared to be higher for the reject frame, and the consistency between 
the initially stated preference and the final two choices, which were found to 
be more consistent under the reject frame. Choices were considered consistent 
if no other programs were initially rated higher than the final selections. 
Kogut (2011) further provided evidence that supported his proposed 
mechanism underlying the aforementioned difference, by demonstrating that 
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when instructed to consider both advantages and disadvantages, the choice 
consistency for positive framing is improved.  
Overall, the research by Kogut (2011) suggests that reject framing 
results in higher choice consistency than accept framing. Accordingly, we 
hypothesised that exclusion framing would be more likely to result in 
responses consistent with initial preference stated in the choice blindness 
paradigm, in other words, increased ability to detect a mismatch between 
intended and presented outcome. However, since the framing in Kogut’s 
(2011) experiment is thought to exert influence prior to the final selection, we 
can only equate this to the initial selection process in the choice blindness 
task, combining this with the earlier proposal that consistent framing should 
result in increased detection of incongruence between choice and outcome, 
we can hypothesise that participants will be more likely to exhibit detection 
when the choice and justification instructions are framed as rejections.  
It must be noted that given the binary nature of the choice blindness 
paradigm, due to the difficulty in presenting more than one non-chosen 
alternative as the single selected option, it is impossible to create an 
experiment directly parallel to that of Kogut (2011) as instead of using 
multiple options, only two can be initially presented. In fact, Kogut (2011) 
hypothesised that part of the mechanism responsible for the observed effect 
is the differences in consideration size – something that cannot differ within 
the choice blindness task. Consequently, this may lead to different patterns 
brought about by the procedure used by Kogut (2011), and that used in choice 
blindness. On the other hand, if we consider the reason based approach 
explanation to apply to both Kogut’s (2011) work and choice blindness, the 
pattern observed should remain the same. 
The study conducted by Kogut (2011) is certainly not a typical 
example of demonstrating choice consistency, or a direct parallel to choice 
blindness, however, it provides us with the best available hypothesis at this 
stage. It is also evident that the mechanisms best used to explain the framing 
effects on consistency, are at least in part transferrable to the choice blindness 
paradigm.   
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We, therefore, test whether participants would be more likely to detect 
that their choice has been switched when the choice aspect of the choice 
blindness paradigm was framed as an exclusion task versus inclusion task. In 
order to eliminate the possibility that any effect observed is a result of a 
change in task framing between the initial choice and justification as often 
demonstrated in preference reversal literature (e.g., Shafir, 1993), we also 
manipulated the framing of the justification task. Overall the experiment took 
on a 2 x 2 independent measures design, with two levels of choice framing 
(select preferred vs. select least preferred) and two levels of the justification 
task framing (why preferred vs. why least preferred). The stimuli used in the 
experiment were female faces taken from the Psychological Image Collection 
at Stirling (PICS) in line with the first choice blindness experiment of 
Johansson et al. (2005), in order to maintain consistency with past research. 
It was hypothesised that participants would be more likely to notice a 
mismatch between their chosen face and the one presented when they were 
required to choose and justify the face they do not prefer, compared to when 
they were required to choose and justify the face they did prefer. 
6.3 Method 
Stimuli 
Photographs of female faces were taken from The Psychological 
Image Collection at Stirling (PICS) online face database 
(pics.psych.stir.ac.uk) in accordance with the first choice blindness study 
(Johansson et al., 2005). Eight pairs of faces were selected for the experiment. 
The stimuli sets used were counterbalanced for similarity in physical 
appearance and perceived attractiveness based on previously reported ratings 
(see Kirichek, Cooke, Van Schaik & Kusev, submitted). The final 
combinations were comprised of two face pairs that were similar physically 
and on attractiveness; two pairs that were physically dissimilar but of similar 
attractiveness; two pairs that were physically similar but of dissimilar 
attractiveness; and two pairs dissimilar both physically and on attractiveness 
(see Appendix).  
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Participants 
Participants were recruited via the Prolific Academic recruitment 
platform. One hundred and thirty-nine participants (87 male) took part in the 
experiment with a mean age of 30.58 (SD=10.16).  
Procedure 
Participants were randomly allocated to one of four conditions that 
determined the framing of the choice and justification tasks within the choice 
blindness paradigms. After consenting to take part in the study and providing 
demographic information, participants completed a single choice blindness 
paradigm task, which consisted of the choice phase, justification phase and 
detection assessment.  
During the choice phase participants selected between two faces, 
indicating either their preferred, or least preferred face depending on the task 
framing condition they were allocated to. Participants then provided a 
confidence rating in their choice as a distractor task, in accordance with past 
literature using computerised variations of the choice blindness paradigm 
(Pärnamets et al., 2015). 
During the justification phase, participants were presented with a face 
on screen and required to justify why they prefer (not prefer) the face. The 
picture shown was always the one incongruent with the instructions. To 
achieve this, in some conditions participants were shown their selected image, 
whereas others the non-selected alternative. For instance, if the choice phase 
is framed as preferred and the participant chooses face a over b, for preferred 
framing of the justification task participants would be presented with picture 
b and instructed to justify why they preferred it, whereas for non-preferred 
framing of the justification task participants would be presented with face a 
and asked to justify why they did not prefer it. It must be noted that 
participants allocated to the preferred framing of both the choice and 
justification tasks underwent the conventional choice blindness paradigm 
featured in other research (e.g., Johansson et al., 2005).  
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In accordance with past research (e.g., Johansson et al., 2005; Sagana 
et al., 2013; Somerville & McGowan, 2016) two variables were used to assess 
whether participants detected the switch: concurrent detection and 
retrospective detection. Participants’ justifications provided for preferring 
(not preferring) the presented face were used to establish concurrent detection 
(detected or undetected), a post-experiment questionnaire which required 
participants to indicate if they noticed anything unusual, followed by the 
instructions to describe what it was they thought was unusual was used to 
establish retrospective detection (detected or undetected). For both dependent 
variables, the written responses were assessed to determine whether 
participants detected the switch. Any reference to the face being different 
from that selected or choosing the wrong face in error resulted in the trial 
being coded as detected. All remaining trials were coded as not detected. In 
order to ensure all detected trials were included in the analysis a composite 
variable termed overall detection was created, where any trial detected 
concurrently or retrospectively was coded as detected, all other trials were 
coded as undetected.  
Lastly, participants were provided with debrief information and 
researcher contact details in case of any concerns and paid for their time. 
6.4 Results  
The proportion of participants to detect a mismatch of choice and 
outcome (coded 0 for not detected 1 for detected) was 40.1% concurrently 
and 38.1% retrospectively. 47.4% of trials were detected overall.  
Visual examination (see Table 1) of overall detection by framing of 
the choice task (coded 0 for preferred 1 for least preferred) and the framing 
of the justification task (coded 0 for preferred and 1 for least preferred) 
revealed that when choice and justification tasks were both framed as 
preferred, the proportion of participants detecting the switch was visibly 
higher compared to other conditions. A chi-squared analysis revealed that the 
detected proportions were significantly different across the four task 
variations (χ²=23.945, p<.001, df=3). Pairwise comparisons further 
134/215 
 
confirmed that the proportion of detected trials when both task and 
justification were framed in terms of the preferred alternative was 
significantly higher compared to preferred choice and non-preferred 
justification framing (χ²=17.241, p<.001, df=1), non-preferred choice and 
preferred justification framing (χ²=11.470, p=.001, df=1), or when both 
choice and justification were framed as non-preferred (χ²=19.625, p=.001, 
df=1). No other comparisons were significant (p>.05).   
Table 1. Overall detection of mismatch in choice and outcome, by choice and 
justification task framing. 
 
Confidence. Mean choice confidence rating was 7.54 (SD=2.07) on a scale of 
1 to 10. A general linear model using confidence as a dependent variable, and 
choice and task framing and overall detection as predictor variables was not 
significant overall (F (7,136) =1.087, p=.375). No predictors were significant 
in isolation (p>0.05).  
Decision Time. Average decision time was 9.70 seconds (SD=23.17). A 
general linear model for decision time as a dependent variable and choice and 
task framing and overall detection as predictor variables was not significant 
overall (F (7,136) =1.181, p=.318). No predictors were significant in isolation 
(p>0.05).  
Stimulus Characteristics. Overall detection ranged from 37.9% to 
58.3% depending on similarity and attractiveness of stimuli. The variation 
across conditions was not significant (χ²=3.515, p<.319, df=3). A chi-squared 
analysis was carried out to ensure the distribution of stimuli did not vary by 
framing of choice and justifications framing conditions, this was not 
significant (χ²=22.347, p<.380, df=21). 
Prefer 
Justification
Not Prefer
Justification
Prefer
Justification
Not Prefer 
Justification
Overall
 Detection
84.4% 34.3% 43.8% 31.6% 47.4%
Prefer Choice Framing Not Prefer Choice Framing
Overall 
Mean
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6.5 Discussion 
In the current study, we investigated the effects of task on participants’ 
ability to detect a mismatch between their indicated preference and presented 
outcome. The framing was manipulated at two stages of the choice blindness 
task, which consisted of participants being asked to select the female face 
they prefer (or not prefer) out of a pair of stimuli, followed by being shown a 
face and instructed to justify why they preferred (or did not prefer) it, the face 
however, never matched the instructions. We found that when at least one of 
the tasks (choice or justification) was framed negatively the detection of the 
mismatch was much lower, compared to when both tasks were framed 
positively (as in the original choice blindness paradigm). 
The findings were the opposite of what we hypothesised based on past 
literature into how task framing can affect choice consistency. More 
specifically, Kogut (2011) found that asking participants to identify 
improvement programs they found least important resulted in their final 
choices being more consistent with their original ratings of importance, 
compared to when they were asked to identify the most important programs. 
In other words, the research suggested that negative framing of the tasks is 
likely to result in higher choice consistency – the opposite pattern to that 
observed here if we consider choice blindness and consistency to be closely 
related.  
One possible explanation for the difference in the data observed to 
that hypothesised is that the relationship between inconsistent choice and 
choice blindness is not as direct as theorised. Although both presuppose a 
stable preference order to which preferences could be compared, there are 
other factors that differ between the two. For instance, whereas in Kogut’s 
(2011) choice consistency task participants encounter all alternatives in the 
second elicitation task, only one option is presented to them in choice 
blindness, and it is well established that the alternatives amongst which a 
choice is presented can alter participants’ behaviour (e.g., Huber et al., 1982). 
Furthermore, in re-choice consistency paradigms providing inconsistent 
responses is not incorrect per se, whereas in choice blindness not detecting 
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the switch is equivalent to not detecting an error which may be prone to 
different psychological pressures, yet is more prone to demand characteristics 
as through reporting a switch a participant contradicts the researcher.  
It is more likely, however, that the procedural differences in the tasks 
utilised by Kogut (2011) and that presented here are responsible for the 
divergence of results. One of the key differences here is that the former used 
multiple alternatives, whereas the current study only uses binary choice. 
Kogut (2011) propose that one of the mechanisms through which participants 
achieve higher consistency is through the higher consideration set they 
identify when selecting the least compared to most important alternatives 
(Yaniv & Schul, 1997), a factor not present in the binary choice used in the 
choice blindness paradigm. On the other hand, Kogut (2011) also suggests 
that it is the consideration of positive attributes in the positive framing of the 
problem that results in the possible preference change, as the previously non-
selected alternatives become more attractive (Yaniv et al., 2002), a factor that 
one would expect to influence the alternatives in the choice blindness 
paradigm as well as the aforementioned consistency experiment.  
There are two other variables that may confound the observed pattern 
of results: whether the face presented was the one selected (with instruction 
to explain why it was not selected) or not selected (with instruction to explain 
why it was selected), and the congruence of framing across the two task. 
These features vary for participants who are presented with positive or 
negative feedback for both parts of choice blindness thus making the framing 
between the two conditions congruent and the face presented the non-chosen 
alternative, compared to when they are presented with negative framing for 
one of the tasks and positive for the other, thus making the framing 
incongruent and the face presented the chosen alternative. For example, when 
participants undergo a positively framed choice task, however, are then asked 
to explain why they did non-prefer a presented alternative they must be shown 
the face they chose in the first instance in order for the alternative to be 
incongruent with the instructions. This could impact whether participants 
notice the switch, as selected alternatives are known to be better remembered 
than the chosen alternative (McClelland, Stewart, Judd & Bourne, 1987). In 
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addition, we also know that positive and negative frames of questions have 
been known to impact participants in a systematic direction (Shafir, 1993), 
thus the switch in phrasing could also theoretically impact the observed 
consistency. However, if this was indeed the reason for the different level of 
detection, we would expect to see the difference between the two conditions 
with congruent framing compared to the two with incongruent framing for 
the two tasks – yet we only observed the higher detection for positive 
congruent framing, but not negative. 
The level of detection observed when the task is framed in a manner 
akin to the conventional choice blindness paradigm is much higher at an 
average of 76% compared to the highest detected proportion of 26% reported 
by Johansson et al. (2005). This might indicate that the observed result is an 
anomaly. However, even if the figure is higher than the average detection 
level that would be observed using this procedure in the population more 
generally, given the large effect size observed the difference between the 
positively framed task and the other framing combinations is unlikely to be 
eliminated. The procedural differences between the currently presented 
experiment and past choice blindness work are much larger than between the 
conditions in the current experiment, suggesting these are more likely to be 
responsible for the observed discrepancy than assuming that an almost 50% 
difference in conditions is completely due to chance. One such difference is 
that classically choice blindness experiments were carried out with a physical 
trick and experimenter present (Johansson et al., 2005; Steenfeldt-Kristensen 
& Thornton, 2013), whereas the current experiment used a computerised task. 
The detection rates in other computerised choice blindness tasks have indeed 
been similar to what we observe here (e.g., 63% – Pärnamets et al., 2015). In 
addition, the paradigm we use requires participants to only make a single 
decision, whereas in the conventional paradigm they complete 15 trials, 
seventh, tenth, and fourteenth of which are manipulated. The completion of 
the initial six choice tasks may build confidence, or trust, in the paradigm 
confounding the observed choice blindness with social effects not present in 
the one decision variation of the task.  
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Overall, it appears that we find a strong effect of framing on choice 
blindness, with positive framing resulting in higher detection of mismatch 
between intended choice and its outcome. The observed phenomenon is still, 
however, to be explained. One potential discrepancy is that processing 
information in its negative form (e.g., not prefer vs. prefer) is neurologically 
harder for the participant to process. For instance, Fischler, Bloom, Childers, 
Roucos, and Perry, (1983) show that when asked to judge statements such is 
‘A sparrow is a tree’ participants show significant negative scalp potentials 
in the region of about 250 to 450 msec. following their presentation. 
However, when the same sentence is phrased in the negative (e.g., ‘A sparrow 
is not a tree’), the same activity is observed even though in this instant the 
content of the statement holds true. This is also not surprising given that it is 
a lot more common encounter decision of what we prefer, compared to not 
prefer. For example, we choose which groceries to buy on regular basis, yet 
it is very rare for us to select our least preferred items from those available. 
Accordingly, it seems participants are more likely to recognise when a 
positively framed statement is untrue, thus explaining why the positive 
framing of the choice blindness tasks is more likely to result in higher 
detection of an erroneous outcome. On the other hand, the participants’ ability 
to then provide justifications for the question ‘Why did you not prefer the 
face’ suggests that they could not have simply misunderstood the instructions 
and must have processed the negative information.  
The finding that neither confidence nor decision time varied with 
detection, nor the task at hand, also provides an interesting insight. Assuming 
participants are less familiar with negative statements, and find it harder to 
process these we would expect this to reflect in longer decision times and 
lower subjective confidence, which is not the case. Whilst it must be noted 
that the reliability of decision time for online experiments is somewhat weak, 
the confidence data does raise the question of whether task difficulty can 
really be responsible for the pattern observed. On the other hand, the 
dissociation of confidence from choice blindness has also been reported in 
the past (Hall et al., 2013) and it is likely that people have limited insight into 
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the stability of their choices (the likelihood that the same alternative is chosen 
if the task is to be repeated) and accuracy of their own performance.  
It seems at this stage the data is not sufficient to identify the 
mechanisms that underlie the differences in choice blindness for positively 
and negatively framed tasks. Furthermore, we cannot definitively say whether 
the same mechanisms may guide choice consistency and choice blindness, as 
at least for the multiple alternative consistency task the effects of framing 
appear to be the opposite to those observed for choice blindness. If we are to 
answer these questions, future research into both choice blindness and choice 
consistency is required. First a consistency study using only binary choices, 
over two time points, and varying framing of the choice at each time point is 
necessary to establish whether framing affects consistency differently for 
multiple compared to binary choice, and in turn providing a more direct 
comparison for the choice blindness paradigm. Second variations of the 
choice blindness paradigm would help unravel why framing may play a role 
in choice blindness. For instance, including explicit instructions to consider 
both negatives and positives like Kogut (2011) would help identify whether 
justification strategies may impact the framing effects; or alternatively the use 
of negative particles can be replaced with single words (e.g., ‘not prefer’ with 
‘hate’), to eliminated processing difficulties as the possible explanation.  
The results presented here clearly demonstrate an interesting effect of 
framing on choice blindness: positive framing across all of the choice 
blindness paradigm results in a much higher proportion of participants 
detecting that the outcome presented is incongruent with their response, 
compared to when at least one of the tasks (choice or justification) is framed 
negatively. Such findings comprise an effect opposite to that hypothesised 
and further research is needed to understand this surprising discovery. 
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6.6 Appendix 
Face combinations used in the experiment and the respective proportions of 
trials detected by similarity and attractiveness levels. 
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Chapter 7. 
Choice blindness for stimuli external 
to the choice. (Paper IV) 
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7.1 Abstract 
Choice blindness refers to the inability to notice the switch of a 
previously selected preferred stimulus for a non-selected ‘imposter’ 
alternative during feedback (Johansson et al., 2005). The level of choice 
blindness is measured by asking participants to justify why they selected the 
imposter choice in place of the actual choice, followed by a request to indicate 
whether they noticed anything unusual. Although the levels of imposter 
detection vary by domain, it has become an established phenomenon. The 
processes underlying choice blindness, however, are not yet well understood. 
In the current paper, we ask whether people accept imposter choice regardless 
of having encountered it before; because they had seen it before; because they 
have evaluated it before; or because it was encountered as a part of 
comparative choice, even if that choice was separate from the one they are 
receiving feedback for. We found that stimuli not encountered previously, 
just seen previously, and previously evaluated in isolation induced a high 
level of detection. The detection significantly decreased when the participants 
encountered the stimulus in a preferential choice task preceding the actual 
choice they are receiving feedback for. We propose that although there appear 
to be a number of factors that contribute to choice blindness, the imposter 
choice needs to undergo a similar cognitive task to the one at hand in order to 
be falsely identified as the real preference made which in the case of the 
classic choice blindness paradigm entails being deliberated as a part of a 
comparative choice process.  
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7.2 Introduction 
Choice blindness refers to the failure to detect a mismatch between 
intention and outcome when making a preferential choice (Johansson et al., 
2005). This is usually demonstrated by switching the alternative selected by 
participants in a preferential choice task with the non-chosen alternative, or 
an ‘imposter choice’, and measuring the proportion of people that report 
noticing something unusual. Lower proportion noticing the switch is then 
taken as an indication of higher level of choice blindness and vice versa. For 
example, in the original choice blindness experiment (Johansson et al., 2005) 
participants were presented with two female faces printed on card and asked 
to select their preferred option. Their choice was then replaced with the non-
chosen face using a sleight of the hand and the participants were asked to 
justify the presented option. The majority of people complied with providing 
a justification and failed to report noticing anything unusual having taken 
place. Furthermore, participants used features specific to the ‘imposter’ face 
in their justification suggesting the effect extends beyond not being able to 
tell the two alternatives apart Johansson et al., 2008). 
The existence of choice blindness is now broadly accepted across 
many different domains, including faces (Johansson et al., 2008; Johansson 
et al., 2006; Sagana et al., 2013, 2014a), consumer products (Cheung et al., 
2015; Hall et al., 2010; Sauerland et al., 2014; Somerville & McGowan, 
2016), self-reported psychological health symptoms (Merckelbach et al., 
2011), moral preferences (Hall et al., 2012), political opinions (Hall et al., 
2013), personal finance (McLaughlin & Somerville, 2013) haptic stimuli 
(Steenfeldt-Kristensen & Thornton, 2013), and witness testimony for incident 
details (Aardema et al., 2015; Cochran et al., 2015) and faces and voices of 
individuals encountered (Sagana et al., 2013; Sauerland et al., 2013).The 
effects shown have been demonstrated beyond what would be expected from 
error in valuation alone (Loomes & Sugden, 1998; Woodford, 2014), and 
present a problem for models of consumer choice (Somerville & McGowan, 
2016) and the existence of stable ordered preferences more broadly (Chater 
et al., 2011). The notion that our preferences do not appear to have a stable 
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order of alternatives is not a new one of course, with a wide range of literature 
demonstrating that people fail to exhibit consistency in their preferences 
across alternatives, and different points in time (for review see Rieskamp et 
al., 2006). Nonetheless, choice blindness introduces a distinct approach to 
choice stability, as not only does it question just how stable our preferences 
actually are, it also highlights our own inability to monitor intentions as well 
as cognitive processes that gave rise to these intentions within a single choice 
(Johansson et al., 2005).  
To date, a number of factors have been investigated as mediators of 
choice blindness (e.g., similarity – e.g., Steenfeldt-Kristensen & Thornton, 
2013; time constraints – e.g., Johansson et al., 2005; choice certainty – e.g., 
Hall et al., 2013; and choice familiarity – e.g., Somerville & McGowan, 
2016), however, all of the research to date assumes that choice blindness is 
specific to switching the alternatives that the participants were given to select 
their response from.  The current paper takes a new look at choice blindness 
and when it occurs. More specifically, we attempt to identify at which stage 
of the choice process a stimulus becomes susceptible to being mistakenly 
recognised as a previously stated preference. To identify which aspect of the 
paradigm may be responsible we considered how the stages leading up to the 
decision unfold over time and noted four distinct stages; pre-task stage with 
no knowledge of the stimuli, encountering the stimuli, evaluating the stimuli, 
and comparing between the alternatives to make a selection.  
If the stages identified here comprehensively cover the process 
leading up to the choice, the characteristics that make a stimulus susceptible 
to choice blindness must occur at one of these stages. It also follows that since 
the latter stages (e.g., comparing alternatives) also require participants to 
undergo the earlier processes (e.g., encountering and evaluating the 
alternatives), once we observe choice blindness in earlier stages it will also 
be present in the latter ones – and thus choice blindness becomes more likely 
with each proceeding step. Additionally, aside from the increase in the 
number of processes undergone, each interaction stage is also likely to exert 
an additive effect on liking or preference (e.g., Freedman & Fraser, 1966; 
Zajonc, 1968), as well as memory (e.g., Craik & Lockhart, 1972) of the 
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stimuli encountered, the two processes at the core of monitoring preferential 
choice over time.  
Literature suggests that exposing participants to items prior to 
evaluating them can result in more favourable ratings when assessing these 
stimuli later (Zajonc, 1968). Deeper interaction with such stimuli (such as 
evaluation or decision making) can also increase the cognitive ease of 
processing such stimuli further thus enhancing our evaluations of these items 
even more (Oppenheimer, 2008). This suggests that with each of the 
identified stages leading up to a choice participants would experience an 
increase in liking as each step requires additional, and thus deeper, 
processing. This could, in turn, be responsible for bringing about choice 
blindness as having already experienced positive evaluations of a stimulus we 
are more likely to agree to it later (e.g., foot in the door technique – Freedman 
& Fraser, 1966), and we are also more likely to judge such stimuli as true 
(Reber & Unkelbach, 2010). 
Similarly, the memory trace for the stimuli encountered at each of the 
proceeding stages is also anticipated to increase as the depth of processing of 
the material increases (Craik & Lockhart, 1972).  It has been proposed that 
memory failure may be able to account for choice blindness (Pärnamets et al., 
2015; Sagana et al., 2014a), in which instance inability to recognise stimuli 
should not affect the susceptibility to choice blindness and stimuli that have 
never been encountered before would have the same chance of being 
mistakenly accepted as previously stated preferences. However, recognition 
memory of the stimuli presented in the choice blindness task has, in fact, been 
found to remain intact after participants undergo the choice blindness 
paradigm, regardless of whether they detect the mismatch of the presented 
outcome or not (Pärnamets et al., 2015; Sagana et al., 2014a). This would 
suggest that participants would be capable of detecting that they had not 
encountered a stimulus when a brand-new alternative is presented to them 
during feedback, and thus exhibit a very high level of detection when a brand-
new face is presented. Additionally, the increase in memory strength with 
each stage of the decision would also increase the likelihood that we will 
mistake the face for one recently seen, decreasing the chance of the stimulus 
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being recognised as external to the current task and thus decreasing the chance 
of detecting that the stimulus cannot be the one that was selected. 
Although recognition memory seems to remain intact, in order for 
choice blindness to occur some form of memory failure seems to be essential. 
Pärnamets et al. (2015) propose that source memory is where such a failure 
occurs. Source memory refers to the knowledge of when and where 
something was learned (Pandey, 2011), in the case of the choice blindness 
example referring to knowledge that the image presented was seen during the 
choice presented in the experiment, when it was either rejected or chosen. 
Source memory is considered to be more reconstructive in nature than 
recognition memory (Johnson et al., 1993; Yonelinas, 1999), using in the 
moment judgements to determine a plausible set of events and thus more 
susceptible to suggestion. This suggests that as long as participants recognise 
the alternative presented to them during feedback, there is a likelihood that 
they will misjudge the alternative as the selected one when, in fact, it was not, 
resulting in choice blindness. Source memory misattribution, however, is 
very reliant on similarity of the sources in which information is presented 
(Johnson, Foley & Leach, 1988; Johnson et al., 1993), and therefore since 
each of the latter decision stages that we identify shares more with the 
decision we provide feedback for in the choice blindness paradigm the 
chances of falsely accepting the imposter choice also increases with each 
consecutive stage. 
Overall, based on effects of preference and memory discussed above, 
we hypothesise that the susceptibility to accepting an imposter stimulus as 
one that we indicated as our preference would increase with each stage of the 
decision. Given the ability to identify a novel stimulus as one never 
encountered we hypothesise very high chances of detection (little to no choice 
blindness) when participants are requested to justify a never seen face. 
Conversely, given the similarity of the memory source when encountering a 
stimulus in a decision similar to the target task we anticipate such a scenario 
to elicit a similar level of detection to the choice blindness paradigm. For the 
two stages in between, a gradual increase is our best hypothesis. 
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In order to empirically test the stipulated hypothesis, we created four 
experimental conditions for each of the identified decision stages; novel, pre-
exposed, pre-judged and pre-choice conditions. In the novel condition the 
imposter stimulus is one the participants have never encountered before and 
are not familiar with. In the pre-exposed condition, participants saw the 
imposter choice prior to the experiment in an array of alternatives and were 
simply instructed to look at the alternatives presented. In the pre-judged 
condition participants saw the imposter choice amongst the same array and 
were instructed to provide three positive points about the face to ensure they 
have evaluated the possible reasons for its selection1. And in the last, pre-
choice condition, participants encountered the imposter choice as a part of a 
binary selection task preceding the choice task that will consequently receive 
the erroneous feedback. We used an alternative from the preceding trial as 
opposed to the classical choice blindness in-trial switch in order to 
differentiate the act of choosing from any direct comparison or association 
with what would be the alternative presented as correct feedback. In addition, 
the choice presented was always one that was not selected, in order to ensure 
that the feedback remained at odds with the actual preferences previously 
stated.  
The experiment used female faces as choice blindness has been most 
commonly tested within this domain (Johansson et al., 2005, 2006, 2008; 
Pärnamets et al., 2015), thus ensuring that choice blindness can occur with 
the stimuli in question and providing a reliable baseline for the current 
experiment. As similarity and attractiveness are thought to affect the level of 
facial choice blindness (e.g., Sagana et al., 2013) we control for the two 
parameters within the experiment and data analysis. The procedure used in 
the experiment follows the computerised version of the choice blindness 
paradigm (Pärnamets et al., 2015) in order to maintain consistency with other 
literature. We did make one potentially consequential change in procedure in 
                                                            
1 The prejudgement task asked participants to provide positive evaluations of the 
stimuli presented as opposed to unspecified or negative evaluations as comparative choice 
processes are likely to be contingent on the positive information in a preferential choice 
task (e.g., Mitsuda & Glahot, 2014), whereas in a sequential evaluation task there is a 
possibility that participants would attend to the negative aspects of the stimuli. 
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exposing participants to one as opposed to 36 trials, manipulating the 
feedback provided on every trial. This method was used as once participants 
experience a number of trials it is difficult to establish what carry over effects 
trust and visual memory interference may have on the manipulated trial. 
Through this research, we aim to identify the boundaries of the 
situations under which people are susceptible to accepting false feedback as 
their own, by establishing at which stage of a choice process the stimuli 
become susceptible to being accepted as a self-reported preference. The 
failure to detect a switched choice at each level can help us identify the 
components that facilitate choice blindness, in turn narrowing down the 
potential range of mechanisms that underlie the phenomenon. Furthermore, 
this allows us to identify the conceptual and ethical concerns with how we 
view preference and decision making in our society if choice blindness does, 
in fact, extend to stimuli beyond those present in the current problem.   
7.3 Method 
The study took on a between subject 4 x 2 x 2 factorial design, with 
four levels of interaction with the imposter stimuli (novel, pre-exposure, pre-
judgement & pre-choice), two levels of ‘imposer’ similarity (similar or 
dissimilar to the choice pair) and two levels of ‘imposter’ attractiveness (high 
or low).  Choice blindness was measured by the proportion of trials in which 
participants reported noticing the switch. Detection was assessed at three 
stage of the paradigm – (i) concurrent detection (detected or not detected) 
which was measured through the justifications provided by the participants 
for selecting the ‘imposter’ feedback, with any mention of a change in face, 
mistaken selection or anything unusual coded as detected; (ii) retrospective 
detection (detected or not detected) which was measured by asking 
participants to indicate whether they noticed anything unusual and describe 
what they found unusual if the response was confirmatory, any mention of a 
change in face or mistaken selection was coded as detected and (iii) informed 
detection (detected, not detected, or uncertain) where participants were 
informed of the possibility of being shown the wrong face and asked to 
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indicate whether they believed they experienced the switch by selecting the 
most suited response from three possible alternatives – yes, no, or unsure. For 
the purpose of analysis, an additional variable overall detection (detected or 
not detected) was created, coded as detected if the participant detected the 
switch either concurrently or retrospectively. Overall detection was used as 
the primary dependent variable, due to the inconsistent demonstration of 
sensitivity for concurrent and retrospective detection in past literature (i.e., 
sometimes people demonstrate higher detection concurrently and at other 
times retrospectively). 
Materials 
Black and white photos of female faces from The Psychological 
Image Collection at Stirling (PICS) online face database 
(pics.psych.stir.ac.uk) were used in the current experiment, to create stimuli 
in line with the original study. In order to control for similarity and 
attractiveness of the faces, ratings of the parameters were obtained through 
an online survey distributed to 350 people (173 female; mean age of 48.35; 
see Kirichek et al., submitted, for details).  
A total of eight faces were selected for use across the four conditions. 
Four of the faces formed two ‘core’ pairs, each pair high on similarity and 
one of the sets high in attractiveness and the other low in attractiveness. The 
remaining four faces were designed to fulfil the role of the imposter stimuli, 
two of which were similar to the core images, and two dissimilar. Each of the 
similarity levels further contained one image high on attractiveness and one 
low on attractiveness. 
Procedure 
The experiment was carried out using the Qualtrics Online Survey 
Creator (Qualtrics, 2016), and participants were recruited using Prolific 
Academic recruitment platform (Prolific Academic, 2016). Four separate 
surveys were created for each of the conditions – novel, pre-exposed, pre-
judgement and pre-choice. The surveys were then posted for participants to 
sign up to on the recruitment platform, with participation possible only once, 
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creating a quasi-random allocation of people to the different conditions. At 
the start of each survey, participants were allocated to one of four stimulus 
type conditions, and one of four similarity-attractiveness conditions using a 
random number generator which determined which stimuli they will be 
exposed to. 
Prior to the experiment participants were informed of the nature of the 
task, revealing as much as possible of the procedure without interfering with 
the experiment. They then had to confirm they understand their right to 
confidentiality and to withdraw at any time, and verify that they are satisfied 
with the information received and are happy to proceed. The different 
conditions varied in the procedure the participants underwent prior to the core 
choice blindness task, and in the face shown during feedback. For the novel 
choice condition participants were not presented with any additional 
information prior to the choice blindness task, and saw a face they had not 
been exposed to during the feedback condition.  
For the pre-exposure and pre-justification conditions, participants 
were presented with six out of the possible eight faces, in accordance with the 
stimuli condition they belonged to. The set contained the four images varying 
in similarity and attractiveness, and one of the two core pairs. For the pre-
exposure condition the participants were instructed simply to look at the faces 
presented on the screen, whereas in the pre-justification condition they also 
had to provide three positive characteristics of each of the faces presented.  
The seen core pair was then used for the choice phase of the study, and one 
of the remaining four images randomly allocated for presentation during 
feedback depending on the similarity-attractiveness condition the participant 
was allocated to. 
For the pre-choice condition participants were required to complete 
the preferential binary choice task three times. The first choice was made 
between one of the core face pairs, the response to this choice was not 
analysed and only used so that the participants encountered six faces like they 
did in the justification condition, keeping the number of items in memory 
consistent. The second choice was made between a pair of faces as 
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determined by the randomly allocated similarity-attractiveness condition. The 
last choice was made between the unseen core face pair. The face used during 
feedback was always the non-chosen alternative in the second choice task, in 
order to keep the procedure as close as possible to the original choice 
blindness study, and to avoid introducing a difference of retrospective 
preference plausibility. The attractiveness and similarity of the imposter face 
was coded accordingly with the face presented. 
The core choice blindness procedure remained the same for all 
participants: as the last phase of the study all participants were given a binary 
choice task, where they selected their preferred face. After their selection, 
they indicated their confidence in their choice, partially as a measure of 
interest and partially as a distractor task in line with past research (see 
Pärnamets et al., 2015). After this, participants were presented with a face that 
was not one of the alternatives they saw in their choice, and required to 
provide a justification for selecting the presented image. Participants were 
then asked to indicate if they noticed anything unusual about the task, and if 
they answered yes were instructed to describe what it was that they found 
unusual. We informed the participants that the face they saw during feedback 
may have been switched, and asked them to indicate whether they believed 
that they experienced the switch by selecting between three options – yes, no 
and unsure. The participants in the pre-choice condition were also required to 
answer whether they thought the face shown was, in fact, from the most recent 
trial, to ensure all variations of switch detection were covered. After the 
experiment, all of the participants were fully debriefed on the nature of the 
experiment and purpose of the research, and given the details of the 
researchers to contact in case of any concerns. They were then provided with 
a code to authorise payment for their participation. 
Participants 
One hundred and ninety-nine people (72 female) took part in the 
experiment, with the average age of 30.12 (SD=9.29). Participant were 
recruited using the Prolific Academic online recruitment platform (Prolific 
Academic, 2016), with eligibility limited by age (18-80 years old) and 
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English ability (Fluent or Native).  Three participants were excluded from the 
analysis due to incomplete responses that did not allow for detection to be 
assessed. 
Fifty (19 female; mean age 31.84) participants took part in the novel 
condition, 52 (17 female; mean age 30.92) in the pre-exposure condition, 50 
(21 female; mean age 31.14) in the pre-judgement condition and 44 (14 
female; mean age 26.22) in the pre-choice condition. The difference in mean 
age between groups was significant (F (3,195) = 3.582, p = .015). 
7.4 Results 
An average of 51.3% of people reported noticing something unusual 
concurrently, 60.7% retrospectively (retrospective detection). In order to 
ensure all forms of detection are included in the analysis an overall detection 
variable was created, coded as detected (1) if the participants reported 
detecting the switch either concurrently or retrospectively, and non-detected 
(0) otherwise. The proportion successful overall detection was 65.1%. 
Visual analysis of overall detection rates by experimental condition 
(see Table 1.) suggested that a lower proportion of people experience 
detection in the pre-choice condition, compared to other experiment types.  
Table 1. Proportion of overall detected trials by experimental condition (no 
exposure, pre-exposure, pre-choice and pre-choice). 
 
A logistic regression was carried out to predict the level of overall 
detection exhibited by participants using experimental condition, similarity, 
attractiveness and age as a continuous predictor variable to control for the 
difference in age observed between the conditions. Interaction terms were not 
included in the model, due to the limited sample size restricting the number 
of predictor variables to be used. A test of the full model against a constant 
No Exposure Pre-Exposure Pre-Judgement Pre-Choice
Overall
 Detection 72.0% 72.5% 72.0% 40.9% 65.1%
Overall 
Mean
Experimental Condition
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only model was statistically significant, indicating that the full set of 
predictors is better at predicting when participants notice something unusual 
(χ²= 14.089, p=.020, df=6). The Wald statistic revealed that the experiment 
condition is a significant predictor of the number of people who notice 
something unusual (Wald=10.456, p =.015, df=3). A by-category comparison 
using the novel choice condition as the reference category revealed a 
significant decrease in detection for the pre-choice condition (β =-
1.327, p =.008), and no significant difference for pre-exposure (β 
=.042, p =.926) or pre-judgement conditions (β =.017, p =.970). 
Attractiveness (β =-.209, p =.539), similarity (β =-.009, p =.980) and age (β 
=.013, p =.434) were not found to be significant predictors of detection.  
Informed Detection. After participants were informed of a potential switch in 
their choice an additional 19.0% reported that they experienced the switch 
and 6.7% were unsure (in addition to 65.1% overall detection). The 
proportion of people exhibiting informed detection or uncertainty did not 
differ significantly between experiment types (χ²= 2.334, p = .504, df=3). 
When informed detection and uncertain individuals was combined with 
overall detection 90.8% of participants appeared to at least suspect the switch 
was possible, a proportion significantly lower than 100% that would be 
anticipated if no choice blindness had occurred (t (194) =-4.442, p<.001).  
For the pre-choice condition participants were also informed that the 
face they saw as feedback was from a different trial, and asked to indicate 
whether they experienced this. Overall 26.2 % out of 44 participants noticed 
the wrong order and 26.2% reported being unsure. Whilst all participants that 
noticed the order switch also experienced other types of detection, 9 % of the 
participants were uncertain about the order even though they didn’t report 
other types of detection. 
Decision time. The average detection time was 6.21 seconds (SD=5.95). A 
general linear model using decision time as dependent variable and 
experiment type, overall detection and the interaction of the two as 
independent variables was significant overall (F (7,194) =4.051, p<.001). 
Experiment type was the only significant predictor (F (1,194) =7.701, 
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p<.001).  The decision time was highest for no-exposure condition (8.05 
secs), followed by pre-exposure (7.35 secs), pre-judgement (6.48 secs) and 
pre-choice conditions (2.47 secs). 
Confidence. The average confidence was 7.76 (SD=1.90) on a scale of 1 to 
10. A general linear model using confidence as dependent variable and 
experiment type, overall detection and the interaction of the two as 
independent variables was not significant overall (F (7,194) =.808, p=.582).    
7.5 Discussion 
In the current study, we investigated the type of interaction with a 
stimulus that is required for a participant to be susceptible to mistakenly 
recognising the stimulus as their own stated preference. In line with the 
original choice blindness study (Johansson et al., 2005), we presented 
participants with two female faces to choose from, and then asked them to 
justify their preference for a face that they did not select. However, instead of 
presenting participants with the non-selected alternative in their choice we 
presented them with a face that was either brand new to the participant; 
previously seen; previously evaluated; or a part of a previous choice. Our 
principal finding was that choice blindness can be successfully induced using 
stimuli external to the choice task. Furthermore, participants were 
significantly less likely to detect that the face they are shown is not the one 
they selected when the face was encountered as a part of a previous choice 
task, compared to when the face was previously evaluated, previously seen, 
or not encountered at all. The finding that people are very good at recognising 
whether they had previously encountered the alternative presented, indicates 
that recognition memory remains intact during the choice blindness paradigm, 
in-line with past literature (e.g., Pärnamets et al., 2015).  On the other hand, 
the results also suggest that whilst some form of source memory failure 
(inability to recall which alternative was chosen) must occur for choice 
blindness to take place, to some extent source memory must remain intact in 
order for participants to recognise that the task for which they are receiving 
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feedback, is different to the task in which the image presented was initially 
encountered. 
The overall switch detection rate in the study was 65.1%, slightly 
above the previously reported range for choice blindness paradigms using 
facial stimuli (13%-63%; Johansson et al., 2005; Pärnamets et al., 2015). 
However, once participants are informed of the possibility that they might 
have been shown the wrong face as many as 91% of participants report 
detecting something unusual (83% detected & 8% uncertain). Nonetheless, 
the procedure used successfully established the presence of choice blindness 
using stimuli external to the task in question. It does, however, appear that the 
lower level of detection experienced by participants in the pre-choice 
condition is predominantly responsible for the significant levels of choice 
blindness observed overall. In fact, when participants that report being 
uncertain are coded as detected for informed detection, the levels of choice 
blindness observed for the novel and pre-exposed condition are not 
significantly different from 0% and for the pre-exposure condition the 
difference is only marginally significant.   
It appears that a very small proportion of people fail to detect a 
mismatch between their intended stated preference and one presented during 
feedback, when that feedback consists of a stimulus that was not subject to a 
comparative choice process. It must be noted however, that it remains a 
concern that a significant proportion of people do not report identifying the 
switch when first requested to do so even for conditions seldom prone to 
choice blindness. Whether this is due to genuine error or demand 
characteristics, this lack of reporting the mismatch could have detrimental 
consequences for real life decisions. For example, if a third of people accept 
anything they are given as their preferred choice this poses problems for 
models of consumer choice (see Somerville & McGowan, 2016) regardless 
of whether they may have noticed that something is not quite right. This in 
turn highlights the importance of a robust method of preference elicitation in 
the study of preferential cognition. 
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For the pre-choice condition, however, the proportion of people 
exhibiting choice blindness (40.9% overall detection) does appear to reflect a 
limitation of human cognition. As with the classic choice blindness paradigm, 
this presents ethical concerns for malleability of choice and for our ability to 
monitor our own behaviour, and the environment conditions of the choice that 
lead to that behaviour (e.g., Johansson et al., 2005). There are two possible 
task characteristics that may be responsible for the low level of detection 
observed in the pre-choice condition in comparison with the novel, pre-
exposed and pre-judged stimuli; the added comparative component of the 
choice task and the level of similarity between the task in which the stimulus 
is encountered and the task we are evaluating the feedback for.  
As proposed in the introduction each stage of the decision process, 
which for the pre-choice condition is reflected in the addition of comparative 
component to the judgement stage, is accompanied by an increased depth in 
processing. This change in processing could in turn account for the increased 
levels in the pre-choice condition compared to the others increasing memory 
strength (Craik & Lockhart, 1972) and affective evaluation (Oppenheimer, 
2008) of the imposter stimuli. For better remembered stimuli participants 
would be more likely to identify them as recently seen and therefore assess 
them to be a part of the recently undertaken choice task. For the stimuli with 
better affective evaluations (achieved through increased fluency), participants 
would be more likely to judge the stimuli as a likely candidate for what they 
preferred. This explanation is contingent on a plausibility judgement taking 
place when we are presented with information about our own choices, which 
is likely to occur due to reconstructive nature of source memory as proposed 
by Pärnamets et al. (2015). There is also a concern regarding the lack of 
gradual increase in choice blindness across the different conditions, which 
should be apparent if depth of processing is at least in part responsible as this 
should differ between each of the conditions, however, this could be 
explained by a detection ceiling effects, with the maximum level of detection 
being reached for the pre-judgement condition and thus all the decision stages 
preceding it. 
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On the other hand, if the comparative nature of the task is responsible 
for choice blindness we would not anticipate choice blindness to occur when 
the feedback is manipulated for a judgement rating and not a choice, yet a 
choice blindness equivalent has been consistently demonstrated in judgement 
task (e.g., Hall et al., 2012, 2013; Merckelbach et al., 2011; Sagana et al., 
2014a).  Although a valid criticism at face value, it fails to take into account 
that every study using judgement to demonstrate choice blindness, has done 
so by asking participants to select a numeric value from a fixed numeric scale 
as opposed to providing false verbal narrative for example. As a result, 
participant still have to undertake a comparative process between the 
available numerals when choosing the most appropriate thus approximating 
the choice element in the current experiment. The equivalent of the current 
experiment for such judgement procedure would be to present participants 
with feedback that lies outside the scale from which they selected their 
response. It would be reasonable to hypothesise that in this instance a similar 
pattern will be observed where a numeral outside the scale that is brand new 
or was simply shown to the participants earlier would result in high switch 
detection, whereas a number selected on a different scale prior to the task 
would result in relatively low detection.  
The alternative explanation is that in this experiment the pre-choice 
task simply took on the form most similar to the task being manipulated. 
Although source memory has been found to be reconstructive in nature 
(Johnson et al., 1993; Yonelinas, 1999), source misattributions are more 
likely to occur when the source is similar (Johnson et al., 1988, 1993) which 
could account for why misattributions occurred for the stimuli from pre-
choice conditions but not others. Further research using judgement tasks with 
imposter feedback originating from previously undergone choice task may 
shed light on which aspect of the pre-choice condition is responsible for 
choice blindness, however, for now it remains unclear whether a comparative 
process is what causes us to mistakenly accept erroneous feedback or whether 
the feedback being encountered in a similar environment may be sufficient. 
The secondary measures within this study such as similarity, 
attractiveness, self-reported confidence and decision time failed to 
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demonstrate any statistically significant, meaningful relationships with 
choice blindness. Although this is in part surprising given that all of the 
aforementioned have been identified as variables that affect choice blindness 
(e.g., similarity & attractiveness – Steenfeldt-Kristensen & Thornton, 2013; 
confidence – Sagana et al., 2013; decision time – Johansson et al., 2005), a 
number of other studies have also failed to find these effects (e.g., similarity 
& attractiveness – Johansson et al., 2005; confidence – Hall et al., 2013; time 
– Kirichek et al., submitted). The mixed findings regarding the effects of 
stimuli and task characteristic could be explained through other mediating 
factors-for example, time, confidence, similarity and attractiveness have all 
been found to contribute to choice difficulty, however, do not account for a 
hundred percent of its variability (Liberman & Förster, 2006). Perhaps when 
task difficulty reaches a certain threshold, the aforementioned variables stop 
having an effect, however, without explicit and precise knowledge of other 
factors this is merely a speculation, and the current paper is not sufficient to 
determine why similarity, attractiveness, confidence and time constraint 
appear to play no role in choice blindness when using this particular 
procedure.  
On the other hand, decision time did appear to vary between the 
conditions, with the longest time taken to reach a choice for no exposure, and 
the shortest time for pre-choice condition. This in turn supports the notion 
that each proceeding task type shares more with the choice paradigm, as 
practicing the task beforehand should reduce the reaction time in the target 
task. It must be noted that the reduction in decision time would result in less 
exposure to the stimuli at hand which could cause a weaker memory for the 
presented alternatives and accordingly a lower level of detection. If this were 
the case we would anticipate a gradual reduction in detection for no exposure, 
pre-exposure and pre-judgement conditions, however we see an almost 
perfectly uniform pattern. Accordingly, it seems unlikely that decision time 
is driving choice blindness, especially since no significant effect on detection 
was identified.  
Overall the study demonstrates that choice blindness can occur when 
stimuli external to the choice itself are presented during feedback as the 
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selected option. This however, is only the case when the imposter stimulus is 
encountered in a past comparative choice setting, in turn ruling out novel, 
previously seen and previously evaluated stimuli as potential falsely accepted 
choices. We pose two possible explanation for the observed pattern; either the 
comparative process is crucial in giving rise to the choice blindness 
phenomenon, or that choice blindness occurs when the target task and 
feedback source are procedurally similar. Further research using a variety of 
different target tasks is necessary to establish the role of comparative 
processes in choice blindness.    
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Chapter 8. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Past research has shown that people often accept false feedback about 
their own characteristics and decisions they made in the past, even when that 
feedback contradicts the information they provided shortly prior to receiving 
that feedback. In this thesis, I explored two phenomena used to demonstrate 
such false feedback acceptance, the Barnum effect (Meehl, 1956) and choice 
blindness (Johansson et al., 2005), with the aim of identifying the conditions 
required for false feedback to be accepted, and in turn to create a false 
perception of one’s choices.  
Chapter 4 of this thesis was dedicated to investigating whether the 
Barnum effect, or the tendency to accept false feedback about one’s personal 
characteristics, occurs for feedback about one’s personality and risk attitudes, 
and whether this has a subsequent effect on people’s perception of related 
choices they would make in the future. The Barnum effect was successfully 
induced for both personality and risk domains, with the pattern of false 
feedback acceptance demonstrating consistency with past research that 
suggests people are more likely to accept socially positive feedback, but not 
negative feedback (Johnson et al., 1985; Macdonald & Standing, 2002). 
However, there was no subsequent effects of receiving, or accepting false 
feedback, on subsequent choice, which is surprising in light of past research 
(Halperin & Snyder, 1979; Sakamoto et al., 2000).  
In chapters 5 through 7, I focused on the choice blindness 
phenomenon, which demonstrates that people often fail to notice a mismatch 
between their indicated preference in a choice task and the outcome 
presented, when that outcome is in-fact switched for a different alternative. 
The aim of the experiments discussed was to identify which variables 
influence the likelihood of choice blindness being experienced, specifically 
number of alternatives presented in the choice, framing of the choice and 
justification of outcome tasks, and the level of prior interaction with the 
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switched alternative. All three variable were found to have a significant effect 
on the proportion of people who experience choice blindness, however the 
effect of number of alternatives was dependent on the nature of stimuli used. 
In this chapter, I discuss the implications of the research presented in 
this thesis to the wider literature on the subject. Building on the discussion in 
chapters 2 and 3, I consider how the findings contribute to our knowledge of 
when false feedback is likely to be accepted, how this may be relevant to the 
related research fields of introspective access, ability to detect errors, and 
preferential choice (specifically relevant for chapters 5 to 7), as well as how 
this contributes to our understanding of cognitive processes that determine 
whether the Barnum effect or choice blindness occur.  
8.1 Variables that Influence False Feedback Acceptance 
In chapter 3 of this thesis, I discussed a number of variables that 
appear to affect false feedback acceptance: the domain of the task for which 
the feedback is delivered, similarity of the real and altered outcome, 
favourability of the feedback, subjective confidence and demand 
characteristics. In addition, I outlined a few parameters that are specifically 
relevant to the choice blindness paradigm, including the number of 
alternatives in a choice, framing of the problem and familiarity with the 
stimuli presented. Here I revisit that discussion in light of the findings 
reported in this thesis, with consideration given to each of the aforementioned 
variables that are thought to impact false feedback acceptance. 
Past literature suggests that the likelihood of people accepting false 
feedback about one’s characteristics, or choices, is dependent on the domain 
of the task for which the feedback is provided. For Barnum effect, people 
have been found to rate false feedback as less accurate when the measure from 
which it is thought to be generated is specific, and the methodology used to 
generate the profile is transparent (see Dickson & Kelly, 1985; Furnham & 
Schofield, 1987). For example, profiles from trait personality measures are 
less susceptible to the Barnum effect, compared to profiles generated using 
astrology (e.g., Wyman & Vyse, 2008). The likelihood of experiencing the 
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Barnum effect, therefore, appears to vary depending on the domain of the 
measure used. In the research presented in chapter 4, we investigate two 
distinct feedback domains; personality and risk attitudes. The personality 
measure used in the first experiment is based on the five-factor personality 
model (reporting trait openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, 
agreeableness. and neuroticism), and the effects of such feedback format on 
the Barnum effect have been tested in the past with somewhat mixed results 
(Andersen & Nordvik, 2002; Wyman & Vyse, 2008; Poškus, 2014). For 
example, Andersen and Nordvik (2002) conclude that participants 
successfully identify and reject invalid five-factor personality feedback, 
whilst Poškus (2014) reports successfully inducing the Barnum effect when 
providing false five-factor personality feedback. Here we provide support for 
the susceptibility of such personality feedback to the Barnum effect. That said 
this appears to only be the case when the feedback is socially positive, 
suggesting domain alone cannot determine whether the Barnum effect can be 
induced. In experiment two, I introduce a new domain into the Barnum effect 
literature, the risk-taking attitude measure. Overall the accuracy ratings given 
to the risk attitude feedback did not differ significantly from those for 
personality feedback, for real or altered scores (in aggregate or if compared 
by socially desirability of conditions), suggesting participants perceive the 
measures to be of similar accuracy for real and altered feedback types across 
the personality and risk attitude measures. We propose that when the feedback 
provided is based on real, validated measures, and augmented using the same 
procedure, the changes in accuracy ratings show little variation between 
domains. Whilst for positive feedback the reported accuracy ratings are 
similar to those for real feedback, negative feedback is perceived as neither 
accurate nor inaccurate.  
Similarly, for choice blindness, the domain in which the choice is 
made can impact the likelihood of people accepting false feedback. For 
example, Somerville and McGowan (2016) report a much higher level of 
detection for brand chocolates compared to faces. In this thesis, however, we 
only explore choice blindness in one domain, namely preferential choice for 
female faces, a domain most prominent when it comes to studying the choice 
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blindness phenomena. The average detection of false feedback reported in 
each experiment presented in this thesis (47-65%) is slightly above the range 
of detection reported in past literature on choice blindness using faces (12-
63%), however this is likely due to the difference in dependent variables used 
between the work presented and past literature. I combined concurrent and 
retrospective detection for the purpose of my analysis and in the past 
concurrent detection has been the conventionally reported measure. Whilst 
this complicates between study comparisons, it appeared to be a necessary 
precaution to account for the unusual pattern of results observed in my thesis: 
higher levels of detection observed for concurrent detection compared to 
retrospective in two out of three studies focusing on choice blindness. I 
suspect the pattern is a result of the study being carried out online, preventing 
the experimenter from clarifying what would be deemed as unusual. In turn, 
if participants believed that the switch resulted from their own mistake or a 
system error they might perceive it as irrelevant.   
Examination of concurrent detection in isolation does appear to lie 
within the previously reported range at 40.1-56.5% providing additional 
evidence that the likelihood of experiencing choice blindness in facial 
preference tasks, lies within a certain range. Whilst other domains are not 
explored here, one could expect the rate of choice blindness to be different 
for other domains. However, although the baseline may change, the 
systematic changes observed in the experiments presented here would also 
impact choice blindness in a similar manner for other areas of paradigm 
applications. Specifically, it is proposed that the impact of similarity, 
favourability, framing, interaction with the switched stimuli, and potentially 
time and confidence would alter choice blindness in the same direction as 
observed here, across different domains.  
The most intuitively relevant factor to the acceptance of false 
feedback is the difference in favourability between the outcome one would 
expect, and that presented. The research on Barnum effect has often found 
that social positive feedback is more readily accepted than negative feedback 
(e.g., Johnson et al., 1985; Macdonald & Standing, 2002; for exception see 
Dmitruk et al., 1973). The results discussed in chapter 4 appear to support this 
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finding. For experiment one, participants were more likely to accept 
personality feedback when openness, conscientiousness, extraversion and 
agreeableness trait scores were increased and neuroticism trait scores were 
decreased compared to the inverse. Whilst the feedback was designed to more 
closely resemble the traits of a person thought to be more (vs less) likely to 
volunteer for psychology experiments, this exact pattern has been found to be 
seen as more positive (vs negative) by Poškus and Žukauskienė (2014; in 
Poškus, 2014). Similarly, for experiment two participants were more likely to 
accept feedback associated with low risk taking behaviour, compared to high 
risk taking behaviour, which is often evaluated more negatively (Alhakami & 
Slovic, 1994), and is potentially associated with socially negative traits such 
as gambling, or promiscuity.  
For choice blindness, the nature of the paradigm makes it difficult to 
assess how changes in favourability between the selected alternative and the 
presented choice impact acceptance of incorrect feedback, because by the 
very nature of choosing one alternative participants indicate that they prefer 
it the most. This makes it impossible to switch the chosen alternative for a 
better one, since the best alternative is always selected. In chapter 5 of this 
thesis, we try a different approach, by varying the difference in attractiveness 
of the face alternatives presented. We find that when the difference is higher, 
making the false feedback less favourable compared to the actual choice 
made, a higher proportion of participants detect that mismatch between 
choice and outcome compared to when the levels of attractiveness are similar 
however this fails to reach significance. The only exception to this 
observation is when participants are faced with a choice of three alternatives 
and the less attractive face is also dissimilar visually. Accordingly, it is 
difficult to ascertain the role of favourability on choice blindness. Whilst in 
some specific scenarios it appears that favourability of the feedback presented 
does affect the likelihood of that feedback being accepted as accurate, for 
choice blindness as well as the Barnum effect, the effect is not present 
throughout. 
Similarity of the false feedback to the real feedback is another factor 
anticipated to impact false feedback acceptance. If the two alternatives are so 
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similar people cannot tell them apart, it would not be surprising that people 
would rate them as equally accurate. Imagine, for example, completing a 
personality test where the real scores suggest you scored high on trait 
extraversion, say 80 on a scale of 1 to 100. If you are then presented with 
feedback saying you scored 81, it is highly likely you would not notice the 
discrepancy, however, if the feedback is the inverse of your score at 20, one 
would suspect that detection would be very likely. Indeed, Andersen and 
Nordvik (2002) demonstrated that participants rate false feedback as less 
accurate when that feedback is dissimilar to their real personality profile. In 
the experiments conducted in chapter 4, the feedback was transformed from 
a scale of 1 to 100, to either a scale of 1 to 50, or 51 to 100, therefore we 
cannot look at the effects of difference between real and false feedback 
without introducing real personality as a confounding variable. The results 
pertaining to risk attitude acceptance do, however, suggest that similarity 
plays a crucial role in the acceptance of altered information, with people 
demonstrating stronger risk preference more likely to accept feedback when 
it is altered to suggest high risk preference and less likely to accept feedback 
altered to suggest lower risk preference. On the other hand, the slight increase 
in accuracy ratings when participants received socially positive feedback 
compared to real feedback, suggest that the deviation from real profiles is not 
responsible for differences in the accuracy ratings. It is likely that there is an 
interaction between favourability and similarity, where a person is more 
prone to accepting the feedback if it is either favourable or similar.  
For choice blindness, varying the similarity of alternatives used has 
received somewhat mixed results. Whilst the majority of research has 
reported significant effects of similarity (Hall et al., 2010; McLaughlin & 
Somerville, 2013; Sagana et al., 2013; Sauerland et al., 2013; Steenfeldt-
Kristensen & Thornton, 2013), a few studies failed to find such effects 
(Johansson et al., 2005; Sauerland et al., 2014). In chapter 3, I discussed the 
possibility that a lack of a robust measure of similarity may have been 
responsible for the lack of similarity effect reported in the first choice 
blindness experiment (Johansson et al., 2005). To ensure that the 
manipulation of similarity in experiments presented in this thesis is 
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representative of the population, we used a large sample of 350 raters to 
establish the characteristics of the facial stimuli used (see chapter 5). 
However, despite the same method of establishing similarity being used 
across the experiments presented in chapter 5 through 7, similarity only 
appeared to be a significant predictor of choice blindness in the experiments 
presented in chapter 5. Furthermore, the stimuli assessed on similarity 
included those used by Johansson and colleagues (2005) in their experiment, 
and we found that the ratings we collected corresponded with the similarity 
categories originally assigned to the face pairs, indicating that the procedure 
of allocating faces to different similarity conditions could not be responsible 
for the lack of difference reported. It is therefore proposed that similarity may 
contribute to a higher level cognitive representation, such as ambiguity, which 
in turn determines the likelihood of choice blindness occurring (Sagana et al., 
2013; Somerville & McGowan, 2016). Once this variable reaches a certain 
threshold, the contribution of similarity ceases to have an effect because even 
when the stimuli are dissimilar the situation remains ambiguous. Consider for 
example the experiment presented in chapter 6, where the negative framing 
of the choice or justification task are found to decrease the proportion of 
manipulated trials that are detected. It is likely that negative framing impacts 
the same ‘ambiguity’ factor as similarity, resulting in no effect of similarity 
on choice blindness being identified. Indeed, when the positive framing 
condition is examined in isolation, a trend begins to emerge of higher 
detection when stimuli are dissimilar (81%) compared to when they are 
similar (66%), although this does not reach significance, perhaps due to the 
small sample of people in this subset of the data. 
Whilst I did not investigate the level of ambiguity with respect to the 
Barnum effect in the original research presented here, the very origin of the 
phenomenon suggests that some ambiguity factor does indeed play a role in 
determining whether false feedback is accepted as accurate. As I outlined in 
previous chapters, the Barnum effect was initially considered to be a result of 
information being general and applicable to a wide range of other people 
(Forer, 1949; Sundberg, 1955), such lack of specificity in itself creates 
ambiguity. Direct comparison of generic feedback such as that used in 
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astrology, compared to trait personality measures, further confirmed that 
acceptance of feedback about the self is higher when the feedback is general 
(e.g., Wyman & Vyse, 2008), suggesting that increase in ambiguity increases 
the likelihood of false feedback acceptance.   
If decision ambiguity is indeed the determining factor in whether false 
feedback is accepted or not, we would expect this to be reflected in 
participants’ subjective confidence in their decision. As outlined in chapter 3, 
however, the research on the relationship between confidence and false 
feedback acceptance has been scarce. I am not aware of any such studies 
being carried out for the Barnum effect, but a few have attempted to 
understand the relationship of self-reported confidence and choice blindness. 
One study by Sagana and colleagues (2013) reports the post-decision 
confidence to be a significant predictor of choice blindness. On the other 
hand, when examining the effects of self-reported certainty of political views 
on subsequently altered responses to political questions, Hall et al. (2013) fail 
to report a significant relationship. Similarly, I fail to find a relationship 
between confidence and choice blindness in the experiments presented in 
chapters 5 through 7 of the current thesis. This poses an interesting dilemma, 
since we know that factors contributing to ambiguity also contribute to choice 
blindness, yet this is not reflected in self-reported confidence. One possibility 
that could explain such results is a floor effect of confidence in preferential 
choice, where no participants exhibiting high confidence levels would limit 
differentiation between detected and non-detected trial. However, since the 
average choice confidence observed in my research (chapters 5-7 ranged) 
from 7.2 to 7.8 on a 0 to 10 scale, we can reject such hypothesis. Another 
explanation for this discrepancy could be that subjective confidence and 
actual level of ambiguity are not as closely linked as we intuitively suspect.  
After all, confidence ratings have often been found to be poor predictors of 
decision quality (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1975). If this is the case, 
however, we are faced with a different challenge of finding a direct measure 
of what it means for a choice to be ‘ambiguous’.  
So far, I have discussed variables that have been investigated with 
respect to both the Barnum effect and choice blindness paradigm. There are 
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a number of variables considered in my research, which I will now discuss, 
that are more relevant for the choice blindness procedure, specifically number 
of alternatives presented in the choice task, positive and negative framing of 
the task, and the prior interaction with the stimulus used in the switch. Whilst 
the Barnum effect will be mentioned where relevant, it will be seldom 
discussed in the remainder of this section.  
 In chapter 3, I proposed that the number of alternatives presented in 
a choice might impact choice blindness. For example, when asking 
participants to recognise a face from a line-up formed of six alternatives, and 
switching the selected face for a different alternative in a subsequent 
justification task, Sagana et al. (2013) reported a higher detection rate of the 
switch compared to other choice blindness studies using facial stimuli. I 
proposed that this may be a result of methodological deviation from the 
original paradigm, since the study gave participants a task with an objectively 
correct outcome, to recognise an earlier encountered individual. However, in 
chapter 5 we report that increasing the number of alternatives can indeed 
increase the level of switch detection, which could explain the results reported 
by Sagana and colleagues. Whilst overall, the detection for three compared to 
two alternative tasks was higher, we must be cautious when interpreting these 
results since such effect was only observed when there was a variation in 
physical similarity and attractiveness of the faces used. In chapter 5, I propose 
that the mechanism underlying the observed phenomenon is the enhanced 
salience of differences between the alternatives, this however, does not negate 
the pattern observed.  
It remains unclear why the difference in choice blindness for binary 
and ternary choice only occurs when both similarity and attractiveness are 
varied, but not one or the other. As noted earlier in this chapter, for binary 
choice variability in similarity alone is sufficient to produce a change in 
proportions of people who detect wrong feedback being presented. Whilst this 
is also true for ternary choice, a combination of variation in the two 
parameters seems to produce a much larger change in detection. This is 
potentially a result of the difficulty in creating ternary stimuli sets equally 
spaced across the similarity and attractiveness dimensions, for example for 
171/215 
 
stimuli that are designed to be equally similar and attractive one pair within 
the three will always be slightly more similar than the other unless a perfect 
level of control is achieved through artificially creating stimuli. Whilst the 
reason for this pattern requires further research, it does allow us to predict 
under which circumstances detection of erroneous outcomes can be increased, 
and the results highlight that extrapolating the findings of binary choice to 
multi-alternative choice should be done with caution.  
In chapter 2, I briefly discussed research evidence on how framing, or 
more specifically the response modality of the question, may impact choice 
blindness, concluding that whilst studies using judgement rating demonstrate 
slightly lower levels of detection compared to the original paradigm, further 
research directly comparing judgement and decision tasks whilst controlling 
for other factors is required.  In chapter 6, I explored another form of framing 
variation, positive versus negative question frame that is presented to 
participants.  Past research has demonstrated that choice outcome (Shafir, 
1993), as well as choice consistency (Kogut, 2011), vary with the manner in 
which the task instructions are formulated. More specifically a study by 
Kogut (2011), reported that higher choice consistency can be observed when 
participants are provided with negatively framed tasks (i.e., please select the 
options you would like to reject) compared to a positively framed task (i.e., 
please select the option you would like to keep). Surprisingly, I found that 
participants exhibited the highest levels of detection when both the choice and 
justification elements of the choice blindness task were framed positively, 
which coincidentally was in line with the original procedure of the choice 
blindness paradigm (Johansson et al., 2005). Detection rates for participants 
who underwent the task with at least one negative frame (i.e., were required 
to select their preferred face and required to justify why they did not prefer it, 
or required to select the face they did not prefer regardless of the justification 
frame) were significantly lower compared to when the original procedure was 
used, but showed no significant difference between each other.  
There are a number of possible differences in the research approaches 
that could explain this difference. First, it must be noted that the definition of 
choosing and rejecting framing is very different in the experiment presented 
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in chapter 6 and the research conducted by Kogut (2011); whereas we asked 
participants to either select their preferred or non-preferred alternative, in 
keeping with the choice blindness paradigm, the choice consistency 
researchers asked participants to include their preferred alternatives or 
exclude their least preferred alternatives out of a host of possibilities. 
Although both sets of research were designed to measure the effects of 
choosing versus rejecting alternatives, the difference in the wording of the 
tasks themselves could produce a difference in the choice outcomes observed. 
Additionally, the research presented in chapter 6 used binary choice with one 
outcome, whereas Kogut (2011) used multiple alternative tasks that required 
participants to narrow their selection in stages. The decision domains 
themselves could have determined how framing can affect choice consistency 
in different ways. Alternatively, a possibility remains that the cognitive 
processes involved in choice consistency and outcome mismatch detection 
are, in fact, different, and the choice consistency work simply measures 
something different to the choice blindness paradigm. The reasons for the 
observed discrepancy can only be theorised, until further empirical work can 
establish the effect of all of the aforementioned variables, so for the moment, 
we can only conclude that probability of switched outcome detection is at its 
highest when both the choice and feedback tasks are positively framed. 
In chapter 3 of this thesis, I discussed how familiarity with a domain 
can reduce choice blindness, as demonstrated by Somerville and McGowan 
(2016) who applied the choice blindness paradigm to preferential choice 
decisions with familiar chocolate brands, demonstrating a much lower level 
of accepting switched feedback.  The last original paper in this thesis (Chapter 
7) explored the effects of another type of familiarity, which was manipulated 
within the experiment itself. This was achieved by presenting false feedback 
that consisted of pictures of faces not encountered during the actual choice 
task for which the feedback is being provided, and varying the levels of prior 
interactions with that face. The results were somewhat reassuring for our 
ability to monitor the validity of feedback provided for our choices, in that 
we found that a very high proportion of people (more than 85%) detecting 
that their choice had been switched if they are presented with an alternative 
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that they had never seen before, or only encountered in a different task, such 
as only studying the alternative or providing evaluative comments for it when 
presented amongst a range of other alternatives. However, we did find that 
about a third of participants who encountered the face as part of a preceding 
choice task failed to detect that their choice had been switched, suggesting 
choice blindness can be induced using alternatives outside the task as 
feedback. The implications of this finding are two-fold: first it demonstrates 
that the range of false feedback people may accept is wider than previously 
anticipated, and second it highlights the importance of source memory 
similarity for the choice selected and choice presented as feedback in choice 
blindness, which will be discussed in further detail later in this chapter 
(section 8.3). Another important contribution of this experiment is that it 
provides us with a new procedural approach to choice blindness that can now 
be used to explore a wider range of circumstances, such as whether detection 
of a manipulated outcome can be reduced when the feedback provided is, in 
fact, better than the choice made. 
The last variable I would like to consider, as a determining factor of 
false feedback acceptance is demand characteristic, such as investigator 
effects (see chapter 3). Such effects are of some concern for all psychology 
experiments, as it is hard to determine whether people are responding with 
their genuine thoughts, or with what they think the experimenter expects from 
them (Orne, 1962). For example, some people may be embarrassed to suggest 
the experimenter has made a mistake when presented with incorrect feedback, 
or alternatively if they have received accurate feedback from the experimenter 
in the past they may develop trust and assume that the experimenter’s 
judgement is better than their own, even when they suspect something is not 
right. Interestingly, neither the Barnum effect (Orpen & Jamotte, 1975; 
Snyder & Larson, 1972), nor choice blindness (Sauerland et al., 2013, 2014) 
appear to be affected by individual differences in susceptibility to social 
desirability as measured by the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability scale. 
However, it remains possible that the propensity to demand characteristics in 
the tasks used is so high that even the participants less susceptible to social 
desirability exhibited the effects. Such effects can be minimised by 
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eliminating direct interaction with the experimenter, and ensuring there is no 
past experience which can impact their judgement.  
Whilst I do not directly manipulate the factors associated with demand 
characteristics in any of the studies presented, I have taken some steps to 
minimise the chances of such circumstances having an effect. For the 
experiments outlined in chapter 4, investigating the Barnum effect, the data 
was collected online without the experimenter present, minimising potential 
experimenter effects and suggesting the effect is a real cognitive phenomenon 
as opposed to the participants’ response to perceived expectations. Other 
research using computers to supposedly generate the feedback has also 
consistently reported successfully inducing the Barnum effect (Baillargeon & 
Danis, 1984; Guastello & Rieke, 1990; O’Dell, 1972).  Furthermore, in 
experiment one I manipulate all of the trait scores presented, preventing 
participants from learning to treat feedback as accurate. Whilst only one trait 
is manipulated in experiment two, any effects resulting from the lack of 
manipulation of the other three traits presented would have been visible in 
comparison to experiment one.  
Similarly, in the experiments using the choice blindness paradigm 
(chapters 5 through 7) I employ an online procedure with a one-shot decision 
to investigate choice blindness to minimise experimenter effects. To my 
knowledge past experiments have always presented false feedback amongst 
other trials which provided real feedback, and this is the first time such 
procedure has been employed. Whilst I do appear to demonstrate higher 
detection rates compared to the range previously reported, this change is 
inconclusive without conducting research that can compare these variables in 
otherwise controlled empirical research. Generally, my findings further 
support the conclusion that social desirability cannot account for choice 
blindness, demonstrating that it is indeed a robust, stable cognitive 
phenomenon.  
 Up to this point, I have discussed the variables that determine the 
likelihood of false feedback acceptance, and the contribution of the original 
papers presented in this thesis to the understanding of these variables. In 
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summary domain, similarity, in some instances favourability and specificity 
appear to be significant predictors of when false feedback acceptance occurs 
for both the Barnum effect and choice blindness. For choice blindness 
specifically, I report that the number of alternatives, framing of the choice 
and justification tasks, and the type of interaction with the feedback presented 
prior to justifying it have a significant effect on false feedback detection. 
Interestingly, subjective confidence and demand characteristics appear to 
have little to no relationship with acceptance of false feedback. In the 
following chapters, I will briefly discuss the contributions of the work 
presented here to our understanding of the consequences of false feedback 
effects (specifically the Barnum effect), as well as to our understanding of the 
mechanisms associated with accepting false feedback. Lastly, I will discuss 
the broader implications of the work for introspection, error detection and 
preferential choice, as well as the possible practical applications of the 
research presented. 
8.2 Consequences of False Feedback Acceptance 
Past research has demonstrated that accepting false feedback can 
actually impact our decisions and behaviours, making them more congruent 
with the information provided. Whilst I do not explore such effects of false 
feedback acceptance with respect to choice blindness in the original 
experiments presented here, as discussed in chapter 3 experiencing choice 
blindness has been found to alter participant response (Johansson et al., 2014; 
Kusev et al., in preparation; Merckelbach et al., 2011). For example, this has 
been demonstrated using the choice blindness paradigm to switch the 
preferences for female faces (Johansson et al., 2014), with findings indicating 
that we are more likely to select a face we did not initially prefer as our 
preference, after being presented with it as false feedback and providing a 
justification for why we chose is. Similarly, the perceived intensity of 
psychological symptoms has been found to change, after being presented with 
an adjusted version of the initially reported intensity, in the direction of that 
adjustment (Merckelbach et al., 2011). In other words, after accepting altered 
feedback, participants are more likely to report heightened symptom severity 
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if they see feedback suggesting increased intensity, and milder symptom 
intensity if the feedback if they see feedback suggesting lower intensity.  
In the research presented in chapter 4 of this thesis, I examined 
whether the Barnum effect can induce a similar change, and failed to find an 
analogous effect. To my knowledge, there have been two studies in the past 
which tried to investigate this before, with a different conclusion (Halperin & 
Snyder, 1979; Sakamoto et al., 2000). Halperin and Snyder (1979) found that 
that giving participants feedback that suggests a high propensity to change 
resulted in more positive outcomes of snake phobia treatment. Sakamoto et 
al. (2000) reported that giving people feedback that suggests higher trait 
extraversion resulted in more conversation with a confederate, and better 
impression of the confederate by the individual and vice versa. Both studies, 
however, suffered from a range of limitations. First, both used female only 
samples, a demographic shown to accept feedback more readily (compared to 
males; Layne, 1998). Second, neither used an appropriate control group, of 
real or neutral feedback, making it difficult to establish the changes induced 
by feedback type alone. Lastly, in both studies the feedback was delivered by 
the experimenter as prose, which could have result in demand characteristics, 
as well as motivational messages implicitly contained in the feedback.   
My decision to carry out another experiment exploring consequences 
of the Barnum effect was motivated by these limitations, trying to provide a 
more controlled, albeit less ecologically valid procedure, using a gender 
balanced sample for the first time. Chapter 4 outlined two experiments: the 
first altering psychological profiles to assess their impact on participants’ self-
reported likelihood to volunteer for psychology experiments, and the second 
altering risk attitude profiles to assess their impact on preference for risky 
versus certain lotteries. Neither showed a relationship between the type of 
feedback provided and subsequent responses, regardless of whether 
participants rated the feedback as accurate or not. It is impossible to identify 
the precise reasons for why my results were not aligned with what would be 
predicted by Halperin and Snyder (1979) and Sakamoto and colleagues 
(2000). The only explanation we can rule out is gender since we detected no 
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difference between male and female participants in feedback acceptance or 
self-reported behavioural propensities.   
One possible explanation is the reduced susceptibility of the 
participants to potential experimenter effects, as for the first time the 
experiment was carried out online and did not require direct contact with 
people involved in the experiment. Another, is that the numeric feedback 
format used in the experiment may have reduced implicit encouragement cues 
that may be associated with prose. Alternatively, it is possible that the 
difference lies in the nature of behaviours measured, whether it is the 
difference in the domain tested or the dissociation between real and self-
reported behaviour. All I can conclude, is that experiencing the Barnum effect 
does not always lead to change in behavioural propensity, and thus that 
accepting false feedback does not necessarily update our beliefs about the 
self. This finding is reassuring as it suggests that our behaviour is not always 
shaped by errors in our environment, yet poses a new and complex task of 
establishing when false feedback does or does not alter behaviour.  
8.3 Mechanisms 
In chapter 3, I discussed the mechanisms that might underlie the 
Barnum effect and choice blindness. Here I will revisit the discussion, 
focusing on memory failure, and self-perception theory, and ambiguity with 
regard to their ability to explain and predict when false feedback is accepted 
One crucial question, which needs to be considered when explaining 
why false feedback acceptance may occur, is why we do not simply recall 
past actions to assess the accuracy of the feedback. In chapter 3 I outlined that 
for choice blindness it is puzzling why we cannot simply compare the 
outcome of a choice task, to the feedback presented in the same format. For 
the Barnum effect, however, since participants may not be able to directly 
envision the relationship between the task they complete and the feedback 
generated, the question is slightly different in that we need to understand why 
people do not use knowledge of their past behaviours to assess the likelihood 
of the information presented.  
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Johnson et al., (1985) proposed that people do exactly that, but 
because of the heuristics, or shortcuts, used to access our memories, the 
outcome is the erroneous acceptance of false information as accurate 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). The researchers suggested that because we 
have a large memory store about ourselves, when faced with general enough 
feedback we are likely to find available behavioural evidence confirming any 
common trait in ourselves. Furthermore, biases in memory can provide a 
reasonable explanation for the higher level of Barnum effect for positive 
compared to negative feedback about the self, as people tend to pay more 
attention to positive feedback and remember it better, thus providing more 
instances that come to mind for positive information, even when those 
instances are not common (Sedikides et al., 2004). Whilst this theory is very 
strong in explaining the acceptance of common, or general traits, it is 
questionable to what extent it could be applied to specific, numeric feedback. 
For such feedback formats, in providing the scale of possibilities, and not 
verbal information, we automatically provide people with a comparison point 
which would be likely to draw attention to the fact that we are on one scale 
and not the other, which may result in memory retrieval for both scenarios. 
Presumably, this would prompt someone who receives contradictory 
feedback, to recall the instances to the contrary. The findings presented in 
chapter 4 provide further support that Barnum effect can occur for specific, 
numeric feedback, suggesting the validity of the availability heuristic should 
be re-visited and further empirical research may be necessary to understand 
whether a limited scale can influence acceptance of invalid information.  On 
the other hand, we only observe high accuracy ratings, when the feedback 
provided is positive which is in line with what one would expect if the 
Barnum effect was a result of the availability heuristic.  
Positive feedback being rated as more accurate than negative feedback 
not only provides support for the memory bias approach put forward by 
Johnson et al. (1985), it can also be taken to support the self-serving bias 
explanation (Macdonald & Standing, 2002) of the Barnum effect. The self-
serving bias approach proposes that we are more likely to attribute positive 
traits to our own nature, whilst negative traits are attributed to external factors, 
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such as the validity of the psychometric tool used to generate the personal 
description (see also Collins et al., 1977; Snyder & Shenkel, 1976). This 
approach, however, fails to explain why acceptance of negative feedback is 
often documented in past literature (e.g., Poškus, 2014; Wyman & Vyse, 
2008), making the availability heuristic approach more comprehensive in 
explaining observed phenomena.  
Neither the self-serving bias, nor the memory bias approach can 
sufficiently explain choice blindness as the memory for the encountered 
stimuli should not differ, and by the very nature of the feedback presented 
being the non-preferred alternative the feedback is never more positive than 
the actual choice. Whilst it is possible that different false feedback effects 
have different underlying mechanisms, it seems improbable that these are 
completely distinct. Or at the very least this is unlikely to be the most 
parsimonious explanation of the Barnum and choice blindness phenomena.  
For choice blindness, the memory failure necessary for accepting false 
feedback is even more surprising, since we can remember complex 
autobiographical information yet fail to recall a simple choice we made just 
minutes before judging the validity of an outcome of that choice. Research 
suggests that only the source memory, or the choice made, appears to be 
unavailable yet the recognition of the stimuli in the task remain intact 
(Pärnamets et al., 2015; Sagana et al., 2014a). The findings reported in 
chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis also support the conclusion that a recognition 
memory limitation explanation of choice blindness is unlikely. First, if 
cognitive resources are already under strain, it would follow that increasing 
the amount of information to encode and store would lead to increased 
difficulty in monitoring such information and thus higher choice blindness. 
Yet, chapter 5 shows the opposite effect by demonstrating that increasing the 
number of alternatives increases the level of detection. Second, if memory 
constraint is responsible for choice blindness, using a better remembered 
stimulus with incongruent task instructions as feedback would increase the 
chance of detection as participants would be more likely to recall the various 
features of their choice. In preferential choice, the selected stimulus is more 
likely be remembered (McClelland et al., 1987), yet when we use the selected 
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alternative with incongruent justification instructions (i.e., Why did you not 
select this alternative?) as the post-decision task in chapter 6 people are more 
likely to experience choice blindness compared to when they are presented 
with the unselected alternative with incongruent instructions.  
Pärnamets et al. (2015) proposed that whilst recognition memory 
remains intact, the evaluative and reconstructive processes involved in 
accessing source memory (Johnson et al., 1993; Yonelinas, 1999) make it 
more susceptible to misremembering. Chapter 7 of this thesis does suggest, 
however, that the similarity of the information source is crucial in determining 
the level of detection exhibited by participants. More specifically, when 
instructed to justify a previously non-chosen alternative, participants are less 
likely to notice the mismatch if that alternative was previously encountered 
in a visually and cognitively similar context, such as a preceding binary 
choice. On the other hand, when the alternative presented is encountered in a 
different task such as evaluation of the item on individual basis, the 
proportion of people who detect the mismatch is substantially higher. This 
supports the notion that the assessment of which choice was previously made 
involves accessing some information from memory of the event, 
accompanied by situational judgements of event likelihood as proposed for 
source memory overall (Johnson et al., 1993). 
Pärnamets et al. (2015) stipulated that the tendency to use external 
information to judge our own behavioural propensity is best described by self-
perception theory (Bem, 1967). Self-perception theory states that when 
internal information is weak, individuals come to know their own attitudes by 
observing their own behaviour and environment. The application of self-
perception theory to the Barnum effect and choice blindness is discussed in 
detail in chapter 2, with the general conclusion that self-perception can 
describe the possible mechanisms behind choice blindness and the Barnum 
effect. However, the theory lacks the specificity required to be rigorously 
tested using empirical data. Support for the application of self-perception 
theory comes from the very demonstration that false feedback is often 
accepted, whether in the context of the Barnum effect or choice blindness. 
The paradigms highlight that whilst in some instances, people use internal 
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information to successfully reject false feedback about the self, whilst in 
others they use external cues to infer their own attitudes and behaviour which 
can lead to accepting false information (e.g., Johansson et al., 2005).  By 
demonstrating false feedback acceptance across a wider range of situations 
than before (chapters 4 through 5), we also support the existence of processes 
akin to those described by self-perception theory. Further support that we use 
knowledge of past actions to infer our own attitudes and propensities comes 
from literature demonstrating that accepting false feedback can in turn lead to 
behavioural change (Halperin & Snyder, 1979; Johansson et al., 2014; 
Merckelbach et al., 2011; Sakamoto et al., 2000; see chapter 3 for discussion). 
Chapter 4 of this thesis, however, presents findings that do not support 
this pattern, demonstrating that altering participants’ personality or risk 
attitude profiles does not alter subsequent self-reported behavioural 
propensities for the related fields of willingness to volunteer for experiments, 
and preferences for risky versus certain lotteries, even when they rate them as 
accurate. This poses the question of why in some instances we update our 
beliefs about the self and act accordingly and in others we will fail to do so. 
It could be argued that in these particular domains the internal information is 
strong enough to override the external information received, yet this still 
doesn’t explain how the feedback is accepted in the first place whilst the 
actions do not change. Without a better definition of strength of internal 
information, and an appropriate measure, self-perception theory can only 
have weak predictive power.  
 Another problem for the application of self-perception theory arises 
when we consider the variability in choice blindness exhibited across 
different domains and procedural variations, as this requires the use of 
internal cues to explain such differences. For example, what reasons would 
an observer have to reach a different conclusion about a person’s behaviour 
when they are making a positively framed choice versus negatively framed 
choice? (Chapter 7).  Logically the memory of past choices made should 
equally inform preferences and lack of preference when making an attitude 
attribution, yet this does not appear to be the case. Similarly, it does not 
explain why the number of alternatives presented would affect choice 
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blindness (chapter 5). In order to explain this, we would need to consider the 
cognitive mechanisms concerned with making any judgement, whether it 
concerns the self or someone else, which still remain to be incorporated into 
a more comprehensive model.  
The possibility that an observer would reach a different conclusion 
under different tasks can be captured in the task ambiguity. Recall that 
ambiguity plays an important role in both choice blindness and the Barnum 
effect (e.g., Forer, 1949; Merckelbach et al., 2011; Sagana et al., 2013; 
Sundberg, 1955). As defined in chapter 3, ambiguity refers to the imprecision 
of the task and its environment which allows the information to be interpreted 
in more than one way, be it a choice outcome or personal description (Sloman, 
Fernbach & Hagmayer, 2010). In other words, for false feedback effects this 
is our ability to explain both the real or false outcome presented. Ambiguity 
can be affected through different properties such as generality, similarity, and 
time constraints, and is thought to be, at least to some extent, related to the 
construct of subjective confidence (e.g., Ellsberg, 1961).  
For the experiment on Barnum effect presented in chapter 4, I used 
feedback that is presented in a specific manner (numeric representation of a 
position on trait scale) to induce the Barnum effect, using validated measures; 
IPIP five factor personality measures (IPIP, 2006) and the Domain Specific 
Risk Attitude Test (Blais & Weber, 2006). Nonetheless, overall participants 
appeared to accept false feedback, suggesting that even for some of our most 
reliable psychometric tools that have been designed to minimise ambiguity, 
the Barnum effect still occurs. On closer examination, this only appears to be 
the case for socially favourable feedback, a pattern that cannot be explained 
by ambiguity alone. Furthermore, as the acceptance rate for positive feedback 
was even higher than for real feedback, it also appears that for this condition 
decrease in similarity does not result in enhanced detection. It seems that 
whilst minimising ambiguity eliminated acceptance of negative feedback, a 
different mechanism is likely responsible for acceptance of positive feedback.  
On the other hand, where subjective judgement is involved, there is 
always some level of ambiguity, which may be the necessary minimum for 
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people to accept false feedback, explaining why the Barnum effect can and 
does occur for measures that appear highly specific. Sagana et al. (2013, 
2014b) propose that the same applies for choice blindness in preferential 
choice. Indeed, we find that some level of choice blindness can be observed 
across every experimental condition presented throughout chapters 5 through 
7, with the lowest acceptance rate of 12%, when the image used as false 
feedback is completely new to the participant. The low level of familiarity 
with choosing between faces is also likely to have played a role in introducing 
ambiguity which allowed for choice blindness to be observed (discovered 
preference hypothesis, Plott, 1966; constructed preference hypothesis, 
Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006; Slovic, 1995), however, since we only use 
female faces as the choice domain in the experiments presented here this is 
not empirically tested.  
As discussed in the previous section we also find evidence of other 
factors related to ambiguity such as similarity, favourability of outcome, and 
framing of the task having an impact on the level of detection observed. 
Similarity and favourability were controlled in all three choice blindness 
experiments presented here, however, only one of the studies found a 
significant effect of these variables. As one would expect, detection was 
lower for stimuli that were visually similar and of a similar favourability 
level, however, this was only found to be the case in the experiment presented 
in chapter 5. We propose that the effect is not observed due to being precluded 
by other factors that influence choice blindness in chapters 6 and 7, namely 
the high ambiguity associated with the framing used in chapter 6 and the 
source of feedback being the choice blindness determinant in chapter 7. The 
sample size does not provide high enough power to examine the effects of 
similarity and favourability within the individual conditions of the two 
experiments.  
 The focus of chapters 6 and 7 was to determine whether the framing 
of the choice task (positive versus negative), and the interaction with the 
stimulus presented during feedback (completed novel, previously seen, 
previously evaluated, or a part of a choice task distinct to the one for which 
the feedback is being presented) impact choice blindness. Both studies 
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reported a significant effect of their respective manipulated variables, both of 
which could be construed as changing the ambiguity of the task at hand. The 
manipulation of task framing demonstrated that the highest proportion of 
detection is reported when the choice task (please select the face you prefer.) 
and the justification task (why did you prefer this face?) are both framed 
positively, whereas when either, or both, tasks are framed negatively the level 
of detection observed is significantly lower. Research has found that people 
find it harder to process sentences containing negative particles (e.g., not) 
than positive, finding them harder to judge (e.g., Carpenter & Just, 1975), and 
therefore more ambiguous, perhaps as a result of rarely having to identify the 
least preferred alternative  compared to most preferred alternative. 
Accordingly, it is likely that changing the framing of the choice blindness task 
from positive to negative decreases detection by introducing additional 
ambiguity.  
For chapter 6, it is possible that when the participants have never seen 
the stimulus presented as false feedback for their choice, or encountered it in 
a different setting, they recognise that the item presented was not a part of the 
choice set and therefore are able to reject it. This switches the necessary 
judgement from subjective (could I have preferred that choice) to an objective 
one (did I see this face in the choice task) minimising ambiguity. However, 
when the stimulus was encountered in a similar task, a source of ambiguity is 
re-introduced by making it harder to identify whether the task in which the 
stimulus was encountered was the same or a different one.  
Whilst ambiguity provides one possible explanation for observed 
effects, without a way to measure ambiguity this remains to be proven. 
Confidence has been put forward as a candidate for measuring ambiguity. 
However, research has shown mixed findings regarding the relationship of 
choice blindness and confidence. Similarly, here we fail to detect a significant 
relationship of confidence and proportion of trials detected (chapters 5-7).  
In chapter 3 I propose that a more objective measure of ambiguity can 
be inferred from choice consistency across trials. The proportion of trials on 
which participants switch choices varies with what appears to be ambiguity 
185/215 
 
of the task (e.g., Loomes & Sugden, 1998; Rieskamp et al., 2006), and the 
process of measuring choice consistency is very similar to choice blindness, 
with both procedures testing choices over two points in time, and both test if 
they elicit the same outcome across the trials – whether through the same 
selection for choice consistency, or recognition of the wrong outcome in the 
choice blindness paradigm. This makes it easy to apply what we know about 
choice consistency to choice blindness. However, in trying to use choice 
consistency to generate hypotheses about choice blindness I found mixed 
results. Whilst in chapter 5 my results are congruent with those previously 
reported in choice consistency studies (DeShazo & Fermo, 2002; Collins & 
Vossler, 2009), demonstrating that people are more likely to detect a 
mismatch in intention and outcome when choosing from three compared to 
two alternatives, just as people show more consistency across their choices 
when their choice set consists of more than two options. This supports the 
notion that the two paradigms reflect the same underlying property, which I 
have referred to as ambiguity in the current work. On the other hand, in 
chapter 6 I find that negative framing of the choice blindness paradigm leads 
to a decrease in detection, whereas past research suggests that consistency for 
negatively framed tasks is in-fact higher (Kogut, 2011). I propose that the 
differences in procedures used, such as variation in the number of alternatives 
presented to the participants as well as the number of choices selected, may 
account for this discrepancy (see chapter 6 for discussion), however, it does 
pose the possibility that choice blindness and choice consistency may, in fact, 
measure different properties. However, since negatively framed statements 
are likely to introduce more ambiguity to the task, I propose that the 
experiments presented in chapter 6 are better suited to reflect the effects of 
ambiguity compared to the procedure employed to study framing in the 
literature on consistency (Kogut, 2011). 
Generally, incorporating ambiguity into self-perception theory 
provides us with a plausible account of the process undergone by participants 
in accepting false feedback. As discussed in chapter 3, predictions made by 
self-perception theory can also be explained by cognitive dissonance (when 
there is an inconsistency between cognitions people experience mental 
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discomfort, which results in the adjustment of one or more of the cognitions 
– Festinger, 1957). Unfortunately, the research presented here does not allow 
us to differentiate which model is better suited to describing false feedback 
effects, however, as there is still no evidence to suggest people do experience 
psychological discomfort, self-perception theory provides the more 
parsimonious explanation of false feedback acceptance effects.   
In this section, I have attempted to outline the contributions of my 
own research to how source memory (including availability heuristic and self-
serving bias), self-perception theory (or cognitive dissonance) and ambiguity 
(including discovered preference hypothesis, or constructed preference 
theory) can explain, and predict false feedback effects. Overall my work 
provides further support for the plausibility of each of the mechanisms 
discussed, suggesting some element of every proposed approached are likely 
to play a role in bringing about choice blindness. This is not surprising, since 
none of the theories make contradictory prediction for the empirical question 
at hand, and in many ways the majority of the processes are complimentary, 
simply describing a different decision stage of every process. For instance, 
we can take self-perception theory as a skeleton of false feedback acceptance 
processes consisting of two-parts; assessing validity of the information based 
on internal cue strength, and using external information to judge the 
likelihood of the information provided as we would for any other individual. 
Memory strength can then be described as a determining factor of internal 
information, whilst ambiguity of the situation would be key in determining 
the judgement based on internal information. In this way, we can see that the 
approaches discussed are not in competition, and build on one another. To 
fully understand, why false feedback acceptance occurs, we would need to 
consider all the possible factors that can determine internal signals and 
external signals alike, which is outside the scope of this thesis. However, it 
does call for a development of such comprehensive, unified theory which can 
then be used to fine-tune our knowledge of human cognition, by creating 
testable hypotheses. For the moment, however, we lack such theory. (e.g., 
Gawronski & Strack, 2004).  
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Having discussed how the experimental work presented in chapters 4 
through 7 can help us understand the factors that determine when this occurs 
and the possible underlying mechanisms, I will now turn to the last two 
sections of this thesis, which try to capture how the research presented here 
can contribute to wider academic literature (focusing on introspection, error 
detection and preferential choice) and the potential of applying such 
knowledge respectively.  
8.4 Implications for Research 
In chapter 2 of this thesis, I put forward three areas that appear to be 
closely intertwined with the false feedback acceptance effects discussed in 
this thesis; introspection, error detection and preferential choice. I will now 
briefly discuss how the findings reported in this thesis contribute to such 
phenomena.  
The very nature of accepting false feedback that contradicts the 
information we recently provided about the self, questions our ability to be 
introspective, or access the information about our own attitudes, actions and 
what brought them about. Across the experiments presented here, we provide 
further evidence that false feedback is indeed often accepted, therefore 
questioning our introspective abilities. Nonetheless, the research also shows 
some hope for the knowledge of ourselves by demonstrating that some 
conditions can increases mismatch detections which in turn suggests higher 
introspective access. For example, chapters 4 and 5 show that if feedback 
provided is not advantageous and negatively affects our self-image we are 
likely to detect its inaccuracy. Furthermore, if the feedback encountered does 
not seem probable, for example, if we do not remember considering it 
(chapter 3), we also have a heightened ability to detect its falsehood.  
This suggests that whilst we may not hold a precise description of our 
personality profiles, or preference order as a precise list, we must have the 
ability to access relevant past experiences and emotional associations. For 
example, in order to reject negative feedback, we need to access information 
that suggests ‘this is bad for me’, or when we reject feedback that was not a 
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part of the choice, we must be able to compare to it to the knowledge of what 
we had seen in the past. Perhaps the research outlined does not call for 
labelling introspective information unreliable, but instead a reconsideration 
of what it means to be introspective. 
This further has important implications for error detection. The 
support for the notion that people tend to accept false feedback can be viewed 
as a demonstration of failure to detect errors regardless of whether we treat 
that information as suggestive that we made an error or that some external 
factor has led to an error being made. The research, however, is also 
reassuring as it suggests that by defining tasks in a particular way can 
maximise our ability to detect mismatches between our intentions and the 
environment. For example, at this stage we can suggest that extending 
decision sets to three instead of two choices can increase our ability to monitor 
the choice that was made (chapter 5), similarly it appears that when dealing 
with choosing from a small set of alternatives we are better off phrasing the 
task in a positive manner (i.e., which one do you prefer; chapter 6), whilst 
past research indicates that when rejecting alternatives to narrow down the 
item pool asking people to reject the unwanted  alternatives can result in a 
higher choice consistency (Kogut, 2011). Another positive finding comes 
from chapter 4 of this thesis, as it suggests that even when we fail to detect 
an error it does not mean that error is necessarily incorporated into our beliefs 
system, or that it will impact how we treat information at a later date.  
It must be noted that in many instances it is unclear why we fail to 
detect errors, given that we have evolved specialised neural systems to do so 
(see Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Yeung et al., 2004). However, by clarifying 
circumstances in which error detection is high or low we are making a step in 
the right direction to determine how the human mind adapts to dealing with 
the imprecise and error-prone world. Perhaps now that we have built up some 
understanding using behavioural data, we can start introducing biological 
measures to decipher what this means. For instance, an EEG study measuring 
error-related negativity (Gehring, 1992) produced during the Barnum 
procedure or choice blindness can inform us whether not invalid information 
is detected as error at all, or whether this is simply not transferred to our 
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consciousness. This can, in turn, be used to understand why some 
circumstances are more prone to error than others (as discussed in chapters 5 
through 7) and help identify how to maximise error detection. Alternatively, 
monitoring the activity in the anterior cingulate cortex during the choice 
blindness task can tell us if a person is experiencing discomfort, or dissonance 
(van Veen, Krug, Schooler & Carter, 2009), and help us test the cognitive 
dissonance explanation of choice blindness. Whilst continuing behavioural 
research that identifies situational factors that can improve choice monitoring 
and is no doubt of value in academic and practical application settings alike, 
expanding the approach can aid the interpretation of the behavioural data and 
help formulate a comprehensive model of feedback acceptance. 
Lastly, I would like to touch on the impact my findings may have on 
our understanding of preferential choice. In chapter 3, I discussed how 
understanding violations of rational choice theory is crucial to developing 
descriptive models of how the mind operates, which has been a challenge 
academics have been trying to tackle for the last half a century (e.g., 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Choice blindness (Johansson et al., 2005) was 
one of the latest of such violations, demonstrating that we are unable to access 
a stable representation of our preference, or even to use a recently made 
choice to inform the task of justifying a decision (that we did not make). 
Beyond demonstrating that we fail to think like rational agents, choice 
blindness has also provided us with a way to measure choice stability, or the 
extent to which a stated preference is likely to remain the same regardless of 
external influences. 
In the past, choice stability has been measured through choice 
consistency, or the elicitation of the same outcome across different points in 
time, with research often reporting that people fail to remain consistent across 
two choices on about 25% of trials (Camerer, 1989; Hey, 2001; Loomes & 
Sugden, 1998).  Here I compared the detection of invalid feedback, to the 
rates of consistency across trials reported in past literature. Specifically, I 
investigated whether increasing the number of choice alternatives, as well as 
whether negative framing of the task, can improve choice stability 
demonstrated through the choice blindness task, as would be hypothesised 
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from past literature using choice consistency to measure stability (DeShazo 
& Fermo, 2002; Collins & Vossler, 2009, Kogut, 2011). In comparing the rate 
of choice blindness for two and three-alternative tasks, I find that ternary 
choice is indeed more stable than binary, however, this effect only occurs 
when the alternatives presented are of different visual similarity and level of 
attractiveness. Nonetheless, since past research fails to control for such 
characteristics of the alternatives presented, it is possible that the same effect 
would be observed for choice consistency, suggesting that choice blindness 
and choice consistency are likely to reflect the same inherent characteristics 
of choice processes.  
On the other hand, in exploring how framing impacts the level of 
choice blindness, I find that people are more likely to detect invalid feedback 
when both the choice and justification elements of the task are framed 
positively, contrary to what we would expect from Kogut’s (2011) work on 
choice consistency. However, there are also a number of procedural 
differences that could have led to the discrepancy in conclusions, including 
the difference in number of alternatives presented and selected, and the fact 
that Kogut (2011) measured consistency of choices with previously stated 
opinions, and the current research attempts to measure the consistency 
between a choice and its direct outcome (for detailed discussion of the 
differences see chapter 6). Whether it is the procedural difference that led to 
this discrepancy, or that choice blindness and choice consistency do indeed 
reflect different cognitive mechanisms remains unclear, and requires further 
research. All I conclude is that as far as the choice blindness procedure is 
concerned, increasing the number of alternatives and framing the choice and 
judgement tasks in a positive manner can increase false feedback detection, 
and thus improve at least some form of choice stability.  
Chapter 4 provides another interesting contribution to how we 
perceive preferential choice. Past research has shown false feedback 
acceptance can shape our preferences. For example, Johansson et al. (2014) 
demonstrated that accepting feedback that suggests the non-preferred 
alternative was, in fact, preferred results in higher likelihood of that 
alternative being selected in the future. Similarly, information about the self, 
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such as high extraversion, has been shown to impact subsequent social 
interactions (Sakamoto et al., 2000). Accordingly, by integrating the two lines 
of research, we can hypothesise that presenting people with information about 
their own characteristics which are directly related to preferences, should 
impact actual subsequent preferences, as long as people accept the feedback 
presented as accurate. However, in the experiment presented in chapter 4, I 
find that risk preference as demonstrated in choosing between certain and 
risky lotteries is not affected by accepting altered information about one’s 
own financial risk preference. This suggests that risk preferences are not as 
malleable, as one would hypothesise based on previous research, at least in 
some circumstances. 
Overall, it seems clear that false feedback acceptance can help us 
decipher when choices are more stable, allowing us to more accurately 
describe and predict preferential choice behaviours. I have attempted to 
outline the small contribution my own work presents for the broader 
understanding, however, there is still a long way to go before we have a 
comprehensive theory of preferential choice. Personally, I feel that it may be 
time to pause and reflect on how the breadth of knowledge we have 
accumulated over the last century combines together and whether approaches 
from other disciplines, such as Barnum effect as a product of psychometric 
evaluation literature, can come together. Such a task is not, however, in the 
scope of this PhD thesis. Before concluding this thesis, I will now briefly 
discuss one last area to which the empirical work presented here is relevant, 
the potential for practical applications. 
8.5 Relevance to application 
Lastly, I would like to briefly discuss the practical implications of my 
work, and choice blindness more broadly. Like most academic research, the 
Barnum procedure and the choice blindness paradigm are usually carried out 
under strictly control experimental conditions with abstract choices of little 
consequence to the decision maker. Although this provides the rigour needed 
in academia, it makes it difficult to simply take the procedure and apply it to 
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real world behavioural change, and yet I am often asked whether that is what 
I intend to do.  
One question is whether acceptance of false feedback provides a 
“magic bullet” for behaviour change to replace ‘bad’ preferences with ‘good’ 
ones, for example, if a person struggling to eat healthily can we simply tell 
them that they chose a healthy option (e.g., apple) as opposed to an unhealthy 
option (e.g., chocolate) when ordering their lunch. I think this is very unlikely. 
Firstly, as Somerville and McGowan (2016) demonstrated in their application 
of choice blindness to familiar chocolate brands, only a very small proportion 
of people experience choice blindness for items with which they have had 
ample experience. Second, comparing apples with chocolates requires using 
two discrete categories of items in inducing choice blindness, this is yet to be 
investigated directly, however, research into similarity deems this endeavour 
unlikely to be successful (see chapter 5). Last but not least, no research would 
advocate the use of false feedback in real life, as this would be unethical under 
almost all circumstances. In academic research, participants are informed of 
their rights, only participate if they consent to do so, often pre-decide if they 
are willing to take part in deception based research (see Prolific Academic 
sign up agreement), and receive a full debrief at the end of the experiment. 
The inability to follow these steps in real life could have many adverse 
consequences from perceived loss of control to loss of trust in society, not to 
mention it is a direct violation of people’s right to choose. 
Although the use of paradigms that utilise false feedback is unlikely 
in real life situations, the insights we gained from the research within the 
choice blindness domain can have many important implications. Questions 
such as ‘Which decision types are prone to manipulation?’ or ‘How do we 
elicit the most stable choices?’ can be useful in many different contexts. One 
area which has already become a focus of choice blindness research is 
eyewitness testimony. Sagana and colleagues (Sauerland et al., 2013; Sagana 
et al., 2013; Sagana et al., 2014b; Sagana, Sauerland & Merckelbach, 2016) 
have established that choice blindness does in-fact occur in field studies that 
closely resemble the process undergone by witnesses in real life, questioning 
the validity of eyewitness identification overall. The aim of the research, 
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however, is not to destroy the legal system, but to understand how eyewitness 
decisions are made and how these can be improved. For example, does the 
fact that distortion of the decision made in an identification task (through 
choice blindness) can lead to strengthening an invalid identification later 
(Sagana et al., 2014a) suggest that we should avoid using multiple 
identification processes? The answers perhaps are not as straight forward as 
the questions involved given the practical limitations of changing procedure, 
but in the very least the research based information can identify which 
decisions may be invalid.  
The research presented in the current thesis suggests that people are 
more prone to the inability to monitor their choices when the alternatives 
presented are similar versus dissimilar, when there are two options to choose 
from compared to three, and when they are asked to reject as opposed to select 
their choice. I propose that it is in-fact this error-prone procedure that is most 
conducive to our legal system, as if the suspect presented within the possible 
alternatives is identified correctly within an error prone scenario it is more 
likely that the choice was made based on established knowledge. This 
however, is only applicable when only one suspect is presented within a line-
up and the incorrect nature of choosing any other alternative can be 
established with certainty.  
The eyewitness procedure is outside the scope of this thesis and my 
vision of how knowledge of what type of circumstances are prone to error 
should be used is nothing more than a personal hypothesis (see Sagana, 2015 
for discussion). However, whilst the robustness of eyewitness testimony 
remains an area of concern, research that helps identify what makes decisions 
prone to error, including choice blindness and the Barnum effect, will remain 
relevant. In fact, this statement applies to any field that involves assessing the 
validity of information or making choices with large consequences, especially 
when others may have a vested interest in the outcome.  
False feedback acceptance research also holds important implications 
for clinical diagnoses and treatment. Consider work by Halperin and Snyder 
(1979) which demonstrates that feedback that suggests high susceptibility to 
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change can increase susceptibility to therapy. If this is really the case, perhaps 
the benefits of using false feedback can outweigh the ethical concerns 
associated with its use. On the other hand, research in chapter 4 suggests that 
changing responses with the use of false feedback is harder than anticipated 
and cautions us about the need for research validation before considering any 
form of applications. Alternatively, false feedback can also play an interesting 
role in the understanding of clinical symptoms as opposed to their direct 
treatment. For example, Aardema et al.’s (2014) findings that susceptibility 
to choice blindness is linked with traits associated with obsessive compulsive 
disorder, as well as scores on the schizotypal and depression scales. Whilst 
the knowledge itself doesn’t constitute application, perhaps with better 
understanding when choice blindness occurs and how it can be minimised we 
can begin to develop more accurate diagnoses and treatments in turn. 
Overall, the Barnum effect and choice blindness might not be directly 
transferrable to the real world, however, they do have important implications 
for how we can minimise the influence of error or manipulations on the 
decisions that we make. Every study that reveals something new about how 
we treat invalid information, can in turn, be considered a contribution to real 
life problems. 
* * * 
 In summary, throughout this thesis, I attempted to outline the 
importance and characteristics of false feedback acceptance phenomena, 
namely the Barnum effect, or the tendency to accept false feedback about 
one’s own personality, and choice blindness, or the tendency to accept false 
feedback about one’s choices. In the introductory chapters, I presented the 
case for relevance of such work to our understanding of introspective ability, 
error detection and preferential choice, as well as cognition more generally, 
and went on to outline what we know about false feedback acceptance. More 
specifically, discussion was dedicated to establishing that task domain, 
similarity and favourability of feedback, and factors that are known to 
contribute to task ambiguity, such as time and problem frame, are likely to 
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contribute to the likelihood of false feedback acceptance. In the original 
empirical work presented in this thesis, I provided further evidence that false 
feedback about the self is often accepted as accurate, for both the Barnum 
effect and choice blindness, and that the likelihood of such acceptance can 
indeed be altered by varying the task at hand. For the first time, I 
demonstrated that choice blindness can be achieved using alternatives outside 
of the task as feedback, and that the likelihood of detecting invalid feedback 
is decreased when using negatively framed task instructions, and three as 
opposed to two alternative tasks. I further reported that whilst false feedback 
acceptance has been found to impact subsequent behaviours in the past, using 
the Barnum effect to achieve such change is not always successful. The 
research outlined has enhanced the knowledge of when and why false 
feedback acceptance occurs and the potential subsequent effects, contributing 
to our understanding of how self-monitoring can be improved more generally. 
This is a small step to creating a comprehensive picture of human cognition, 
and as proposed throughout this work the benefits that can be gained from 
studying false feedback acceptance are far from exhausted and hold a lot of 
potential for future academic work.    
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